2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
50 päivää sitten
‧38 min
1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | - | - | ||
| 55 120 | - | - | ||
| 16 731 | - | - | ||
| 10 967 | - | - | ||
| 737 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 4.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 16.7. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 25.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 7.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 |
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·1 t sittenI throw in the towel here, delete previous posts, and realize that I was wrong. A "detail" is not sufficiently clear and has a fundamental significance for SBB. Page 18 in the Q2, 2026 report for Sveafastigheter (and corresponding items in PPI, etc), under cash flow, shows "Investment in properties" at 604mSEK in the period Jan–Jun 2026. On page 5 of the same report, it appears that 213 mSEK of this was destined for properties under management. This corresponds to 416 mSEK per year. On page 11, it appears that "earnings capacity" per year, before tax, is 477 mSEK. We are further informed that 237 housing units were upgraded in the period, out of the total portfolio of 15,258. This corresponds to (237*2)/15.258 = 3,%, i.e., 1:32. The point? ALL cash generation disappears into apartment upgrades. If these had been investments, then fine. But in reality, upgrading each apartment once every 32nd year cannot be anything other than necessary maintenance, and thereby effectively a cost? And if it had been real investments, where then is the depreciation, i.e., the cost side? They simply don't exist. So if we fundamentally consider these "investments" as costs, then earnings capacity goes to zero. And that corresponds to what we can actually see from the cash flow statement: Today, the business is not able to generate a single krone in cash. If the companies are to be able to generate cash, I really only see four theoretical ways: i. Radical change in net operating income. Unless major regulatory changes occur in these regulated housing agreements, I cannot see that anything substantial can be achieved here. If we look at Sveafastigheter, the increase in net operating income was 3,2% like-for-like. And that is AFTER investments in upgrades have been made. It is completely irrelevant. ii. The Development side starts to generate a lot of cash. First and foremost, this is a small part of the whole, secondly (and it would take too long to describe an analysis of this part here) there is no relevant contribution either today or in the forecasts. iii. Accounting P/L gain combined with increased borrowing enables dividends. Absolutely a possibility, and perhaps what shareholders hope for. But for that to happen, it must happen despite the fundamentals, not because of them. As the situation is now, there is no fundamental reason (read: Underlying value creation and cash generation) for the values of the properties to increase. iv. Massive sale of properties, debt payment, liquidation of the company and payment to shareholders. Good possibility, but nothing indicates this. The question is also: Who is interested in paying "fair value" for the used housing stock? Neither theoretically would anyone want this, ref. the calculation above (zero cash generated), in practice Klarabo, which is much smaller, was unable to get a cash bid that was better than a merger with Svea, and if someone were still able to buy and turn this into a cash machine, well, then that just means they would be able to operate more economically rationally than Sveafastigheter. Hoping for a sale, as the situation is today, is really hoping for a sale to "a bigger fool". To summarize: SBB's subsidiaries, when we adjust for absolutely essential maintenance, are unable to produce cash. Knowing that Sveafastigheter is integrated into SBB's balance sheet, because SBB is the majority owner, we also know that SBB's equity is inflated by 5 kroner per share, as Svea appears at book value and not market value of the shareholding. Assessed at market value, SBB's equity would not be more than approx. 3 kroner per share. I, and no one, can know if the share price will go up for SBB. But I think this seems more and more like Buffett's investment in Berkshire as a textile company, according to himself his most idiotic investment ever. Read his "Letter to shareholders" for the first 10-15 years and see how capital increasingly disappeared from practically zero-return in the textile business to investments in value-creating and cash-generating businesses. We see the confirmation when Svea "proudly" shows that they have a "Yield-on-cost" of 6% on investments in appartment upgrades (which are fundamentally more necessary maintenance than real investments). 6%? So instead of paying dividends to shareholders, who can expect a 12% return in the stock market, one chooses to invest in upgrades that yield 6%? There is no economic rationale behind this, other than to "buy" growth in net operating income, at a far too high price. Alternatively: This is highly necessary maintenance that must be carried out, as the apartments can no longer be rented out in the condition they are in. But then Svea and Klara generate absolutely nothing over time. (Note: PPI is a bit better on this dimension, but in practice the argument is the same here too). Good weekend and thanks for my time SBB, Svea, Klarabo and PPI. Never again, and thanks for the reminder to read the cash flow side, and not just P/L and the balance sheet.
·7 t sittenWaiting for shareholder value to be realized…
Then you have to wait with the patience of an angel. There is no interest from the management's side to create any value; it's about maintaining a position of power and not changing the ownership structure. Every company with sound thoughts would come up with something, e.g., a share issue, and raise money and turn around the loss figures.
·3 päivää sittenFunny with the DI editorial team Today it is written what a nice discount there is in Lundbergs when they summarize Lundbergs' all shareholdings in underlying owned shares with P/E ratios of approx 20-40 and valuation above book value. When the DI editorial team writes about SBB and their underlying companies, all of which have a large discount against book value, the tone is different, implying the properties are dilapidated castles with inflated values. I must cancel my subscription to DI- ·3 päivää sittenIt is written that short sellers have made a lot of money on short selling. But they don't do that until they have bought and returned the shares. I.e., when the short position has gone down sharply, the short sellers' trade is safe, but right now they are very far out at sea. Since the short interest is still above 15%, it will be interesting to see where the price goes when the short sellers are to secure their profit.
·31.8.Can someone bring some good news!
The merger between Klarabo and Svea will significantly increase earnings in SBB. You can see that directly in the report for Q3 on earning capacity in SBB and in Svea. Then you will want to see it in the Q4 report 2026. The leverage also decreases significantly in SBB.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
50 päivää sitten
‧38 min
1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·1 t sittenI throw in the towel here, delete previous posts, and realize that I was wrong. A "detail" is not sufficiently clear and has a fundamental significance for SBB. Page 18 in the Q2, 2026 report for Sveafastigheter (and corresponding items in PPI, etc), under cash flow, shows "Investment in properties" at 604mSEK in the period Jan–Jun 2026. On page 5 of the same report, it appears that 213 mSEK of this was destined for properties under management. This corresponds to 416 mSEK per year. On page 11, it appears that "earnings capacity" per year, before tax, is 477 mSEK. We are further informed that 237 housing units were upgraded in the period, out of the total portfolio of 15,258. This corresponds to (237*2)/15.258 = 3,%, i.e., 1:32. The point? ALL cash generation disappears into apartment upgrades. If these had been investments, then fine. But in reality, upgrading each apartment once every 32nd year cannot be anything other than necessary maintenance, and thereby effectively a cost? And if it had been real investments, where then is the depreciation, i.e., the cost side? They simply don't exist. So if we fundamentally consider these "investments" as costs, then earnings capacity goes to zero. And that corresponds to what we can actually see from the cash flow statement: Today, the business is not able to generate a single krone in cash. If the companies are to be able to generate cash, I really only see four theoretical ways: i. Radical change in net operating income. Unless major regulatory changes occur in these regulated housing agreements, I cannot see that anything substantial can be achieved here. If we look at Sveafastigheter, the increase in net operating income was 3,2% like-for-like. And that is AFTER investments in upgrades have been made. It is completely irrelevant. ii. The Development side starts to generate a lot of cash. First and foremost, this is a small part of the whole, secondly (and it would take too long to describe an analysis of this part here) there is no relevant contribution either today or in the forecasts. iii. Accounting P/L gain combined with increased borrowing enables dividends. Absolutely a possibility, and perhaps what shareholders hope for. But for that to happen, it must happen despite the fundamentals, not because of them. As the situation is now, there is no fundamental reason (read: Underlying value creation and cash generation) for the values of the properties to increase. iv. Massive sale of properties, debt payment, liquidation of the company and payment to shareholders. Good possibility, but nothing indicates this. The question is also: Who is interested in paying "fair value" for the used housing stock? Neither theoretically would anyone want this, ref. the calculation above (zero cash generated), in practice Klarabo, which is much smaller, was unable to get a cash bid that was better than a merger with Svea, and if someone were still able to buy and turn this into a cash machine, well, then that just means they would be able to operate more economically rationally than Sveafastigheter. Hoping for a sale, as the situation is today, is really hoping for a sale to "a bigger fool". To summarize: SBB's subsidiaries, when we adjust for absolutely essential maintenance, are unable to produce cash. Knowing that Sveafastigheter is integrated into SBB's balance sheet, because SBB is the majority owner, we also know that SBB's equity is inflated by 5 kroner per share, as Svea appears at book value and not market value of the shareholding. Assessed at market value, SBB's equity would not be more than approx. 3 kroner per share. I, and no one, can know if the share price will go up for SBB. But I think this seems more and more like Buffett's investment in Berkshire as a textile company, according to himself his most idiotic investment ever. Read his "Letter to shareholders" for the first 10-15 years and see how capital increasingly disappeared from practically zero-return in the textile business to investments in value-creating and cash-generating businesses. We see the confirmation when Svea "proudly" shows that they have a "Yield-on-cost" of 6% on investments in appartment upgrades (which are fundamentally more necessary maintenance than real investments). 6%? So instead of paying dividends to shareholders, who can expect a 12% return in the stock market, one chooses to invest in upgrades that yield 6%? There is no economic rationale behind this, other than to "buy" growth in net operating income, at a far too high price. Alternatively: This is highly necessary maintenance that must be carried out, as the apartments can no longer be rented out in the condition they are in. But then Svea and Klara generate absolutely nothing over time. (Note: PPI is a bit better on this dimension, but in practice the argument is the same here too). Good weekend and thanks for my time SBB, Svea, Klarabo and PPI. Never again, and thanks for the reminder to read the cash flow side, and not just P/L and the balance sheet.
- ·7 t sittenWaiting for shareholder value to be realized…Then you have to wait with the patience of an angel. There is no interest from the management's side to create any value; it's about maintaining a position of power and not changing the ownership structure. Every company with sound thoughts would come up with something, e.g., a share issue, and raise money and turn around the loss figures.
- ·3 päivää sittenFunny with the DI editorial team Today it is written what a nice discount there is in Lundbergs when they summarize Lundbergs' all shareholdings in underlying owned shares with P/E ratios of approx 20-40 and valuation above book value. When the DI editorial team writes about SBB and their underlying companies, all of which have a large discount against book value, the tone is different, implying the properties are dilapidated castles with inflated values. I must cancel my subscription to DI
- ·3 päivää sittenIt is written that short sellers have made a lot of money on short selling. But they don't do that until they have bought and returned the shares. I.e., when the short position has gone down sharply, the short sellers' trade is safe, but right now they are very far out at sea. Since the short interest is still above 15%, it will be interesting to see where the price goes when the short sellers are to secure their profit.
- ·31.8.Can someone bring some good news!The merger between Klarabo and Svea will significantly increase earnings in SBB. You can see that directly in the report for Q3 on earning capacity in SBB and in Svea. Then you will want to see it in the Q4 report 2026. The leverage also decreases significantly in SBB.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | - | - | ||
| 55 120 | - | - | ||
| 16 731 | - | - | ||
| 10 967 | - | - | ||
| 737 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 4.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 16.7. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 25.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 7.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
50 päivää sitten
‧38 min
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 4.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 16.7. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 25.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 7.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 |
1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·1 t sittenI throw in the towel here, delete previous posts, and realize that I was wrong. A "detail" is not sufficiently clear and has a fundamental significance for SBB. Page 18 in the Q2, 2026 report for Sveafastigheter (and corresponding items in PPI, etc), under cash flow, shows "Investment in properties" at 604mSEK in the period Jan–Jun 2026. On page 5 of the same report, it appears that 213 mSEK of this was destined for properties under management. This corresponds to 416 mSEK per year. On page 11, it appears that "earnings capacity" per year, before tax, is 477 mSEK. We are further informed that 237 housing units were upgraded in the period, out of the total portfolio of 15,258. This corresponds to (237*2)/15.258 = 3,%, i.e., 1:32. The point? ALL cash generation disappears into apartment upgrades. If these had been investments, then fine. But in reality, upgrading each apartment once every 32nd year cannot be anything other than necessary maintenance, and thereby effectively a cost? And if it had been real investments, where then is the depreciation, i.e., the cost side? They simply don't exist. So if we fundamentally consider these "investments" as costs, then earnings capacity goes to zero. And that corresponds to what we can actually see from the cash flow statement: Today, the business is not able to generate a single krone in cash. If the companies are to be able to generate cash, I really only see four theoretical ways: i. Radical change in net operating income. Unless major regulatory changes occur in these regulated housing agreements, I cannot see that anything substantial can be achieved here. If we look at Sveafastigheter, the increase in net operating income was 3,2% like-for-like. And that is AFTER investments in upgrades have been made. It is completely irrelevant. ii. The Development side starts to generate a lot of cash. First and foremost, this is a small part of the whole, secondly (and it would take too long to describe an analysis of this part here) there is no relevant contribution either today or in the forecasts. iii. Accounting P/L gain combined with increased borrowing enables dividends. Absolutely a possibility, and perhaps what shareholders hope for. But for that to happen, it must happen despite the fundamentals, not because of them. As the situation is now, there is no fundamental reason (read: Underlying value creation and cash generation) for the values of the properties to increase. iv. Massive sale of properties, debt payment, liquidation of the company and payment to shareholders. Good possibility, but nothing indicates this. The question is also: Who is interested in paying "fair value" for the used housing stock? Neither theoretically would anyone want this, ref. the calculation above (zero cash generated), in practice Klarabo, which is much smaller, was unable to get a cash bid that was better than a merger with Svea, and if someone were still able to buy and turn this into a cash machine, well, then that just means they would be able to operate more economically rationally than Sveafastigheter. Hoping for a sale, as the situation is today, is really hoping for a sale to "a bigger fool". To summarize: SBB's subsidiaries, when we adjust for absolutely essential maintenance, are unable to produce cash. Knowing that Sveafastigheter is integrated into SBB's balance sheet, because SBB is the majority owner, we also know that SBB's equity is inflated by 5 kroner per share, as Svea appears at book value and not market value of the shareholding. Assessed at market value, SBB's equity would not be more than approx. 3 kroner per share. I, and no one, can know if the share price will go up for SBB. But I think this seems more and more like Buffett's investment in Berkshire as a textile company, according to himself his most idiotic investment ever. Read his "Letter to shareholders" for the first 10-15 years and see how capital increasingly disappeared from practically zero-return in the textile business to investments in value-creating and cash-generating businesses. We see the confirmation when Svea "proudly" shows that they have a "Yield-on-cost" of 6% on investments in appartment upgrades (which are fundamentally more necessary maintenance than real investments). 6%? So instead of paying dividends to shareholders, who can expect a 12% return in the stock market, one chooses to invest in upgrades that yield 6%? There is no economic rationale behind this, other than to "buy" growth in net operating income, at a far too high price. Alternatively: This is highly necessary maintenance that must be carried out, as the apartments can no longer be rented out in the condition they are in. But then Svea and Klara generate absolutely nothing over time. (Note: PPI is a bit better on this dimension, but in practice the argument is the same here too). Good weekend and thanks for my time SBB, Svea, Klarabo and PPI. Never again, and thanks for the reminder to read the cash flow side, and not just P/L and the balance sheet.
- ·7 t sittenWaiting for shareholder value to be realized…Then you have to wait with the patience of an angel. There is no interest from the management's side to create any value; it's about maintaining a position of power and not changing the ownership structure. Every company with sound thoughts would come up with something, e.g., a share issue, and raise money and turn around the loss figures.
- ·3 päivää sittenFunny with the DI editorial team Today it is written what a nice discount there is in Lundbergs when they summarize Lundbergs' all shareholdings in underlying owned shares with P/E ratios of approx 20-40 and valuation above book value. When the DI editorial team writes about SBB and their underlying companies, all of which have a large discount against book value, the tone is different, implying the properties are dilapidated castles with inflated values. I must cancel my subscription to DI
- ·3 päivää sittenIt is written that short sellers have made a lot of money on short selling. But they don't do that until they have bought and returned the shares. I.e., when the short position has gone down sharply, the short sellers' trade is safe, but right now they are very far out at sea. Since the short interest is still above 15%, it will be interesting to see where the price goes when the short sellers are to secure their profit.
- ·31.8.Can someone bring some good news!The merger between Klarabo and Svea will significantly increase earnings in SBB. You can see that directly in the report for Q3 on earning capacity in SBB and in Svea. Then you will want to see it in the Q4 report 2026. The leverage also decreases significantly in SBB.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | - | - | ||
| 55 120 | - | - | ||
| 16 731 | - | - | ||
| 10 967 | - | - | ||
| 737 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 4 980 635 | 4 980 635 | 0 | 0 |