2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
42 päivää sitten38 min
24,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
2,99 %Tuotto/v
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
134
Myynti
Määrä
71
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | - | - | ||
| 4 | - | - | ||
| 8 | - | - | ||
| 2 | - | - | ||
| 31 | - | - |
Ylin
807,5VWAP
Alin
798,5VaihtoMäärä
5 6 154
VWAP
Ylin
807,5Alin
798,5VaihtoMäärä
5 6 154
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 798 | 6 798 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 798 | 6 798 | 0 | 0 |
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 5.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 29.10. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 19.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 7.5. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 6.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 26.2. |
Datan lähde: Quartr, FactSet
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuAnswer from Chat-Gpt about Jyske Bank's future. I think one should read the answer: 1. Why banks traditionally trade low There are four classic reasons that are deeply structural: A. Regulatory risk (Basel, SIFI, capital requirements) Banks must hold enormous buffers – in practice this means: Low ROE ceiling (you rarely get >12–13%) High capital requirements = low leverage No exponential growth → Investors do not pay tech multiples for something that cannot grow quickly due to legislation. B. Banks' business is cyclical – and historically dangerous Fear of crisis always sits with investors: 2008 (global crisis) 1990s (DK banking crisis) Negative interest rate period (2015–2021) that destroyed margins Real estate as latent risk → The bank can earn 7–12 mia. in good years (like Jyske), but lose 4 mia. in bad ones. This gives a risk discount, even if things are going well right now. C. Weak differentiation A bank is not like Novo, ASML or Nvidia. Customers rarely switch banks, but the bank also has no unique technology. It is considered infrastructure: low innovation low pricing power low growth → Therefore, banks globally trade low. D. The iron law of the rule: P/B ≈ ROE / Cost of Equity The financial theory that ALL investors' models are built on: P/B = ROE / (required return) For banks with: ROE 10–12% Required return 10–12% … the model automatically gives P/B = 1. And that matches Jyske Bank quite precisely. 2. Why Ringkjøbing Landbobank trades high RLB has for many years had ROE 15–20%, lower risk, and a culture where: losses are extremely low customers are stable they lend to strong Jutland segments with high security Therefore, they get P/B 1.8–2.2 and PE 14–17. RLB is "Novo Nordisk" among banks – not because they make AI, but because their ROE is structurally higher. 3. Why you perceive Jyske Bank's employees as “replaceable” Because they are. The Danish banking system is one of the most automated in the world. Customer employees: may not advise outside standard products may not say anything that can be interpreted as “investment advice” follow scripts for compliance reasons have large parts of insight into customer data, but may not perform risk profiling themselves Therefore, AI will: → Replace 60–80% of customer-facing functions in 2026–2030 And the banks know it. You are right: Advisory and credit assessment are better solved by AI, which can see patterns in: account history payment patterns risk housing data consumption data probability of default This is the biggest paradigm shift since online banking. 4. Will AI change banks' valuation? Yes – but only partially. A. AI provides higher productivity Banks in Europe expect: 20–30% fewer employees 25–40% lower administrative costs better credit assessment lower losses All together → higher ROE. If Jyske goes from ROE 10–12% to 14–16%, the calculation changes dramatically: P/B goes from 1 → 1.4–1.6 PE goes from 7–9 → 12–16 This is not unrealistic if AI lowers the cost base. B. But banks remain regulated infrastructure Even with AI comes: capital requirements stress tests political risk “too big to fail” regimes This means: Banks will never get tech multiples or SaaS valuations. But they can well be moved from “cheap value stocks” → “high-quality compounders”, as in Switzerland and Singapore. 5. Is Jyske Bank concretely cheap? All figures indicate that yes, it is significantly undervalued: PE ≈ 9 P/B ≈ 1.0 ROE ≈ 11–12% Massive share buybacks (15.000/day) Business is booming (especially housing/mortgage credit) Losses are record low High leverage towards housing transactions in DK, which is currently extremely strong If Jyske merely received half of the RLB multiple, the share price would be 30–40% higher. 6. So the question: Will there be a re-rating? A. Yes – if AI lowers costs If the cost-income ratio falls from 53% → 40–45%, Jyske gets: ROE 14–16% P/B 1.4–1.6 PE 12–14 This corresponds to +30–60% upside from now. B. Furthermore, many investors will discover “bank ≠ value trap” There are 3 trends in Europe: Banks are making a fortune due to normal interest rates (not zero interest rates) Share buybacks are exploding AI dramatically reduces labor costs More banks are becoming “semi-tech”, especially in payments and risk models Therefore, banks are starting to be traded a bit more like infrastructure assets, but still far from tech. C. But the structural discount will NEVER disappear You will never get PE 25 for a bank, no matter how digital it becomes. Regulation and credit risk stop multiple expansion at some point. Realistic ceiling: P/E 12–15 P/B 1.3–1.7 That is still a huge re-rating from today. To be continued - conclusion in next comment·1 päivä sittenConclusion: You are right about the AI thesis. Banks must save massively on employees, and everything you experience can be done better by AI. Jyske Bank is fundamentally undervalued. PE=9, P/B=1 is a gift when ROE is 11–12% and rising. The market will gradually change its view on banks, but they will never become tech. They will become “digitized infrastructure” – and that can well give PE 12–15. Ringkjøbing Landbobank is the prototype for the future value set: High quality → high P/B. If you own Jyske, you own a stock with asymmetric risk/upside – high earnings – low losses – buybacks – undervaluation – AI-tailwinds.- ·5.12.I also have this ETF which (just in case you've been living under a rock for a few years) is going through the roof. It's fucking crazy. A European bank ETF that is 80% up this year. https://www.nordnet.dk/etf/liste/amundi-euro-stoxx-banks-lybk-xeta
·3.12.It must surely fall again soon so the rest of us can buy in.·5.12.I am ridiculously bullish on Jyske Bank. I currently have 200K in it. However, I am also a customer and must say there is room for improvement. IF these come, we will go significantly higher. You wouldn't believe how many idiots they have employed. I mean, people who can only say what their Kåmputa tells them, which is why I think they could easily be replaced by an AI agent.
·2.12.Then it hit 800. Then Jens Løgstrup starts selling off the shares as they would become too large a position when it reached 800.
·1 päivä sittenAttended a lecture with the good Jens not too long ago. He said that he continues to view Jyske Bank very positively and that he will merely CONSIDER taking a bit off the top north of price 800.
·30.11.With Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
42 päivää sitten38 min
24,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
2,99 %Tuotto/v
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuAnswer from Chat-Gpt about Jyske Bank's future. I think one should read the answer: 1. Why banks traditionally trade low There are four classic reasons that are deeply structural: A. Regulatory risk (Basel, SIFI, capital requirements) Banks must hold enormous buffers – in practice this means: Low ROE ceiling (you rarely get >12–13%) High capital requirements = low leverage No exponential growth → Investors do not pay tech multiples for something that cannot grow quickly due to legislation. B. Banks' business is cyclical – and historically dangerous Fear of crisis always sits with investors: 2008 (global crisis) 1990s (DK banking crisis) Negative interest rate period (2015–2021) that destroyed margins Real estate as latent risk → The bank can earn 7–12 mia. in good years (like Jyske), but lose 4 mia. in bad ones. This gives a risk discount, even if things are going well right now. C. Weak differentiation A bank is not like Novo, ASML or Nvidia. Customers rarely switch banks, but the bank also has no unique technology. It is considered infrastructure: low innovation low pricing power low growth → Therefore, banks globally trade low. D. The iron law of the rule: P/B ≈ ROE / Cost of Equity The financial theory that ALL investors' models are built on: P/B = ROE / (required return) For banks with: ROE 10–12% Required return 10–12% … the model automatically gives P/B = 1. And that matches Jyske Bank quite precisely. 2. Why Ringkjøbing Landbobank trades high RLB has for many years had ROE 15–20%, lower risk, and a culture where: losses are extremely low customers are stable they lend to strong Jutland segments with high security Therefore, they get P/B 1.8–2.2 and PE 14–17. RLB is "Novo Nordisk" among banks – not because they make AI, but because their ROE is structurally higher. 3. Why you perceive Jyske Bank's employees as “replaceable” Because they are. The Danish banking system is one of the most automated in the world. Customer employees: may not advise outside standard products may not say anything that can be interpreted as “investment advice” follow scripts for compliance reasons have large parts of insight into customer data, but may not perform risk profiling themselves Therefore, AI will: → Replace 60–80% of customer-facing functions in 2026–2030 And the banks know it. You are right: Advisory and credit assessment are better solved by AI, which can see patterns in: account history payment patterns risk housing data consumption data probability of default This is the biggest paradigm shift since online banking. 4. Will AI change banks' valuation? Yes – but only partially. A. AI provides higher productivity Banks in Europe expect: 20–30% fewer employees 25–40% lower administrative costs better credit assessment lower losses All together → higher ROE. If Jyske goes from ROE 10–12% to 14–16%, the calculation changes dramatically: P/B goes from 1 → 1.4–1.6 PE goes from 7–9 → 12–16 This is not unrealistic if AI lowers the cost base. B. But banks remain regulated infrastructure Even with AI comes: capital requirements stress tests political risk “too big to fail” regimes This means: Banks will never get tech multiples or SaaS valuations. But they can well be moved from “cheap value stocks” → “high-quality compounders”, as in Switzerland and Singapore. 5. Is Jyske Bank concretely cheap? All figures indicate that yes, it is significantly undervalued: PE ≈ 9 P/B ≈ 1.0 ROE ≈ 11–12% Massive share buybacks (15.000/day) Business is booming (especially housing/mortgage credit) Losses are record low High leverage towards housing transactions in DK, which is currently extremely strong If Jyske merely received half of the RLB multiple, the share price would be 30–40% higher. 6. So the question: Will there be a re-rating? A. Yes – if AI lowers costs If the cost-income ratio falls from 53% → 40–45%, Jyske gets: ROE 14–16% P/B 1.4–1.6 PE 12–14 This corresponds to +30–60% upside from now. B. Furthermore, many investors will discover “bank ≠ value trap” There are 3 trends in Europe: Banks are making a fortune due to normal interest rates (not zero interest rates) Share buybacks are exploding AI dramatically reduces labor costs More banks are becoming “semi-tech”, especially in payments and risk models Therefore, banks are starting to be traded a bit more like infrastructure assets, but still far from tech. C. But the structural discount will NEVER disappear You will never get PE 25 for a bank, no matter how digital it becomes. Regulation and credit risk stop multiple expansion at some point. Realistic ceiling: P/E 12–15 P/B 1.3–1.7 That is still a huge re-rating from today. To be continued - conclusion in next comment·1 päivä sittenConclusion: You are right about the AI thesis. Banks must save massively on employees, and everything you experience can be done better by AI. Jyske Bank is fundamentally undervalued. PE=9, P/B=1 is a gift when ROE is 11–12% and rising. The market will gradually change its view on banks, but they will never become tech. They will become “digitized infrastructure” – and that can well give PE 12–15. Ringkjøbing Landbobank is the prototype for the future value set: High quality → high P/B. If you own Jyske, you own a stock with asymmetric risk/upside – high earnings – low losses – buybacks – undervaluation – AI-tailwinds.
- ·5.12.I also have this ETF which (just in case you've been living under a rock for a few years) is going through the roof. It's fucking crazy. A European bank ETF that is 80% up this year. https://www.nordnet.dk/etf/liste/amundi-euro-stoxx-banks-lybk-xeta
- ·3.12.It must surely fall again soon so the rest of us can buy in.·5.12.I am ridiculously bullish on Jyske Bank. I currently have 200K in it. However, I am also a customer and must say there is room for improvement. IF these come, we will go significantly higher. You wouldn't believe how many idiots they have employed. I mean, people who can only say what their Kåmputa tells them, which is why I think they could easily be replaced by an AI agent.
- ·2.12.Then it hit 800. Then Jens Løgstrup starts selling off the shares as they would become too large a position when it reached 800.·1 päivä sittenAttended a lecture with the good Jens not too long ago. He said that he continues to view Jyske Bank very positively and that he will merely CONSIDER taking a bit off the top north of price 800.
- ·30.11.With Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Copenhagen
Määrä
Osto
134
Myynti
Määrä
71
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | - | - | ||
| 4 | - | - | ||
| 8 | - | - | ||
| 2 | - | - | ||
| 31 | - | - |
Ylin
807,5VWAP
Alin
798,5VaihtoMäärä
5 6 154
VWAP
Ylin
807,5Alin
798,5VaihtoMäärä
5 6 154
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 798 | 6 798 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 6 798 | 6 798 | 0 | 0 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 5.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 29.10. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 19.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 7.5. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 6.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 26.2. |
Datan lähde: Quartr, FactSet
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
42 päivää sitten38 min
Uutiset ja analyysit
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 5.2.2026 |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 29.10. | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 19.8. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 7.5. | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 6.5. | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 26.2. |
Datan lähde: Quartr, FactSet
24,00 DKK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
2,99 %Tuotto/v
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuAnswer from Chat-Gpt about Jyske Bank's future. I think one should read the answer: 1. Why banks traditionally trade low There are four classic reasons that are deeply structural: A. Regulatory risk (Basel, SIFI, capital requirements) Banks must hold enormous buffers – in practice this means: Low ROE ceiling (you rarely get >12–13%) High capital requirements = low leverage No exponential growth → Investors do not pay tech multiples for something that cannot grow quickly due to legislation. B. Banks' business is cyclical – and historically dangerous Fear of crisis always sits with investors: 2008 (global crisis) 1990s (DK banking crisis) Negative interest rate period (2015–2021) that destroyed margins Real estate as latent risk → The bank can earn 7–12 mia. in good years (like Jyske), but lose 4 mia. in bad ones. This gives a risk discount, even if things are going well right now. C. Weak differentiation A bank is not like Novo, ASML or Nvidia. Customers rarely switch banks, but the bank also has no unique technology. It is considered infrastructure: low innovation low pricing power low growth → Therefore, banks globally trade low. D. The iron law of the rule: P/B ≈ ROE / Cost of Equity The financial theory that ALL investors' models are built on: P/B = ROE / (required return) For banks with: ROE 10–12% Required return 10–12% … the model automatically gives P/B = 1. And that matches Jyske Bank quite precisely. 2. Why Ringkjøbing Landbobank trades high RLB has for many years had ROE 15–20%, lower risk, and a culture where: losses are extremely low customers are stable they lend to strong Jutland segments with high security Therefore, they get P/B 1.8–2.2 and PE 14–17. RLB is "Novo Nordisk" among banks – not because they make AI, but because their ROE is structurally higher. 3. Why you perceive Jyske Bank's employees as “replaceable” Because they are. The Danish banking system is one of the most automated in the world. Customer employees: may not advise outside standard products may not say anything that can be interpreted as “investment advice” follow scripts for compliance reasons have large parts of insight into customer data, but may not perform risk profiling themselves Therefore, AI will: → Replace 60–80% of customer-facing functions in 2026–2030 And the banks know it. You are right: Advisory and credit assessment are better solved by AI, which can see patterns in: account history payment patterns risk housing data consumption data probability of default This is the biggest paradigm shift since online banking. 4. Will AI change banks' valuation? Yes – but only partially. A. AI provides higher productivity Banks in Europe expect: 20–30% fewer employees 25–40% lower administrative costs better credit assessment lower losses All together → higher ROE. If Jyske goes from ROE 10–12% to 14–16%, the calculation changes dramatically: P/B goes from 1 → 1.4–1.6 PE goes from 7–9 → 12–16 This is not unrealistic if AI lowers the cost base. B. But banks remain regulated infrastructure Even with AI comes: capital requirements stress tests political risk “too big to fail” regimes This means: Banks will never get tech multiples or SaaS valuations. But they can well be moved from “cheap value stocks” → “high-quality compounders”, as in Switzerland and Singapore. 5. Is Jyske Bank concretely cheap? All figures indicate that yes, it is significantly undervalued: PE ≈ 9 P/B ≈ 1.0 ROE ≈ 11–12% Massive share buybacks (15.000/day) Business is booming (especially housing/mortgage credit) Losses are record low High leverage towards housing transactions in DK, which is currently extremely strong If Jyske merely received half of the RLB multiple, the share price would be 30–40% higher. 6. So the question: Will there be a re-rating? A. Yes – if AI lowers costs If the cost-income ratio falls from 53% → 40–45%, Jyske gets: ROE 14–16% P/B 1.4–1.6 PE 12–14 This corresponds to +30–60% upside from now. B. Furthermore, many investors will discover “bank ≠ value trap” There are 3 trends in Europe: Banks are making a fortune due to normal interest rates (not zero interest rates) Share buybacks are exploding AI dramatically reduces labor costs More banks are becoming “semi-tech”, especially in payments and risk models Therefore, banks are starting to be traded a bit more like infrastructure assets, but still far from tech. C. But the structural discount will NEVER disappear You will never get PE 25 for a bank, no matter how digital it becomes. Regulation and credit risk stop multiple expansion at some point. Realistic ceiling: P/E 12–15 P/B 1.3–1.7 That is still a huge re-rating from today. To be continued - conclusion in next comment·1 päivä sittenConclusion: You are right about the AI thesis. Banks must save massively on employees, and everything you experience can be done better by AI. Jyske Bank is fundamentally undervalued. PE=9, P/B=1 is a gift when ROE is 11–12% and rising. The market will gradually change its view on banks, but they will never become tech. They will become “digitized infrastructure” – and that can well give PE 12–15. Ringkjøbing Landbobank is the prototype for the future value set: High quality → high P/B. If you own Jyske, you own a stock with asymmetric risk/upside – high earnings – low losses – buybacks – undervaluation – AI-tailwinds.
- ·5.12.I also have this ETF which (just in case you've been living under a rock for a few years) is going through the roof. It's fucking crazy. A European bank ETF that is 80% up this year. https://www.nordnet.dk/etf/liste/amundi-euro-stoxx-banks-lybk-xeta
- ·3.12.It must surely fall again soon so the rest of us can buy in.·5.12.I am ridiculously bullish on Jyske Bank. I currently have 200K in it. However, I am also a customer and must say there is room for improvement. IF these come, we will go significantly higher. You wouldn't believe how many idiots they have employed. I mean, people who can only say what their Kåmputa tells them, which is why I think they could easily be replaced by an AI agent.
- ·2.12.Then it hit 800. Then Jens Løgstrup starts selling off the shares as they would become too large a position when it reached 800.·1 päivä sittenAttended a lecture with the good Jens not too long ago. He said that he continues to view Jyske Bank very positively and that he will merely CONSIDER taking a bit off the top north of price 800.
- ·30.11.With Vestjysk Bank's submission of its financial report on Tuesday, the series concluded after a third quarter where surprises on the financial reporting front were few. But one does not need to bring out the magnifying glass to see indications that future Danish listed banks risk being divided into an A-team and a B-team. There is agreement among bank directors that consolidations will continue to sweep over the industry; but no one sees themselves as playing second fiddle in a merger. This discrepancy may cause smiles in the short term, but at some point, it will become serious for those banks that, both in a relative and absolute sense, do not have control over their costs. While the (almost) entire Danish business journalism community limits their presentation of quarterly reports to a comparison with the corresponding quarter last year – and therefore, about 20 times following the same template, has had to note that net interest income has been falling – this templated approach misses a crucial element in determining future winners and losers: Cost management. With many years as an economic advisor as my background, I have learned that it is in good times that the captain must manage the economy tightly, while in times of crisis, room for maneuver must be created to bring the ship safely to port – and perhaps even make some offensive and even cheap investments. This fundamental principle applies regardless of whether it concerns a personal economy, a corporate economy, or a national economy. While the stewards of the national economy are only elected for a period of four years, and are not necessarily chosen for their abilities or insight into economic matters, we can demand to have higher expectations of the managers of companies. I have great sympathy for the bank directors' focus on the fact that it is other stakeholders than just the shareholders whose interests must be safeguarded. All interests must naturally be calibrated. There is simply no natural conflict between strict cost management and the interests of other stakeholders. Yes, employees want higher wages – but employees also have an interest in a viable structure. And if I were to pinpoint one aspect that, in my view, is indicative of the banks' results in the coming years, it is the readiness to have a firm hand on the tiller on the cost side. The first visible proof of this level of awareness is a strategic goal for a given cost-to-income ratio. If you read the banks' financial reports and there is no mention of a target for the cost-to-income ratio, then I believe we have a first warning sign. Try to form your own opinion based on the following four examples: 1. From Nordfyns Bank's annual report 2024: “The Group's business model and growth strategy mean that the cost-to-income ratio will continue to be relatively high. It is management's objective that growth and efficiency improvements should continuously reduce the cost-to-income ratio.” (I am probably not claiming too much if I believe this is a relatively vague formulation of an objective). 2. From SJF Q3 report 2025: “Our cost-to-income ratio must be reduced and be below 50 % by financial year 2026 at the latest.” 3. Danske Bank has, in its “Forward 28” strategy, set a concrete target for a cost-to-income ratio of a maximum of 45. 4. The ultimate proof that strict cost management is not a barrier to continued growth and success is Ringkjøbing Landbobank, which is known for its notorious focus on the cost-to-income ratio. This has also meant that the bank is now valued at completely different multiples than its competitors. To identify the differences between the banks, I have conducted a very simple analysis of net interest and fee income vs. personnel and administrative costs in the Danish listed banks from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025. There can be many objections to the assumptions in such an analysis: Why Q1 2023? Why compare the top line with a single element on the cost side? My answer to this is that sometimes even very simple analyses can help us identify a trend. Although interest rates have fallen during the period (but this is the same for all banks), otherwise, despite geopolitical tensions and inflation challenges, it must be said to be a quite stable period. What I am trying to identify is not the actual level (we have other key figures for that), but solely the development for the individual banks over this period consisting of 11 quarters. I have only included 17 listed banks in the analysis, as Ringkjøbing Landbobank, due to its history, is valued differently by analysts and investors. At the same time, I am excluding Nordea, as its primary listing is not in Denmark.
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