2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
780 490
Myynti
Määrä
639 608
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 58 149 | - | - | ||
| 243 | - | - | ||
| 4 532 | - | - | ||
| 89 | - | - | ||
| 92 | - | - |
Ylin
4,179VWAP
Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
VWAP
Ylin
4,179Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 17.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 7.11. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 20.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 19.2. | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 27.11.2024 |
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
·9 t sittenstraight into the trash can again, just red red red·9 t sittenSorry for that, not at all meant to cause more stress.
·11 t sittenCould there be an error in the reporting of short selling? Some of the short sellers do not seem to change their holdings at all, i.e., no trading is taking place. Can that be correct?
·21 t sittenAssume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid. Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering). At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares). The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below) If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.- ·21 t sittenIf one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering. Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %. By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure. This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate. One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn. The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI. Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.
·12 t sittenThanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025. In short – you are absolutely right on the main points: • SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential). • Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK. • This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value. • Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025. So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable. But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger: • Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled. • The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time. • Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms. • The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real. • Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time. So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced: This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine. Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀 - ·22 t sittenThere is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.
·9 t sittenHave you included the 40% ownership stake in PPI? Furthermore, there is a currency gain of almost 1.5% on the euro in Q4 right now. Previously, the exposure was 25000 mill. But what it is after the transaction and how it is regulated between the parties is uncertain. But otherwise, the profit is approximately 375 mill SEK. In addition, you should add the operating profit in Q4 and value increases.
·3 t sitten · MuokattuCongratulations Harry. You are one of the few who understand this case. When one is valued at 40% of NAV and sells for 35 billion (approx) at 95% of NAV, most should understand that this is fantastic for SBB. If the shorters dream of covering (cheaply), after Q4 figures, then I think they underestimate how stupid all the small investors are here. But they (the shorters) are working to keep the price low and there are fewer and fewer owners in Nordnet. Perhaps some sell tax-motivated before New Year. Many just get tired (impatient) and sell. But buying and holding this for months and years, should be a sure path to wealth.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·9 t sittenstraight into the trash can again, just red red red·9 t sittenSorry for that, not at all meant to cause more stress.
- ·11 t sittenCould there be an error in the reporting of short selling? Some of the short sellers do not seem to change their holdings at all, i.e., no trading is taking place. Can that be correct?
- ·21 t sittenAssume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid. Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering). At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares). The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below) If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.
- ·21 t sittenIf one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering. Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %. By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure. This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate. One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn. The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI. Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.·12 t sittenThanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025. In short – you are absolutely right on the main points: • SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential). • Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK. • This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value. • Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025. So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable. But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger: • Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled. • The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time. • Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms. • The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real. • Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time. So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced: This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine. Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀
- ·22 t sittenThere is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.·9 t sittenHave you included the 40% ownership stake in PPI? Furthermore, there is a currency gain of almost 1.5% on the euro in Q4 right now. Previously, the exposure was 25000 mill. But what it is after the transaction and how it is regulated between the parties is uncertain. But otherwise, the profit is approximately 375 mill SEK. In addition, you should add the operating profit in Q4 and value increases.·3 t sitten · MuokattuCongratulations Harry. You are one of the few who understand this case. When one is valued at 40% of NAV and sells for 35 billion (approx) at 95% of NAV, most should understand that this is fantastic for SBB. If the shorters dream of covering (cheaply), after Q4 figures, then I think they underestimate how stupid all the small investors are here. But they (the shorters) are working to keep the price low and there are fewer and fewer owners in Nordnet. Perhaps some sell tax-motivated before New Year. Many just get tired (impatient) and sell. But buying and holding this for months and years, should be a sure path to wealth.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
780 490
Myynti
Määrä
639 608
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 58 149 | - | - | ||
| 243 | - | - | ||
| 4 532 | - | - | ||
| 89 | - | - | ||
| 92 | - | - |
Ylin
4,179VWAP
Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
VWAP
Ylin
4,179Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 17.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 7.11. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 20.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 19.2. | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 27.11.2024 |
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
32 päivää sittenUutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 17.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 7.11. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 20.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 13.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 19.2. | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 27.11.2024 |
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·9 t sittenstraight into the trash can again, just red red red·9 t sittenSorry for that, not at all meant to cause more stress.
- ·11 t sittenCould there be an error in the reporting of short selling? Some of the short sellers do not seem to change their holdings at all, i.e., no trading is taking place. Can that be correct?
- ·21 t sittenAssume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid. Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering). At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares). The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below) If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.
- ·21 t sittenIf one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering. Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %. By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure. This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate. One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn. The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI. Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.·12 t sittenThanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025. In short – you are absolutely right on the main points: • SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential). • Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK. • This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value. • Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025. So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable. But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger: • Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled. • The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time. • Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms. • The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real. • Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time. So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced: This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine. Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀
- ·22 t sittenThere is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.·9 t sittenHave you included the 40% ownership stake in PPI? Furthermore, there is a currency gain of almost 1.5% on the euro in Q4 right now. Previously, the exposure was 25000 mill. But what it is after the transaction and how it is regulated between the parties is uncertain. But otherwise, the profit is approximately 375 mill SEK. In addition, you should add the operating profit in Q4 and value increases.·3 t sitten · MuokattuCongratulations Harry. You are one of the few who understand this case. When one is valued at 40% of NAV and sells for 35 billion (approx) at 95% of NAV, most should understand that this is fantastic for SBB. If the shorters dream of covering (cheaply), after Q4 figures, then I think they underestimate how stupid all the small investors are here. But they (the shorters) are working to keep the price low and there are fewer and fewer owners in Nordnet. Perhaps some sell tax-motivated before New Year. Many just get tired (impatient) and sell. But buying and holding this for months and years, should be a sure path to wealth.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
780 490
Myynti
Määrä
639 608
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 58 149 | - | - | ||
| 243 | - | - | ||
| 4 532 | - | - | ||
| 89 | - | - | ||
| 92 | - | - |
Ylin
4,179VWAP
Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
VWAP
Ylin
4,179Alin
4,078VaihtoMäärä
28,3 6 897 880
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 897 880 | 6 897 880 | 0 | 0 |