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Intrum

Ei tietoja.
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
49 päivää sitten
1,3532 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v

Tarjoustasot

Ei dataa

Viimeisimmät kaupat

AikaHintaMääräOstajaMyyjä
----

Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.

Välittäjätilasto

Dataa ei löytynyt

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
28.8.
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29.1.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
30.10.2025
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti
25.7.2025
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.2025

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
  • 20 min sitten
    ·
    Absolutely the worst stock in my portfolio ever. I wonder why people are still willing to push money into the company? Is it the fear of losing everything? A desperate attempt to get out of the swamp relatively dry-shod? My confidence is zero. Made the decision not to invest a single penny more. Maybe I'll get rid of what I have and take the hit? Do I believe there will be selling pressure and the price will go down? However, I might be completely wrong. Maybe I've missed my life's chance? I doubt it…
  • 2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    What did I say, bear x 10 with kr 10000
  • 4 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Have had a dialogue with AI about how the rights issue and the directed issues going forward create a completely new market dynamic. Received the following summary: 1. The present until early July: The technical selling (The short-term perspective) Trading in subscription rights ended on June 24, and the subscription period itself expires on June 29. Until the new shares are actually delivered in early July, we will see a large technical imbalance: Arbitrage and "BTA-pressure": Currently, the share is traded in parallel with Paid Subscribed Shares (BTA). When these BTAs are converted into ordinary shares in early July, a concrete selling pressure often arises. Many investors and arbitragers who bought cheap rights/BTAs want to secure quick profits and sell the new ordinary shares directly upon delivery. The Guarantor Group's actions: If the issue was not subscribed to 100% by the public but partly fell to the guarantors (banks and consortium), these institutions tend to want to sell off their "involuntary" shares on the market as soon as possible to reduce their risk. This can act as a temporary price ceiling. 2. The rest of 2026: Liquidity and index effects (The medium-term perspective) When the over 3 billion shares have been absorbed by the market, the share's characteristics fundamentally change: From "rocket" to "tanker": Previously, Intrum was a relatively "illiquid" share with 136 million outstanding shares. This caused the price to fluctuate sharply on news (high volatility). With over 3 billion shares, enormously larger capital volumes are required to move the price one krona up or down. Trading volumes will increase drastically, but price movements will probably be more sluggish. Index funds must buy: As Intrum's total market capitalization increases in line with 7.5 billion kronor in net capital flowing in, the company's weight in various Swedish and international stock indices (e.g., OMX) will be recalculated. This forces passive index funds to make mechanical support purchases of the share during upcoming index rebalancings, which provides a theoretical cushion against further falls. 3. Going forward: Fundamental valuation and EPS hit (The long-term perspective) Long-term, the share stops being traded on "issuance technique" and returns to being valued based on fundamental key figures. Here, the dilution of ~95.7% becomes brutally visible: Earnings per share (EPS) collapses: Even if Intrum manages to significantly reduce its interest costs by paying off its expensive debts, the net profit must now be divided by 20 times more shares. EPS will look very low for a long time to come. Demand for operational delivery: For the share price to climb long-term, it is not enough that the balance sheet has been saved by the credit rating agencies. The market will demand that management shows that the new, debt-reduced Intrum can actually generate organic growth and stable cash flows. Every report disappointment will be severely punished because there are so many shareholders who want out.
  • 5 t sitten
    ·
    The number of shares does NOT control the price This seems to be a recurring misunderstanding in the thread. That Intrum goes from 136 million to 3.2 billion shares doesn't matter in itself — it's the market capitalization that counts, not the number of shares. Atlas Copco has almost 5 billion shares and is one of Sweden's best-managed companies. It's just like dividing a pizza into 8 or 32 slices — the pizza is the same size regardless. Intrum will never be debt-free — and that's not the intention This is perhaps the most important misunderstanding. Intrum's business model *is built* on debt. They buy overdue receivables with borrowed money and profit from the spread between financing cost and portfolio yield — just like a bank. A debt-free Intrum is a meaningless Intrum. The goal is not zero debt but a *manageable* leverage ratio of 3.0–3.5x Cash EBITDA by 2028. The real problem wasn't the debt — it was the interest rate When interest rates were near zero, Intrum borrowed at 2–3% and bought portfolios with 10–12% yield. A spread of 7–9 percentage points. When interest rates exploded in 2022–2023, the financing cost rose to 7–8% while the portfolio yield couldn't keep up. The spread collapsed. That's the whole crisis in a nutshell.
    2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Well summarized @FreddeBruno 👍🏼
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, ​​eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Tuotteita joiden kohde-etuutena tämä arvopaperi

2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
49 päivää sitten
1,3532 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
  • 20 min sitten
    ·
    Absolutely the worst stock in my portfolio ever. I wonder why people are still willing to push money into the company? Is it the fear of losing everything? A desperate attempt to get out of the swamp relatively dry-shod? My confidence is zero. Made the decision not to invest a single penny more. Maybe I'll get rid of what I have and take the hit? Do I believe there will be selling pressure and the price will go down? However, I might be completely wrong. Maybe I've missed my life's chance? I doubt it…
  • 2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    What did I say, bear x 10 with kr 10000
  • 4 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Have had a dialogue with AI about how the rights issue and the directed issues going forward create a completely new market dynamic. Received the following summary: 1. The present until early July: The technical selling (The short-term perspective) Trading in subscription rights ended on June 24, and the subscription period itself expires on June 29. Until the new shares are actually delivered in early July, we will see a large technical imbalance: Arbitrage and "BTA-pressure": Currently, the share is traded in parallel with Paid Subscribed Shares (BTA). When these BTAs are converted into ordinary shares in early July, a concrete selling pressure often arises. Many investors and arbitragers who bought cheap rights/BTAs want to secure quick profits and sell the new ordinary shares directly upon delivery. The Guarantor Group's actions: If the issue was not subscribed to 100% by the public but partly fell to the guarantors (banks and consortium), these institutions tend to want to sell off their "involuntary" shares on the market as soon as possible to reduce their risk. This can act as a temporary price ceiling. 2. The rest of 2026: Liquidity and index effects (The medium-term perspective) When the over 3 billion shares have been absorbed by the market, the share's characteristics fundamentally change: From "rocket" to "tanker": Previously, Intrum was a relatively "illiquid" share with 136 million outstanding shares. This caused the price to fluctuate sharply on news (high volatility). With over 3 billion shares, enormously larger capital volumes are required to move the price one krona up or down. Trading volumes will increase drastically, but price movements will probably be more sluggish. Index funds must buy: As Intrum's total market capitalization increases in line with 7.5 billion kronor in net capital flowing in, the company's weight in various Swedish and international stock indices (e.g., OMX) will be recalculated. This forces passive index funds to make mechanical support purchases of the share during upcoming index rebalancings, which provides a theoretical cushion against further falls. 3. Going forward: Fundamental valuation and EPS hit (The long-term perspective) Long-term, the share stops being traded on "issuance technique" and returns to being valued based on fundamental key figures. Here, the dilution of ~95.7% becomes brutally visible: Earnings per share (EPS) collapses: Even if Intrum manages to significantly reduce its interest costs by paying off its expensive debts, the net profit must now be divided by 20 times more shares. EPS will look very low for a long time to come. Demand for operational delivery: For the share price to climb long-term, it is not enough that the balance sheet has been saved by the credit rating agencies. The market will demand that management shows that the new, debt-reduced Intrum can actually generate organic growth and stable cash flows. Every report disappointment will be severely punished because there are so many shareholders who want out.
  • 5 t sitten
    ·
    The number of shares does NOT control the price This seems to be a recurring misunderstanding in the thread. That Intrum goes from 136 million to 3.2 billion shares doesn't matter in itself — it's the market capitalization that counts, not the number of shares. Atlas Copco has almost 5 billion shares and is one of Sweden's best-managed companies. It's just like dividing a pizza into 8 or 32 slices — the pizza is the same size regardless. Intrum will never be debt-free — and that's not the intention This is perhaps the most important misunderstanding. Intrum's business model *is built* on debt. They buy overdue receivables with borrowed money and profit from the spread between financing cost and portfolio yield — just like a bank. A debt-free Intrum is a meaningless Intrum. The goal is not zero debt but a *manageable* leverage ratio of 3.0–3.5x Cash EBITDA by 2028. The real problem wasn't the debt — it was the interest rate When interest rates were near zero, Intrum borrowed at 2–3% and bought portfolios with 10–12% yield. A spread of 7–9 percentage points. When interest rates exploded in 2022–2023, the financing cost rose to 7–8% while the portfolio yield couldn't keep up. The spread collapsed. That's the whole crisis in a nutshell.
    2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Well summarized @FreddeBruno 👍🏼
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, ​​eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.

Tarjoustasot

Ei dataa

Viimeisimmät kaupat

AikaHintaMääräOstajaMyyjä
----

Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.

Välittäjätilasto

Dataa ei löytynyt

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
28.8.
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29.1.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
30.10.2025
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti
25.7.2025
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.2025

Tuotteita joiden kohde-etuutena tämä arvopaperi

2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
49 päivää sitten

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti
28.8.
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29.1.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
30.10.2025
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti
25.7.2025
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti
7.5.2025

Tuotteita joiden kohde-etuutena tämä arvopaperi

1,3532 SEK/osake
Viimeisin osinko
0,00%Tuotto/v

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
  • 20 min sitten
    ·
    Absolutely the worst stock in my portfolio ever. I wonder why people are still willing to push money into the company? Is it the fear of losing everything? A desperate attempt to get out of the swamp relatively dry-shod? My confidence is zero. Made the decision not to invest a single penny more. Maybe I'll get rid of what I have and take the hit? Do I believe there will be selling pressure and the price will go down? However, I might be completely wrong. Maybe I've missed my life's chance? I doubt it…
  • 2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    What did I say, bear x 10 with kr 10000
  • 4 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Have had a dialogue with AI about how the rights issue and the directed issues going forward create a completely new market dynamic. Received the following summary: 1. The present until early July: The technical selling (The short-term perspective) Trading in subscription rights ended on June 24, and the subscription period itself expires on June 29. Until the new shares are actually delivered in early July, we will see a large technical imbalance: Arbitrage and "BTA-pressure": Currently, the share is traded in parallel with Paid Subscribed Shares (BTA). When these BTAs are converted into ordinary shares in early July, a concrete selling pressure often arises. Many investors and arbitragers who bought cheap rights/BTAs want to secure quick profits and sell the new ordinary shares directly upon delivery. The Guarantor Group's actions: If the issue was not subscribed to 100% by the public but partly fell to the guarantors (banks and consortium), these institutions tend to want to sell off their "involuntary" shares on the market as soon as possible to reduce their risk. This can act as a temporary price ceiling. 2. The rest of 2026: Liquidity and index effects (The medium-term perspective) When the over 3 billion shares have been absorbed by the market, the share's characteristics fundamentally change: From "rocket" to "tanker": Previously, Intrum was a relatively "illiquid" share with 136 million outstanding shares. This caused the price to fluctuate sharply on news (high volatility). With over 3 billion shares, enormously larger capital volumes are required to move the price one krona up or down. Trading volumes will increase drastically, but price movements will probably be more sluggish. Index funds must buy: As Intrum's total market capitalization increases in line with 7.5 billion kronor in net capital flowing in, the company's weight in various Swedish and international stock indices (e.g., OMX) will be recalculated. This forces passive index funds to make mechanical support purchases of the share during upcoming index rebalancings, which provides a theoretical cushion against further falls. 3. Going forward: Fundamental valuation and EPS hit (The long-term perspective) Long-term, the share stops being traded on "issuance technique" and returns to being valued based on fundamental key figures. Here, the dilution of ~95.7% becomes brutally visible: Earnings per share (EPS) collapses: Even if Intrum manages to significantly reduce its interest costs by paying off its expensive debts, the net profit must now be divided by 20 times more shares. EPS will look very low for a long time to come. Demand for operational delivery: For the share price to climb long-term, it is not enough that the balance sheet has been saved by the credit rating agencies. The market will demand that management shows that the new, debt-reduced Intrum can actually generate organic growth and stable cash flows. Every report disappointment will be severely punished because there are so many shareholders who want out.
  • 5 t sitten
    ·
    The number of shares does NOT control the price This seems to be a recurring misunderstanding in the thread. That Intrum goes from 136 million to 3.2 billion shares doesn't matter in itself — it's the market capitalization that counts, not the number of shares. Atlas Copco has almost 5 billion shares and is one of Sweden's best-managed companies. It's just like dividing a pizza into 8 or 32 slices — the pizza is the same size regardless. Intrum will never be debt-free — and that's not the intention This is perhaps the most important misunderstanding. Intrum's business model *is built* on debt. They buy overdue receivables with borrowed money and profit from the spread between financing cost and portfolio yield — just like a bank. A debt-free Intrum is a meaningless Intrum. The goal is not zero debt but a *manageable* leverage ratio of 3.0–3.5x Cash EBITDA by 2028. The real problem wasn't the debt — it was the interest rate When interest rates were near zero, Intrum borrowed at 2–3% and bought portfolios with 10–12% yield. A spread of 7–9 percentage points. When interest rates exploded in 2022–2023, the financing cost rose to 7–8% while the portfolio yield couldn't keep up. The spread collapsed. That's the whole crisis in a nutshell.
    2 t sitten · Muokattu
    ·
    Well summarized @FreddeBruno 👍🏼
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, ​​eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.

Tarjoustasot

Ei dataa

Viimeisimmät kaupat

AikaHintaMääräOstajaMyyjä
----

Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.

Välittäjätilasto

Dataa ei löytynyt