Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Assume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid.
Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering).
At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares).
The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below)
If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.
If one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering.
Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %.
By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure.
This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate.
One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn.
The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI.
Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.
Thanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025.
In short – you are absolutely right on the main points:
• SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential).
• Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK.
• This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value.
• Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025.
So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable.
But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger:
• Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled.
• The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time.
• Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms.
• The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real.
• Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time.
So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced:
This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine.
Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀
There is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset ja analyysit
Uutiset ja lehdistötiedotteet
Analyysit
5 joulu 09.33
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB lanserar återköpserbjudande av hybridinstrument och obligationer
5 joulu 09.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
SBB announces voluntary tender offers regarding certain outstanding hybrid and senior securities
5 joulu 09.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
SBB offentliggör ett frivilligt återköpserbjudande för vissa utestående hybridinstrument och seniora värdepapper
28 marras 12.06
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE
28 marras 09.06
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
27 marras 09.17
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
26 marras 09.45
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
24 marras 10.04
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB: LEDAMOT KÖPER SINA FÖRSTA AKTIER FÖR 0,2 MLN KR
24 marras 10.04
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB:s styrelseledamot Han-Suck Song gör sitt första aktieköp för 0,2 miljoner kronor
21 marras 15.16
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB höjer intjäningsförmåga efter PPI-affär
21 marras 15.08
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB: GER UPPDATERAD INTJÄNINGSFÖRMÅGA PROFORMA 3 KV
21 marras 15.02
∙
Flash
SBB:s intjäningsförmåga proforma uppgår till 0,71 kronor per stamaktie efter kostnadsnormalisering
21 marras 15.00
∙
Flash
SBB uppdaterar intjäningsförmågan proforma för det tredje kvartalet 2025
21 marras 15.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ) publishes an updated earnings capacity proforma for the third quarter 2025
21 marras 15.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ) publicerar en uppdaterad intjäningsförmåga proforma för det tredje kvartalet 2025
21 marras 12.59
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE (R)
21 marras 11.06
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE
21 marras 09.38
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
18 marras 06.12
∙
Osakeuutinen
Public Property Invest kallar till extrastämma 9 december för att rösta om SBB-affär
17 marras 19.37
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Kallelse till extra bolagstämma i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ)
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Tuotteita joiden kohde-etuutena tämä arvopaperi
Sertifikaatit
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten32 min
1,20 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
Näytä
Uutiset ja analyysit
Uutiset ja lehdistötiedotteet
Analyysit
5 joulu 09.33
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB lanserar återköpserbjudande av hybridinstrument och obligationer
5 joulu 09.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
SBB announces voluntary tender offers regarding certain outstanding hybrid and senior securities
5 joulu 09.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
SBB offentliggör ett frivilligt återköpserbjudande för vissa utestående hybridinstrument och seniora värdepapper
28 marras 12.06
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE
28 marras 09.06
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
27 marras 09.17
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
26 marras 09.45
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
24 marras 10.04
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB: LEDAMOT KÖPER SINA FÖRSTA AKTIER FÖR 0,2 MLN KR
24 marras 10.04
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB:s styrelseledamot Han-Suck Song gör sitt första aktieköp för 0,2 miljoner kronor
21 marras 15.16
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB höjer intjäningsförmåga efter PPI-affär
21 marras 15.08
∙
Osakeuutinen
SBB: GER UPPDATERAD INTJÄNINGSFÖRMÅGA PROFORMA 3 KV
21 marras 15.02
∙
Flash
SBB:s intjäningsförmåga proforma uppgår till 0,71 kronor per stamaktie efter kostnadsnormalisering
21 marras 15.00
∙
Flash
SBB uppdaterar intjäningsförmågan proforma för det tredje kvartalet 2025
21 marras 15.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ) publishes an updated earnings capacity proforma for the third quarter 2025
21 marras 15.00
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ) publicerar en uppdaterad intjäningsförmåga proforma för det tredje kvartalet 2025
21 marras 12.59
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE (R)
21 marras 11.06
∙
Osakeuutinen
BÖRS: LISTA ÖVER DE 15 MEST BLANKADE AKTIERNA I SVERIGE
21 marras 09.38
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Finansinspektionen: Flaggningsmeddelande i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB
18 marras 06.12
∙
Osakeuutinen
Public Property Invest kallar till extrastämma 9 december för att rösta om SBB-affär
17 marras 19.37
∙
Lehdistötiedote
Kallelse till extra bolagstämma i Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (publ)
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Assume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid.
Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering).
At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares).
The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below)
If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.
If one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering.
Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %.
By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure.
This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate.
One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn.
The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI.
Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.
Thanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025.
In short – you are absolutely right on the main points:
• SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential).
• Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK.
• This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value.
• Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025.
So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable.
But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger:
• Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled.
• The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time.
• Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms.
• The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real.
• Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time.
So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced:
This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine.
Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀
There is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Tietoa osakekaupankäyntiin liittyvistä riskeistä
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Näytä kaikki
Seuraava tapahtuma
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
17.2.2026
Menneet tapahtumat
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
7.11.
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti
20.8.
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti
13.5.
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti
19.2.
2024 Q3 -tulosraportti
27.11.2024
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
Tuotteita joiden kohde-etuutena tämä arvopaperi
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1,20 SEK/osake
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Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Assume 3 years from now, SBB owns three companies including Nordiqus on the stock exchange. The debt is under 10 billion, hybrid is 10 billion. Dividends are 1 billion and the only actual obligation is bond debt even though interest on hybrid must also be paid.
Swedish real estate stocks were recently priced 30 % above underlying property values, then they were priced at a 40 % discount and are currently at a 20 % discount. This provides great opportunities for value creation with SBB's new model and a leader who is skilled in FE (financial engeneering).
At the same time, SBB can buy and sell hybrid debt. Hybrid debt also provides an opportunity to prioritize share purchases by cutting interest. (not SBB shares).
The sum of this is a very exciting future for SBB (also read my other post below)
If you understand the company, you will never dare to short. You only dare to do that if you read number analyses without substance.
If one is to understand SBB, one must understand Leiv Synnes's ability for Financial Engineering.
Assume you own property directly in an AS with a total value of 20 million and 12 million in debt, i.e., a debt ratio of 60 %.
By selling property and repaying the debt, you are left with 8 million in cash. If you now buy shares in a real estate company like Entra or Olav Thon with a debt ratio of 50 %, by using 8 million on shares in these companies, you will be exposed to real estate worth 16 million. If you wish to maintain an exposure of 20 million, you can optionally buy shares for 10 million with 2 million in loans. Then you have 2 million in direct loans in the AS and a debt ratio of 20 %, at the same time you have indirect loans via the shares you own of 10 million, but Entra and Olav Thon are responsible for that. You have thereby lowered the debt ratio from 60 to 20 % for the debt the company is responsible for and maintained the exposure.
This is what Synnes has done over the past 2+ years and which has ensured avoiding breaches of loan covenants by forming JVs where one does not have to consolidate.
One will after the PPI transaction own 10 billion directly, 6 bn via SBB Residential, and indirectly via SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI approx 57.5 bn. One also owns a receivable of 5.3 bn.
The direct debt is 23.7 bn after deduction for cash and hybrid debt is 9 bn including deferred interest. Indirect hybrid is 2.5 bn and indirect debt is approx 27.4 via the three, SVEA, Nordiqus and PPI.
Summarized today; Property direct and indirect for 74, debt direct and indirect 51 and hybrid direct and indirect 11.5. There is however a clear plan to handle this, which provides a unique opportunity for gearing when SBB is valued at 8 bn. Even if properties are sold down to 60 bn and debt is reduced to under 10, by buying shares one will have an exposure of approx 8 times with positive cash flow. That is, by buying shares for 3 million, one owns property for 25. Given that debt covenants have been changed, hybrid debt is cheap, this provides an extreme opportunity for a long-term investor who sees a moderate increase in property values over a 5 to 10 year horizon. This is what makes SBB a fantastic case.
Thanks for a really good and educational post – one of the best summaries I've seen on how Synnes has conducted financial engineering over the last 2–3 years. You explain the mechanism crystal clear with the small 20-mill example, and your numbers are almost exactly right with what we see in Q3 and Q4 reports/PPI completion now in December 2025.
In short – you are absolutely right on the main points:
• SBB has in practice moved most of the balance sheet «off-balance» through JVs that are not consolidated (SVEA, Nordiqus, PPI and partly Residential).
• Direct LTV is down in the 20–25 % range, while the economic exposure to real estate still stands at 73–75 bn SEK.
• This gives an implicit gearing of 6–8× when the stock is traded at 8–9 bn SEK market value.
• Hybrid debt is now extremely cheap (1–2 % effective interest rate + deferred coupon), and the covenant package is significantly lighter after all refinancings in 2024/2025.
So yes, for someone who is comfortable with complexity and high volatility, this is still one of the most asymmetric real estate cases in Europe. The potential in the 5–10 year term is still 5–10× if real estate values only do +3–4 % p.a. and the public/residential segment remains reasonably stable.
But there are still some elephants in the room that make not everyone dare to pull the trigger:
• Cash flow looks strong now, but there are still large maturities in 2026–2028 that need to be handled.
• The JV partners (Castlelake, Brookfield, KKR) have significant control and can force sales or block dividends for a long time.
• Hybrid investors still have a «sword of Damocles» hanging over their heads – if the price does not rise, they can force conversion or refinancing on worse terms.
• The Swedish public sector has started to tighten quite significantly – risk of vacancies and rent reduction from 2027 onwards is real.
• Trust is still thin after all the rounds in 2022–2024. New capital will require a high risk premium for a long time.
So my conclusion is roughly like yours, just a bit more nuanced:
This is still a fantastic case for those who have ice in their stomach, like gearing and can tolerate wild swings. But it is still a high-octane investment, not a calm dividend machine.
Thanks again for a really solid post – this should have been a sticky thread on the forum! 🚀
There is a lot of focus on the short sellers, but what one observes is that SBB is not sinking despite increasing short interest. The initial reaction to the PPI transaction was positive, and the transaction is undoubtedly positive. At the same time, the headline for Q4 will be a brutal loss. This is due to the discount of 2.8 billion given in the PPI transaction, a write-down of goodwill of 1.2 billion, and the fact that price movements in PPI occur mark-to-market. This results in a loss of 4 billion SEK which lowers the result by 2.3 kr per share. In addition, there will be value changes on properties which can be both negative and positive. At the same time, the buyback of bonds will yield some gains that can offset some of the loss, best case 1 billion. In other words, there is some fear associated with the market's reaction to the loss that will be presented in Q4, which one should look past. At the same time, one might fear how others react, and thus become hesitant even if one personally looks past Q4. Right now, one must therefore live a bit in a vacuum, which can be frustrating. At the same time, the feeling is that one is now truly seeing the light and is on the way to stabilization.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Tietoa osakekaupankäyntiin liittyvistä riskeistä
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.