2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
24 päivää sitten
‧16 min
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 116 | - | - | ||
| 583 | - | - | ||
| 326 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 30.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 31.8. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 29.5. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 31.3. | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 28.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 - tulosraportti 29.8.2025 |
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·7 t sittenHas anyone heard Russell address the capacity in Basis+ specifically? I think this is one of the most important, but least discussed parts of the case here in the forum. Basis+ is not a single basis trade. The strategy combines spot against futures or perpetuals, relative positions along the Bitcoin yield curve, selling short-term options with ongoing delta hedging, and yield on collateral. These sub-strategies have quite different capacity constraints…. For basis and funding, the size of the Bitcoin market itself is not the decisive factor. Capacity is determined more by the depth of the derivatives markets, the size of open interest, the spreads between spot and futures, funding differences between marketplaces, and how much capital can be moved without the fund itself pressing away the return. When multiple actors make the same trade, the basis will normally compress. And more and more actors are entering this market…. The same crowding problem we have seen in other strategies. Yield curve arbitrage can provide more opportunities, but it requires good liquidity across maturities and marketplaces. Gross exposure can also become far larger than net exposure, even if the portfolio appears delta-neutral. Then margin management, collateral, and counterparty limits become central. The options part has a different capacity/risk profile. Hilbert sells short-term options when the models see attractive levels in the volatility surface, and hedges the delta towards maturity. This part can provide good ongoing premium, but the capacity is limited by options depth, bid/ask spreads, and how efficiently large hedge movements can be executed in volatile markets. A high historical hit rate also does not necessarily say much about the loss size during periods when the market moves sharply. Yield on stablecoin-based collateral is probably easier to scale, but here the risk shifts to credit, liquidity, depeg, smart contracts, and concentration towards certain issuers or platforms. Therefore, I do not believe Basis+ has a single static capacity limit. The capacity will vary with the market regime. In periods of high demand for leverage, high funding, high options pricing, and large spread between marketplaces, the strategy can probably handle significantly more capital. In calm and efficient markets, the same USD 200m may become far more difficult to manage for high return. What I would like to hear Russell answer specifically is: Have they estimated the strategy capacity at, for example, USD 200m, 500m, and 1 billion in AUM? How much do they expect the marginal return to fall when capital increases? Which of the four return sources is in practice the biggest bottleneck? And does the break-even assumption of 18 percent gross return build on a return they believe can be maintained also at significantly higher AUM?(???) It is also relevant whether the growth is to be absorbed by the current Basis+ book, or if Hilbert plans to open more strategies and marketplaces to preserve the return. If more AUM is just pushed into the same spreads, revenues can grow far slower than AUM. If, on the other hand, they have several independent return sources with significant unused capacity, the operational gearing becomes more credible. This is just as important a question as how quickly the pipeline is converted. AUM growth is valuable only when capital can be managed without the fund "arbitrificing away" its own return….
They have the capacity to take in much more. RT has said that many times. They are also looking at several strategies going forward for new markets. Use AI and you will get answers to much of this.
·9 t sittenWritten by someone who really understands the case, but doesn't have a Nordnet user: When the business is a derivative of an underlying asset that is volatile, the shares often become volatile. At this pace, we are still below 2 kroner even if BTC goes to 100k. A bit strange that we give away the entire rally so easily, but that's how it is. On the positive side, 84k is much better than ~50k and sentiment within crypto is significantly better than it has been in a long time. Performance in funds should go up along with allocations, and if we manage 150-200m by Q1 you don't need a share issue (at least nothing of significance if there is any shortfall) and one can look towards 2027 and what we will then earn there. My take is that this will provide a significant repricing. Put another way - if you believe in P/E 20x (Coinbase is 59x for 2027e) and no share issue, today's pricing implies that we will achieve earnings of approximately USD1m. The path from cash breakeven (Q1) to USD1m earnings is terribly short... in 2/20 AUM terms with a 10% return, we're talking about USD25m more AUM. Put one last way - every USD25m AUM (given a 10% return and a 2/20 fee) corresponds to USD20m in valuation after we reach cash breakeven. At that point, it could become a lot of fun. The first step is to get there, but after that, I think the market will quickly chase after. Naturally with the reservation that the fee in reality will be somewhat lower (i.e. 2/15 on Synthetica), but that doesn't change the math significantly. The first USD100m AUM I assume is a 1/10 structure, and the money after this is likely more 2/15. We have to get to 150-200m AUM (defending USD6m OPEX), after which we can base ourselves on the valuation in the paragraph above.Thanks for sharing. The author seems to understand the central mechanism in the Hilbert case well. Once the company covers its fixed cost base, additional AUM can achieve high marginal profitability. That is likely also where the greatest potential re-pricing lies. I still think it is important to distinguish between Hilbert's own numbers and the assumptions put into the calculation. Hilbert has reported fee-paying AUM of USD 79.5m and estimated break-even at USD 165m to 200m. However, this break-even estimate is based on 18 percent annual gross return, effective fee rates of approximately 1.14 percent management fee and 13.81 percent performance fee, as well as a cash cost of USD 1.5m to 1.9m per quarter. The claim that USD 25m in extra AUM yields USD 1m in earnings is mathematically correct if assuming 2/20, 10 percent return, and close to zero marginal cost. But that is a scenario, not a confirmed Hilbert figure. At 2/15 and 10 percent return, USD 25m AUM yields approx USD 0.875m in gross fee income. With the effective rates Hilbert uses in its own presentation, the corresponding income is approx USD 0.63m. At 18 percent return, it becomes approx USD 0.91m. This is fee income before any extra costs and tax, not automatically net profit. Nor do we publicly know which fee structure applies to all new capital. The assumption of 1/10 on the first USD 100m and 2/15 on capital thereafter may be reasonable, but as far as I can see it is not confirmed by Hilbert. I would also distinguish between the effect of a higher BTC price and the return in the strategies themselves. Higher BTC lifts the USD value of BTC-denominated AUM, increases Xapo's fee base, and can improve sentiment and pipeline conversion. Basis+ is nonetheless a delta-neutral strategy. The return depends on basis, funding, volatility, and other market inefficiencies. It does not rise automatically just because BTC rises. Regarding P/E 20, it is a possible valuation assumption, but not a fact. A stable management fee should normally be valued higher than a volatile performance fee. Coinbase is also not a particularly good comparison, since the revenue model, scale, and product breadth are quite different. I agree with the direction of the argument, but not that every USD 25m in extra AUM can automatically be converted to USD 20m in company value. That value depends on fee mix, actual strategy return, cost development, and how repeatable performance fees turn out to be. The positive is that the upside can still be significant if Hilbert reaches USD 165m to 200m in fee-paying AUM, delivers satisfactory returns, and gets costs down as guided without significant dilution. Then the case changes character, from financing risk to operational gearing. But the company must first prove all three parts. AUM must become fee-paying, the strategies must deliver, and costs must actually come down.- ·1 päivä sitten23 new BTC in the queue. 2 mill on the way with the next cohort! Synthetics are ticking and running!
There deleted Baretaper his comment once again. Then has he probably gone into the share again. Same routine...
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
24 päivää sitten
‧16 min
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·7 t sittenHas anyone heard Russell address the capacity in Basis+ specifically? I think this is one of the most important, but least discussed parts of the case here in the forum. Basis+ is not a single basis trade. The strategy combines spot against futures or perpetuals, relative positions along the Bitcoin yield curve, selling short-term options with ongoing delta hedging, and yield on collateral. These sub-strategies have quite different capacity constraints…. For basis and funding, the size of the Bitcoin market itself is not the decisive factor. Capacity is determined more by the depth of the derivatives markets, the size of open interest, the spreads between spot and futures, funding differences between marketplaces, and how much capital can be moved without the fund itself pressing away the return. When multiple actors make the same trade, the basis will normally compress. And more and more actors are entering this market…. The same crowding problem we have seen in other strategies. Yield curve arbitrage can provide more opportunities, but it requires good liquidity across maturities and marketplaces. Gross exposure can also become far larger than net exposure, even if the portfolio appears delta-neutral. Then margin management, collateral, and counterparty limits become central. The options part has a different capacity/risk profile. Hilbert sells short-term options when the models see attractive levels in the volatility surface, and hedges the delta towards maturity. This part can provide good ongoing premium, but the capacity is limited by options depth, bid/ask spreads, and how efficiently large hedge movements can be executed in volatile markets. A high historical hit rate also does not necessarily say much about the loss size during periods when the market moves sharply. Yield on stablecoin-based collateral is probably easier to scale, but here the risk shifts to credit, liquidity, depeg, smart contracts, and concentration towards certain issuers or platforms. Therefore, I do not believe Basis+ has a single static capacity limit. The capacity will vary with the market regime. In periods of high demand for leverage, high funding, high options pricing, and large spread between marketplaces, the strategy can probably handle significantly more capital. In calm and efficient markets, the same USD 200m may become far more difficult to manage for high return. What I would like to hear Russell answer specifically is: Have they estimated the strategy capacity at, for example, USD 200m, 500m, and 1 billion in AUM? How much do they expect the marginal return to fall when capital increases? Which of the four return sources is in practice the biggest bottleneck? And does the break-even assumption of 18 percent gross return build on a return they believe can be maintained also at significantly higher AUM?(???) It is also relevant whether the growth is to be absorbed by the current Basis+ book, or if Hilbert plans to open more strategies and marketplaces to preserve the return. If more AUM is just pushed into the same spreads, revenues can grow far slower than AUM. If, on the other hand, they have several independent return sources with significant unused capacity, the operational gearing becomes more credible. This is just as important a question as how quickly the pipeline is converted. AUM growth is valuable only when capital can be managed without the fund "arbitrificing away" its own return….They have the capacity to take in much more. RT has said that many times. They are also looking at several strategies going forward for new markets. Use AI and you will get answers to much of this.
- ·9 t sittenWritten by someone who really understands the case, but doesn't have a Nordnet user: When the business is a derivative of an underlying asset that is volatile, the shares often become volatile. At this pace, we are still below 2 kroner even if BTC goes to 100k. A bit strange that we give away the entire rally so easily, but that's how it is. On the positive side, 84k is much better than ~50k and sentiment within crypto is significantly better than it has been in a long time. Performance in funds should go up along with allocations, and if we manage 150-200m by Q1 you don't need a share issue (at least nothing of significance if there is any shortfall) and one can look towards 2027 and what we will then earn there. My take is that this will provide a significant repricing. Put another way - if you believe in P/E 20x (Coinbase is 59x for 2027e) and no share issue, today's pricing implies that we will achieve earnings of approximately USD1m. The path from cash breakeven (Q1) to USD1m earnings is terribly short... in 2/20 AUM terms with a 10% return, we're talking about USD25m more AUM. Put one last way - every USD25m AUM (given a 10% return and a 2/20 fee) corresponds to USD20m in valuation after we reach cash breakeven. At that point, it could become a lot of fun. The first step is to get there, but after that, I think the market will quickly chase after. Naturally with the reservation that the fee in reality will be somewhat lower (i.e. 2/15 on Synthetica), but that doesn't change the math significantly. The first USD100m AUM I assume is a 1/10 structure, and the money after this is likely more 2/15. We have to get to 150-200m AUM (defending USD6m OPEX), after which we can base ourselves on the valuation in the paragraph above.Thanks for sharing. The author seems to understand the central mechanism in the Hilbert case well. Once the company covers its fixed cost base, additional AUM can achieve high marginal profitability. That is likely also where the greatest potential re-pricing lies. I still think it is important to distinguish between Hilbert's own numbers and the assumptions put into the calculation. Hilbert has reported fee-paying AUM of USD 79.5m and estimated break-even at USD 165m to 200m. However, this break-even estimate is based on 18 percent annual gross return, effective fee rates of approximately 1.14 percent management fee and 13.81 percent performance fee, as well as a cash cost of USD 1.5m to 1.9m per quarter. The claim that USD 25m in extra AUM yields USD 1m in earnings is mathematically correct if assuming 2/20, 10 percent return, and close to zero marginal cost. But that is a scenario, not a confirmed Hilbert figure. At 2/15 and 10 percent return, USD 25m AUM yields approx USD 0.875m in gross fee income. With the effective rates Hilbert uses in its own presentation, the corresponding income is approx USD 0.63m. At 18 percent return, it becomes approx USD 0.91m. This is fee income before any extra costs and tax, not automatically net profit. Nor do we publicly know which fee structure applies to all new capital. The assumption of 1/10 on the first USD 100m and 2/15 on capital thereafter may be reasonable, but as far as I can see it is not confirmed by Hilbert. I would also distinguish between the effect of a higher BTC price and the return in the strategies themselves. Higher BTC lifts the USD value of BTC-denominated AUM, increases Xapo's fee base, and can improve sentiment and pipeline conversion. Basis+ is nonetheless a delta-neutral strategy. The return depends on basis, funding, volatility, and other market inefficiencies. It does not rise automatically just because BTC rises. Regarding P/E 20, it is a possible valuation assumption, but not a fact. A stable management fee should normally be valued higher than a volatile performance fee. Coinbase is also not a particularly good comparison, since the revenue model, scale, and product breadth are quite different. I agree with the direction of the argument, but not that every USD 25m in extra AUM can automatically be converted to USD 20m in company value. That value depends on fee mix, actual strategy return, cost development, and how repeatable performance fees turn out to be. The positive is that the upside can still be significant if Hilbert reaches USD 165m to 200m in fee-paying AUM, delivers satisfactory returns, and gets costs down as guided without significant dilution. Then the case changes character, from financing risk to operational gearing. But the company must first prove all three parts. AUM must become fee-paying, the strategies must deliver, and costs must actually come down.
- ·1 päivä sitten23 new BTC in the queue. 2 mill on the way with the next cohort! Synthetics are ticking and running!There deleted Baretaper his comment once again. Then has he probably gone into the share again. Same routine...
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 116 | - | - | ||
| 583 | - | - | ||
| 326 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 30.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 31.8. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 29.5. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 31.3. | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 28.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 - tulosraportti 29.8.2025 |
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
24 päivää sitten
‧16 min
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 30.11. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 31.8. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 29.5. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 31.3. | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 28.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 - tulosraportti 29.8.2025 |
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·7 t sittenHas anyone heard Russell address the capacity in Basis+ specifically? I think this is one of the most important, but least discussed parts of the case here in the forum. Basis+ is not a single basis trade. The strategy combines spot against futures or perpetuals, relative positions along the Bitcoin yield curve, selling short-term options with ongoing delta hedging, and yield on collateral. These sub-strategies have quite different capacity constraints…. For basis and funding, the size of the Bitcoin market itself is not the decisive factor. Capacity is determined more by the depth of the derivatives markets, the size of open interest, the spreads between spot and futures, funding differences between marketplaces, and how much capital can be moved without the fund itself pressing away the return. When multiple actors make the same trade, the basis will normally compress. And more and more actors are entering this market…. The same crowding problem we have seen in other strategies. Yield curve arbitrage can provide more opportunities, but it requires good liquidity across maturities and marketplaces. Gross exposure can also become far larger than net exposure, even if the portfolio appears delta-neutral. Then margin management, collateral, and counterparty limits become central. The options part has a different capacity/risk profile. Hilbert sells short-term options when the models see attractive levels in the volatility surface, and hedges the delta towards maturity. This part can provide good ongoing premium, but the capacity is limited by options depth, bid/ask spreads, and how efficiently large hedge movements can be executed in volatile markets. A high historical hit rate also does not necessarily say much about the loss size during periods when the market moves sharply. Yield on stablecoin-based collateral is probably easier to scale, but here the risk shifts to credit, liquidity, depeg, smart contracts, and concentration towards certain issuers or platforms. Therefore, I do not believe Basis+ has a single static capacity limit. The capacity will vary with the market regime. In periods of high demand for leverage, high funding, high options pricing, and large spread between marketplaces, the strategy can probably handle significantly more capital. In calm and efficient markets, the same USD 200m may become far more difficult to manage for high return. What I would like to hear Russell answer specifically is: Have they estimated the strategy capacity at, for example, USD 200m, 500m, and 1 billion in AUM? How much do they expect the marginal return to fall when capital increases? Which of the four return sources is in practice the biggest bottleneck? And does the break-even assumption of 18 percent gross return build on a return they believe can be maintained also at significantly higher AUM?(???) It is also relevant whether the growth is to be absorbed by the current Basis+ book, or if Hilbert plans to open more strategies and marketplaces to preserve the return. If more AUM is just pushed into the same spreads, revenues can grow far slower than AUM. If, on the other hand, they have several independent return sources with significant unused capacity, the operational gearing becomes more credible. This is just as important a question as how quickly the pipeline is converted. AUM growth is valuable only when capital can be managed without the fund "arbitrificing away" its own return….They have the capacity to take in much more. RT has said that many times. They are also looking at several strategies going forward for new markets. Use AI and you will get answers to much of this.
- ·9 t sittenWritten by someone who really understands the case, but doesn't have a Nordnet user: When the business is a derivative of an underlying asset that is volatile, the shares often become volatile. At this pace, we are still below 2 kroner even if BTC goes to 100k. A bit strange that we give away the entire rally so easily, but that's how it is. On the positive side, 84k is much better than ~50k and sentiment within crypto is significantly better than it has been in a long time. Performance in funds should go up along with allocations, and if we manage 150-200m by Q1 you don't need a share issue (at least nothing of significance if there is any shortfall) and one can look towards 2027 and what we will then earn there. My take is that this will provide a significant repricing. Put another way - if you believe in P/E 20x (Coinbase is 59x for 2027e) and no share issue, today's pricing implies that we will achieve earnings of approximately USD1m. The path from cash breakeven (Q1) to USD1m earnings is terribly short... in 2/20 AUM terms with a 10% return, we're talking about USD25m more AUM. Put one last way - every USD25m AUM (given a 10% return and a 2/20 fee) corresponds to USD20m in valuation after we reach cash breakeven. At that point, it could become a lot of fun. The first step is to get there, but after that, I think the market will quickly chase after. Naturally with the reservation that the fee in reality will be somewhat lower (i.e. 2/15 on Synthetica), but that doesn't change the math significantly. The first USD100m AUM I assume is a 1/10 structure, and the money after this is likely more 2/15. We have to get to 150-200m AUM (defending USD6m OPEX), after which we can base ourselves on the valuation in the paragraph above.Thanks for sharing. The author seems to understand the central mechanism in the Hilbert case well. Once the company covers its fixed cost base, additional AUM can achieve high marginal profitability. That is likely also where the greatest potential re-pricing lies. I still think it is important to distinguish between Hilbert's own numbers and the assumptions put into the calculation. Hilbert has reported fee-paying AUM of USD 79.5m and estimated break-even at USD 165m to 200m. However, this break-even estimate is based on 18 percent annual gross return, effective fee rates of approximately 1.14 percent management fee and 13.81 percent performance fee, as well as a cash cost of USD 1.5m to 1.9m per quarter. The claim that USD 25m in extra AUM yields USD 1m in earnings is mathematically correct if assuming 2/20, 10 percent return, and close to zero marginal cost. But that is a scenario, not a confirmed Hilbert figure. At 2/15 and 10 percent return, USD 25m AUM yields approx USD 0.875m in gross fee income. With the effective rates Hilbert uses in its own presentation, the corresponding income is approx USD 0.63m. At 18 percent return, it becomes approx USD 0.91m. This is fee income before any extra costs and tax, not automatically net profit. Nor do we publicly know which fee structure applies to all new capital. The assumption of 1/10 on the first USD 100m and 2/15 on capital thereafter may be reasonable, but as far as I can see it is not confirmed by Hilbert. I would also distinguish between the effect of a higher BTC price and the return in the strategies themselves. Higher BTC lifts the USD value of BTC-denominated AUM, increases Xapo's fee base, and can improve sentiment and pipeline conversion. Basis+ is nonetheless a delta-neutral strategy. The return depends on basis, funding, volatility, and other market inefficiencies. It does not rise automatically just because BTC rises. Regarding P/E 20, it is a possible valuation assumption, but not a fact. A stable management fee should normally be valued higher than a volatile performance fee. Coinbase is also not a particularly good comparison, since the revenue model, scale, and product breadth are quite different. I agree with the direction of the argument, but not that every USD 25m in extra AUM can automatically be converted to USD 20m in company value. That value depends on fee mix, actual strategy return, cost development, and how repeatable performance fees turn out to be. The positive is that the upside can still be significant if Hilbert reaches USD 165m to 200m in fee-paying AUM, delivers satisfactory returns, and gets costs down as guided without significant dilution. Then the case changes character, from financing risk to operational gearing. But the company must first prove all three parts. AUM must become fee-paying, the strategies must deliver, and costs must actually come down.
- ·1 päivä sitten23 new BTC in the queue. 2 mill on the way with the next cohort! Synthetics are ticking and running!There deleted Baretaper his comment once again. Then has he probably gone into the share again. Same routine...
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | - | - | ||
| 23 | - | - | ||
| 116 | - | - | ||
| 583 | - | - | ||
| 326 | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt