Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
10 päivää sitten
6,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
1,72 %Tuotto/v
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
467
Myynti
Määrä
525
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67 | - | - | ||
| 33 | - | - | ||
| 27 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 40 | - | - |
Ylin
350VWAP
Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
VWAP
Ylin
350Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 25.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 20.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 19.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
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Kirjaudu
·2 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the chapter closed after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for the part of the banks that, both relatively and absolutely, do not have control over costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore about 20 times according to the same template have had to state that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as background, I have experienced that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This basic principle applies regardless of whether it is a private economy, a business economy, or a national economy. Where the managers of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations for the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders than just the shareholders. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the helm on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and no goal for the cost ratio is mentioned, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: ”The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost ratio.” (I don't think I'm claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF 3rd quarter report 2025: ”Our cost ratio must be reduced and by the financial year 2026 at the latest be below 50 %” 3. Danske Bank has in its ”Forward 28”-strategy set a concrete goal for a cost ratio of maximum 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from 1st quarter 2023 to 3rd quarter 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why 1st quarter 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. It is true that interest rates have fallen during the period (but that is the same for all banks), but otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it can be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only 17 listed banks included in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I exclude Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark. (continued)·2 t sitten(continued) Overall, the conclusion cannot be otherwise: It is expensive to be small. When the headwinds inevitably arrive one day, it may well be that the small banks have cushioned themselves well compared to historical levels – but from a shareholder perspective, it's not far to losses. The most obvious suggestion must be that SJF Bank should consider whether it's not soon time to enter through the front door on Møn and/or Lolland to find a solution. It sounds extremely cynical, but the latest announcements from SJF Bank regarding staff reductions precisely show an understanding that efficiencies must occur during prosperous times. Thus, we also have the outlines for a scenario that, in my opinion, will happen sooner or later. The moment that Nordfyns Bank's management misunderstood was that they assumed that the voting right restrictions exempted them from the shareholders' judgment. It turned out to be directly the opposite. Therefore, the only way the managements of Møns Bank and Lollands Bank can postpone the scenario where they are taken over by a larger bank is by creating significant improvements in their ordinary banking operations.
·11.8.Declaration of war on SJF Bank: Møns Bank will open a branch in Køge in September. Køge is located 27 km east of SJF Bank's headquarters in Ringsted. SJF Bank is trying to corner Møns Bank. Things went horribly wrong for the large plumbing wholesaler Sanistål when it cornered AO in the 00s. AO survived; Sanistål did not! This cornering is not going that drastically, but I take my hat off to Møns Bank.
·17.8.SJF is headquartered in Holbæk. But I thought the same thing when I saw the sign in the kitchen today. That they are protecting themselves from a takeover by opening up in cities where SJF has branches and thereby becoming less attractive. However, one could counterarguments that SJF could create immediate savings by closing branches in a takeover.·22.8.Yes, I messed it up: It's Sjællandske Nyheder, not SJF Bank, which has its headquarters in Ringsted. On the other hand, I've been wondering if Møns Bank or Lollands Bank are on their way to Copenhagen. Skjern Bank has had bottom-line success with that (but was cheated by a - now former - lawyer who is known for laundering money in lawsuits).- ·31.7.In a merger, the exchange ratio between the shares is naturally a topic that is surrounded by, to put it mildly, lively interest. :) The sum of Møns Bank's shareholders' annual results over the past five years is 283 million. DKK, while it is 402 million. DKK for Lollands Bank. If this is used, Møns Bank's shareholders could get 283/(283+402) = approx. 41% of the shares in the merged bank. Two things could argue for it being a little more, e.g. 45%. One is that the smallest merger partner is typically given a little extra. The other is that Møns Bank is growing faster than Lollands Bank. Whether it will be one or the other should not be decisive, however. The important thing is to put a brake on SJF Bank's purchase of shares at a sale price. Just by merging Møns Bank and Lollands Bank, the sale will be stopped!
- ·10.7.HOVSA! I've discovered something: First I saw the price chart for Møns Bank. Then I checked the trading of the share on Nasdaq. Then it got interesting. And I started checking dates. Technically, the Møns Bank share has been in a positive channel since the beginning of April. The channel is supported by volume, i.e. the price increases occur during heavy trading. This is a sign of further increases. Right after Nordfyns Bank and Fynske Bank first announced their merger plan on May 6, the Møns Bank share rose during good trading. The overall picture of this is that Møns Bank is seen as a merger or acquisition object. But there's more: SJF Bank had 25% of the shares in Nordfyns Bank, but remained remarkably silent about its position on the merger for a long time. It sold all of its shares in Nordfyns Bank, which was announced to the stock exchange on June 23. On June 27, the price of Møns Bank rose a lot during heavy trading. On the same day, the stock exchange was informed that SJF Bank had acquired over 10% of the shares in Møns Bank. Isn't it a really good guess that SJF Bank had A PLAN already at the beginning of May, right after the merger announcement on Funen? If Møns Bank merges with Lollands Bank, the price will rise. Then SJF Bank will get fewer shares for its money in the future. Wouldn't it be a good answer if Møns Bank and Lollands Bank make A PLAN to merge?
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
10 päivää sitten
6,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
1,72 %Tuotto/v
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
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Kirjaudu
- ·2 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the chapter closed after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for the part of the banks that, both relatively and absolutely, do not have control over costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore about 20 times according to the same template have had to state that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as background, I have experienced that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This basic principle applies regardless of whether it is a private economy, a business economy, or a national economy. Where the managers of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations for the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders than just the shareholders. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the helm on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and no goal for the cost ratio is mentioned, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: ”The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost ratio.” (I don't think I'm claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF 3rd quarter report 2025: ”Our cost ratio must be reduced and by the financial year 2026 at the latest be below 50 %” 3. Danske Bank has in its ”Forward 28”-strategy set a concrete goal for a cost ratio of maximum 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from 1st quarter 2023 to 3rd quarter 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why 1st quarter 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. It is true that interest rates have fallen during the period (but that is the same for all banks), but otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it can be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only 17 listed banks included in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I exclude Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark. (continued)·2 t sitten(continued) Overall, the conclusion cannot be otherwise: It is expensive to be small. When the headwinds inevitably arrive one day, it may well be that the small banks have cushioned themselves well compared to historical levels – but from a shareholder perspective, it's not far to losses. The most obvious suggestion must be that SJF Bank should consider whether it's not soon time to enter through the front door on Møn and/or Lolland to find a solution. It sounds extremely cynical, but the latest announcements from SJF Bank regarding staff reductions precisely show an understanding that efficiencies must occur during prosperous times. Thus, we also have the outlines for a scenario that, in my opinion, will happen sooner or later. The moment that Nordfyns Bank's management misunderstood was that they assumed that the voting right restrictions exempted them from the shareholders' judgment. It turned out to be directly the opposite. Therefore, the only way the managements of Møns Bank and Lollands Bank can postpone the scenario where they are taken over by a larger bank is by creating significant improvements in their ordinary banking operations.
- ·11.8.Declaration of war on SJF Bank: Møns Bank will open a branch in Køge in September. Køge is located 27 km east of SJF Bank's headquarters in Ringsted. SJF Bank is trying to corner Møns Bank. Things went horribly wrong for the large plumbing wholesaler Sanistål when it cornered AO in the 00s. AO survived; Sanistål did not! This cornering is not going that drastically, but I take my hat off to Møns Bank.·17.8.SJF is headquartered in Holbæk. But I thought the same thing when I saw the sign in the kitchen today. That they are protecting themselves from a takeover by opening up in cities where SJF has branches and thereby becoming less attractive. However, one could counterarguments that SJF could create immediate savings by closing branches in a takeover.·22.8.Yes, I messed it up: It's Sjællandske Nyheder, not SJF Bank, which has its headquarters in Ringsted. On the other hand, I've been wondering if Møns Bank or Lollands Bank are on their way to Copenhagen. Skjern Bank has had bottom-line success with that (but was cheated by a - now former - lawyer who is known for laundering money in lawsuits).
- ·31.7.In a merger, the exchange ratio between the shares is naturally a topic that is surrounded by, to put it mildly, lively interest. :) The sum of Møns Bank's shareholders' annual results over the past five years is 283 million. DKK, while it is 402 million. DKK for Lollands Bank. If this is used, Møns Bank's shareholders could get 283/(283+402) = approx. 41% of the shares in the merged bank. Two things could argue for it being a little more, e.g. 45%. One is that the smallest merger partner is typically given a little extra. The other is that Møns Bank is growing faster than Lollands Bank. Whether it will be one or the other should not be decisive, however. The important thing is to put a brake on SJF Bank's purchase of shares at a sale price. Just by merging Møns Bank and Lollands Bank, the sale will be stopped!
- ·10.7.HOVSA! I've discovered something: First I saw the price chart for Møns Bank. Then I checked the trading of the share on Nasdaq. Then it got interesting. And I started checking dates. Technically, the Møns Bank share has been in a positive channel since the beginning of April. The channel is supported by volume, i.e. the price increases occur during heavy trading. This is a sign of further increases. Right after Nordfyns Bank and Fynske Bank first announced their merger plan on May 6, the Møns Bank share rose during good trading. The overall picture of this is that Møns Bank is seen as a merger or acquisition object. But there's more: SJF Bank had 25% of the shares in Nordfyns Bank, but remained remarkably silent about its position on the merger for a long time. It sold all of its shares in Nordfyns Bank, which was announced to the stock exchange on June 23. On June 27, the price of Møns Bank rose a lot during heavy trading. On the same day, the stock exchange was informed that SJF Bank had acquired over 10% of the shares in Møns Bank. Isn't it a really good guess that SJF Bank had A PLAN already at the beginning of May, right after the merger announcement on Funen? If Møns Bank merges with Lollands Bank, the price will rise. Then SJF Bank will get fewer shares for its money in the future. Wouldn't it be a good answer if Møns Bank and Lollands Bank make A PLAN to merge?
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
467
Myynti
Määrä
525
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67 | - | - | ||
| 33 | - | - | ||
| 27 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 40 | - | - |
Ylin
350VWAP
Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
VWAP
Ylin
350Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 25.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 20.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 19.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
10 päivää sitten
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 25.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 20.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 19.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
6,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
1,72 %Tuotto/v
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·2 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the chapter closed after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for the part of the banks that, both relatively and absolutely, do not have control over costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore about 20 times according to the same template have had to state that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as background, I have experienced that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This basic principle applies regardless of whether it is a private economy, a business economy, or a national economy. Where the managers of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations for the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders than just the shareholders. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the helm on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and no goal for the cost ratio is mentioned, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: ”The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost ratio.” (I don't think I'm claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF 3rd quarter report 2025: ”Our cost ratio must be reduced and by the financial year 2026 at the latest be below 50 %” 3. Danske Bank has in its ”Forward 28”-strategy set a concrete goal for a cost ratio of maximum 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from 1st quarter 2023 to 3rd quarter 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why 1st quarter 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. It is true that interest rates have fallen during the period (but that is the same for all banks), but otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it can be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only 17 listed banks included in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I exclude Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark. (continued)·2 t sitten(continued) Overall, the conclusion cannot be otherwise: It is expensive to be small. When the headwinds inevitably arrive one day, it may well be that the small banks have cushioned themselves well compared to historical levels – but from a shareholder perspective, it's not far to losses. The most obvious suggestion must be that SJF Bank should consider whether it's not soon time to enter through the front door on Møn and/or Lolland to find a solution. It sounds extremely cynical, but the latest announcements from SJF Bank regarding staff reductions precisely show an understanding that efficiencies must occur during prosperous times. Thus, we also have the outlines for a scenario that, in my opinion, will happen sooner or later. The moment that Nordfyns Bank's management misunderstood was that they assumed that the voting right restrictions exempted them from the shareholders' judgment. It turned out to be directly the opposite. Therefore, the only way the managements of Møns Bank and Lollands Bank can postpone the scenario where they are taken over by a larger bank is by creating significant improvements in their ordinary banking operations.
- ·11.8.Declaration of war on SJF Bank: Møns Bank will open a branch in Køge in September. Køge is located 27 km east of SJF Bank's headquarters in Ringsted. SJF Bank is trying to corner Møns Bank. Things went horribly wrong for the large plumbing wholesaler Sanistål when it cornered AO in the 00s. AO survived; Sanistål did not! This cornering is not going that drastically, but I take my hat off to Møns Bank.·17.8.SJF is headquartered in Holbæk. But I thought the same thing when I saw the sign in the kitchen today. That they are protecting themselves from a takeover by opening up in cities where SJF has branches and thereby becoming less attractive. However, one could counterarguments that SJF could create immediate savings by closing branches in a takeover.·22.8.Yes, I messed it up: It's Sjællandske Nyheder, not SJF Bank, which has its headquarters in Ringsted. On the other hand, I've been wondering if Møns Bank or Lollands Bank are on their way to Copenhagen. Skjern Bank has had bottom-line success with that (but was cheated by a - now former - lawyer who is known for laundering money in lawsuits).
- ·31.7.In a merger, the exchange ratio between the shares is naturally a topic that is surrounded by, to put it mildly, lively interest. :) The sum of Møns Bank's shareholders' annual results over the past five years is 283 million. DKK, while it is 402 million. DKK for Lollands Bank. If this is used, Møns Bank's shareholders could get 283/(283+402) = approx. 41% of the shares in the merged bank. Two things could argue for it being a little more, e.g. 45%. One is that the smallest merger partner is typically given a little extra. The other is that Møns Bank is growing faster than Lollands Bank. Whether it will be one or the other should not be decisive, however. The important thing is to put a brake on SJF Bank's purchase of shares at a sale price. Just by merging Møns Bank and Lollands Bank, the sale will be stopped!
- ·10.7.HOVSA! I've discovered something: First I saw the price chart for Møns Bank. Then I checked the trading of the share on Nasdaq. Then it got interesting. And I started checking dates. Technically, the Møns Bank share has been in a positive channel since the beginning of April. The channel is supported by volume, i.e. the price increases occur during heavy trading. This is a sign of further increases. Right after Nordfyns Bank and Fynske Bank first announced their merger plan on May 6, the Møns Bank share rose during good trading. The overall picture of this is that Møns Bank is seen as a merger or acquisition object. But there's more: SJF Bank had 25% of the shares in Nordfyns Bank, but remained remarkably silent about its position on the merger for a long time. It sold all of its shares in Nordfyns Bank, which was announced to the stock exchange on June 23. On June 27, the price of Møns Bank rose a lot during heavy trading. On the same day, the stock exchange was informed that SJF Bank had acquired over 10% of the shares in Møns Bank. Isn't it a really good guess that SJF Bank had A PLAN already at the beginning of May, right after the merger announcement on Funen? If Møns Bank merges with Lollands Bank, the price will rise. Then SJF Bank will get fewer shares for its money in the future. Wouldn't it be a good answer if Møns Bank and Lollands Bank make A PLAN to merge?
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Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
467
Myynti
Määrä
525
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67 | - | - | ||
| 33 | - | - | ||
| 27 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 40 | - | - |
Ylin
350VWAP
Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
VWAP
Ylin
350Alin
344VaihtoMäärä
0,1 333
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt