Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
5 päivää sitten
0,3553 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
4,96 %Tuotto/v
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
43 295
Myynti
Määrä
42 292
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 950 | - | - | ||
| 3 047 | - | - | ||
| 952 | - | - | ||
| 1 457 | - | - | ||
| 2 500 | - | - |
Ylin
7,18VWAP
Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
VWAP
Ylin
7,18Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 3.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 25.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 26.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 13.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
·1 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.
·Alle minuutti sittenAs always, a pleasure to read your posts, Anders. It was my own hunt for attractive Danish companies to become a shareholder in that led me to Vestjysk Bank. After I came across your posts here, I only became more confident about Vestjysk Bank. You are an excellent communicator, and I hope you continue with your posts for many years.
·12.11.How are the 1.75 kr taxed?
·4.11.Should one buy in? Or wait until the merger is complete- ·2.11.Since the merger between Sydbank, Arbejdernes Landsbank and Vestjysk Bank last Monday, there has been a pronounced sentiment of FOMO. Among shareholders, there has been a clear attempt to get positioned in the next candidate for takeover. Lån & Spar Bank has risen over 17.5% in one week, Danske Andelskassers Bank, 10.1% and Fynske Bank 9.1%. All these increases have been without company-specific news. But my take is that the feeling of FOMO is even more widespread on some of the executive floors in the banks than it is among us shareholders. The fact is that the number of obvious acquisition targets is rapidly diminishing. If the focus is solely on listed banks, then Monday's merger really hurt. Although Sydbank announces that it is hardly the last merger AL Sydbank will participate in, the bank is removed from the 'suspects' in the short term. Vestjysk Bank is completely gone. In the simplified division of Danish banks into large, medium-sized and smaller banks, there is an inherent logic: The smaller banks are too small to be interesting for the large banks. Unless the shares in the 'selling' bank are being sold off cheaply, why enter into an acquisition process where the volume might only expand the business scope by 10%? If the logic is accepted, it leaves an extreme focus on the medium-sized banks, as they are the only ones that can be both prey and hunter in the consolidation wave, which everyone – large and small – agrees is in full swing. Who then remains in this group of medium-sized banks? With Sydbank and Vestjysk Bank out of the game, among the listed banks with equity over DKK 5 billion, there are only the following: Nordea (approx. DKK 240 billion), Danske Bank (DKK 177 billion), Jyske Bank (DKK 47 billion) and Ringkjøbing Landbobank (DKK 11.3 billion). Both Jyske Bank and Ringkjøbing Landbobank would probably decline to be titled as medium-sized banks. But the fact is that compared to Nordea and Danske Bank, they are quite small. Both latter banks have indicated interest in participating in the consolidation – but Danske Bank, in particular, has mentioned that the most obvious focus is probably on our neighboring countries to the north. With the acquisition of Nordjyske Bank in 2018, Ringkjøbing Landbobank has shown that it can manage a merger and continue to be an extremely efficiently run bank. This fact, together with the bank's size, makes Landbobanken the most obvious 'buyer' of one of the 'large smaller banks'. In this group, among others, the following banks are found (which are even on the same data center): SJF Bank (DKK 4.6 billion), Skjern Bank (DKK 1.9 billion), Djurslands Bank (DKK 1.8 billion) and Kreditbanken (DKK 1.2 billion). Further down in the size hierarchy, I cannot help but notice that SJF Bank already has ownership stakes in both Lollands Bank and Møns Bank… And SJF Bank has recently shown its interest in acquiring Nordfyns Bank. Furthermore, Sydbank, Jyske Bank and Nykredit all have ownership stakes in SJF Bank. In my view, this makes SJF the most likely participant in a merger, when both the role of 'hunter' and 'prey' are taken into consideration. In the circle of large smaller banks, Lån & Spar Bank (DKK 3.4 billion) and Danske Andelskassers Bank (DKK 2.9 billion) are also found. The latter is a saga in itself with the siege from Spar Nord and Jyske Bank's continued acquisitions. The financial reporting of recent quarters has generally confirmed a trend where large banks no longer have growth in costs, whereas smaller banks clearly have a much harder time keeping costs stable. It is precisely this effect that makes everyone agree that the consolidation wave will continue – even if no one is of the opinion that they themselves will be an acquired bank… But we should also not be blind to the possibility of horizontal mergers, where equal or nearly equal banks can join forces in the hope of finding synergy effects. Fynske Bank's unsuccessful attempt to acquire Nordfyns Bank was presented as a roughly equal merger. It did not succeed for various reasons – but Nordfyns Bank's management's justification for giving up independence was precisely that they were afraid of 'being left on the platform'. And here we are back with the feeling of FOMO. The best defense against takeover is to run the business efficiently – but small banks have no real possibilities to relatively compete with the large ones on IT (AI?) and compliance. And this development is only expected to accelerate. Therefore, the negotiating power of small banks will not improve down the road. I have great sympathy for the desire for continued independence, but there is a risk, like another Korsbæk Bank, of forgetting to face the new competitive situation. Nordfyns Bank's management made the mistake of believing that, due to the inherent voting right restrictions, they could control the course of events. Whether one likes it or not, capitalism's modus operandi is to stay on one's toes – especially when the number of other potential prey on the savannah is significantly reduced.
·4.11.Thanks for sharing your reflections, Anders. Do you then see it as an argument for personally investing in SJF, or do you exclusively focus on the fundamentals of each individual bank, without assessing the potential upside in the share price upon an acquisition?
·7.11.What a great analysis of the banks in Denmark, Anders, thank you for it. - 30.10.30.10.Hey guys, does it make sense to buy this considering there is a merger up ahead?
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
5 päivää sitten
0,3553 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
4,96 %Tuotto/v
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·1 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.·Alle minuutti sittenAs always, a pleasure to read your posts, Anders. It was my own hunt for attractive Danish companies to become a shareholder in that led me to Vestjysk Bank. After I came across your posts here, I only became more confident about Vestjysk Bank. You are an excellent communicator, and I hope you continue with your posts for many years.
- ·12.11.How are the 1.75 kr taxed?
- ·4.11.Should one buy in? Or wait until the merger is complete
- ·2.11.Since the merger between Sydbank, Arbejdernes Landsbank and Vestjysk Bank last Monday, there has been a pronounced sentiment of FOMO. Among shareholders, there has been a clear attempt to get positioned in the next candidate for takeover. Lån & Spar Bank has risen over 17.5% in one week, Danske Andelskassers Bank, 10.1% and Fynske Bank 9.1%. All these increases have been without company-specific news. But my take is that the feeling of FOMO is even more widespread on some of the executive floors in the banks than it is among us shareholders. The fact is that the number of obvious acquisition targets is rapidly diminishing. If the focus is solely on listed banks, then Monday's merger really hurt. Although Sydbank announces that it is hardly the last merger AL Sydbank will participate in, the bank is removed from the 'suspects' in the short term. Vestjysk Bank is completely gone. In the simplified division of Danish banks into large, medium-sized and smaller banks, there is an inherent logic: The smaller banks are too small to be interesting for the large banks. Unless the shares in the 'selling' bank are being sold off cheaply, why enter into an acquisition process where the volume might only expand the business scope by 10%? If the logic is accepted, it leaves an extreme focus on the medium-sized banks, as they are the only ones that can be both prey and hunter in the consolidation wave, which everyone – large and small – agrees is in full swing. Who then remains in this group of medium-sized banks? With Sydbank and Vestjysk Bank out of the game, among the listed banks with equity over DKK 5 billion, there are only the following: Nordea (approx. DKK 240 billion), Danske Bank (DKK 177 billion), Jyske Bank (DKK 47 billion) and Ringkjøbing Landbobank (DKK 11.3 billion). Both Jyske Bank and Ringkjøbing Landbobank would probably decline to be titled as medium-sized banks. But the fact is that compared to Nordea and Danske Bank, they are quite small. Both latter banks have indicated interest in participating in the consolidation – but Danske Bank, in particular, has mentioned that the most obvious focus is probably on our neighboring countries to the north. With the acquisition of Nordjyske Bank in 2018, Ringkjøbing Landbobank has shown that it can manage a merger and continue to be an extremely efficiently run bank. This fact, together with the bank's size, makes Landbobanken the most obvious 'buyer' of one of the 'large smaller banks'. In this group, among others, the following banks are found (which are even on the same data center): SJF Bank (DKK 4.6 billion), Skjern Bank (DKK 1.9 billion), Djurslands Bank (DKK 1.8 billion) and Kreditbanken (DKK 1.2 billion). Further down in the size hierarchy, I cannot help but notice that SJF Bank already has ownership stakes in both Lollands Bank and Møns Bank… And SJF Bank has recently shown its interest in acquiring Nordfyns Bank. Furthermore, Sydbank, Jyske Bank and Nykredit all have ownership stakes in SJF Bank. In my view, this makes SJF the most likely participant in a merger, when both the role of 'hunter' and 'prey' are taken into consideration. In the circle of large smaller banks, Lån & Spar Bank (DKK 3.4 billion) and Danske Andelskassers Bank (DKK 2.9 billion) are also found. The latter is a saga in itself with the siege from Spar Nord and Jyske Bank's continued acquisitions. The financial reporting of recent quarters has generally confirmed a trend where large banks no longer have growth in costs, whereas smaller banks clearly have a much harder time keeping costs stable. It is precisely this effect that makes everyone agree that the consolidation wave will continue – even if no one is of the opinion that they themselves will be an acquired bank… But we should also not be blind to the possibility of horizontal mergers, where equal or nearly equal banks can join forces in the hope of finding synergy effects. Fynske Bank's unsuccessful attempt to acquire Nordfyns Bank was presented as a roughly equal merger. It did not succeed for various reasons – but Nordfyns Bank's management's justification for giving up independence was precisely that they were afraid of 'being left on the platform'. And here we are back with the feeling of FOMO. The best defense against takeover is to run the business efficiently – but small banks have no real possibilities to relatively compete with the large ones on IT (AI?) and compliance. And this development is only expected to accelerate. Therefore, the negotiating power of small banks will not improve down the road. I have great sympathy for the desire for continued independence, but there is a risk, like another Korsbæk Bank, of forgetting to face the new competitive situation. Nordfyns Bank's management made the mistake of believing that, due to the inherent voting right restrictions, they could control the course of events. Whether one likes it or not, capitalism's modus operandi is to stay on one's toes – especially when the number of other potential prey on the savannah is significantly reduced.·4.11.Thanks for sharing your reflections, Anders. Do you then see it as an argument for personally investing in SJF, or do you exclusively focus on the fundamentals of each individual bank, without assessing the potential upside in the share price upon an acquisition?·7.11.What a great analysis of the banks in Denmark, Anders, thank you for it.
- 30.10.30.10.Hey guys, does it make sense to buy this considering there is a merger up ahead?
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
43 295
Myynti
Määrä
42 292
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 950 | - | - | ||
| 3 047 | - | - | ||
| 952 | - | - | ||
| 1 457 | - | - | ||
| 2 500 | - | - |
Ylin
7,18VWAP
Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
VWAP
Ylin
7,18Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 3.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 25.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 26.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 13.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
Q3-osavuosiraportti
Vain PDF
5 päivää sitten
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4-osavuosiraportti | 3.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3-osavuosiraportti | 25.11. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 28.8. | |
| 2025 Q2-osavuosiraportti | 26.8. | |
| 2025 Q1-osavuosiraportti | 20.5. | |
| 2024 Yhtiökokous | 13.3. |
Datan lähde: Millistream, Quartr
0,3553 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
4,96 %Tuotto/v
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·1 t sittenWith Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.·Alle minuutti sittenAs always, a pleasure to read your posts, Anders. It was my own hunt for attractive Danish companies to become a shareholder in that led me to Vestjysk Bank. After I came across your posts here, I only became more confident about Vestjysk Bank. You are an excellent communicator, and I hope you continue with your posts for many years.
- ·12.11.How are the 1.75 kr taxed?
- ·4.11.Should one buy in? Or wait until the merger is complete
- ·2.11.Since the merger between Sydbank, Arbejdernes Landsbank and Vestjysk Bank last Monday, there has been a pronounced sentiment of FOMO. Among shareholders, there has been a clear attempt to get positioned in the next candidate for takeover. Lån & Spar Bank has risen over 17.5% in one week, Danske Andelskassers Bank, 10.1% and Fynske Bank 9.1%. All these increases have been without company-specific news. But my take is that the feeling of FOMO is even more widespread on some of the executive floors in the banks than it is among us shareholders. The fact is that the number of obvious acquisition targets is rapidly diminishing. If the focus is solely on listed banks, then Monday's merger really hurt. Although Sydbank announces that it is hardly the last merger AL Sydbank will participate in, the bank is removed from the 'suspects' in the short term. Vestjysk Bank is completely gone. In the simplified division of Danish banks into large, medium-sized and smaller banks, there is an inherent logic: The smaller banks are too small to be interesting for the large banks. Unless the shares in the 'selling' bank are being sold off cheaply, why enter into an acquisition process where the volume might only expand the business scope by 10%? If the logic is accepted, it leaves an extreme focus on the medium-sized banks, as they are the only ones that can be both prey and hunter in the consolidation wave, which everyone – large and small – agrees is in full swing. Who then remains in this group of medium-sized banks? With Sydbank and Vestjysk Bank out of the game, among the listed banks with equity over DKK 5 billion, there are only the following: Nordea (approx. DKK 240 billion), Danske Bank (DKK 177 billion), Jyske Bank (DKK 47 billion) and Ringkjøbing Landbobank (DKK 11.3 billion). Both Jyske Bank and Ringkjøbing Landbobank would probably decline to be titled as medium-sized banks. But the fact is that compared to Nordea and Danske Bank, they are quite small. Both latter banks have indicated interest in participating in the consolidation – but Danske Bank, in particular, has mentioned that the most obvious focus is probably on our neighboring countries to the north. With the acquisition of Nordjyske Bank in 2018, Ringkjøbing Landbobank has shown that it can manage a merger and continue to be an extremely efficiently run bank. This fact, together with the bank's size, makes Landbobanken the most obvious 'buyer' of one of the 'large smaller banks'. In this group, among others, the following banks are found (which are even on the same data center): SJF Bank (DKK 4.6 billion), Skjern Bank (DKK 1.9 billion), Djurslands Bank (DKK 1.8 billion) and Kreditbanken (DKK 1.2 billion). Further down in the size hierarchy, I cannot help but notice that SJF Bank already has ownership stakes in both Lollands Bank and Møns Bank… And SJF Bank has recently shown its interest in acquiring Nordfyns Bank. Furthermore, Sydbank, Jyske Bank and Nykredit all have ownership stakes in SJF Bank. In my view, this makes SJF the most likely participant in a merger, when both the role of 'hunter' and 'prey' are taken into consideration. In the circle of large smaller banks, Lån & Spar Bank (DKK 3.4 billion) and Danske Andelskassers Bank (DKK 2.9 billion) are also found. The latter is a saga in itself with the siege from Spar Nord and Jyske Bank's continued acquisitions. The financial reporting of recent quarters has generally confirmed a trend where large banks no longer have growth in costs, whereas smaller banks clearly have a much harder time keeping costs stable. It is precisely this effect that makes everyone agree that the consolidation wave will continue – even if no one is of the opinion that they themselves will be an acquired bank… But we should also not be blind to the possibility of horizontal mergers, where equal or nearly equal banks can join forces in the hope of finding synergy effects. Fynske Bank's unsuccessful attempt to acquire Nordfyns Bank was presented as a roughly equal merger. It did not succeed for various reasons – but Nordfyns Bank's management's justification for giving up independence was precisely that they were afraid of 'being left on the platform'. And here we are back with the feeling of FOMO. The best defense against takeover is to run the business efficiently – but small banks have no real possibilities to relatively compete with the large ones on IT (AI?) and compliance. And this development is only expected to accelerate. Therefore, the negotiating power of small banks will not improve down the road. I have great sympathy for the desire for continued independence, but there is a risk, like another Korsbæk Bank, of forgetting to face the new competitive situation. Nordfyns Bank's management made the mistake of believing that, due to the inherent voting right restrictions, they could control the course of events. Whether one likes it or not, capitalism's modus operandi is to stay on one's toes – especially when the number of other potential prey on the savannah is significantly reduced.·4.11.Thanks for sharing your reflections, Anders. Do you then see it as an argument for personally investing in SJF, or do you exclusively focus on the fundamentals of each individual bank, without assessing the potential upside in the share price upon an acquisition?·7.11.What a great analysis of the banks in Denmark, Anders, thank you for it.
- 30.10.30.10.Hey guys, does it make sense to buy this considering there is a merger up ahead?
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Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
43 295
Myynti
Määrä
42 292
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 950 | - | - | ||
| 3 047 | - | - | ||
| 952 | - | - | ||
| 1 457 | - | - | ||
| 2 500 | - | - |
Ylin
7,18VWAP
Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
VWAP
Ylin
7,18Alin
7,09VaihtoMäärä
2,5 348 630
Välittäjätilasto
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