2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
62 päivää sitten
Tarjoustasot
NGM - Nordic SME
Määrä
Osto
494
Myynti
Määrä
958
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 4 | AVA | NON | ||
| 95 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 7 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 28 | AVA | AVA |
Ylin
19,9VWAP
Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
VWAP
Ylin
19,9Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 34 317 | 26 205 | +8 112 | 21 206 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nordnet Bank AB | 17 320 | 22 224 | −4 904 | 10 258 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 12.2. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 13.11.2025 | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 14.8.2025 | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 15.5.2025 | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 27.2.2025 | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 31.10.2024 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
·16 t sittenOur friend, c-gpt, reads the Q1-Q3 reports and cross-references them with the press release and is not entirely convinced. ---------------------------------------- When reading Q1–Q3 2025 in more detail, the picture becomes clearer, but I don't arrive at a more “proven” substance behind the press release. Rather: the message in the press release is largely a pro forma narrative about 2026, while actual 2025 figures up to Q3 do not show break-even. Below are the most important data points and what they mean. 1) “Recurring revenue covers operating costs and interest / break-even before 2026” The reports actually contain the two series you need: recurring revenue and operating costs per quarter. Q1 2025: Recurring revenue 32.2 MSEK, operating costs -40.4 MSEK → gap approx. 8.2 MSEK before interest. Q1-2025 Q2 2025: Recurring revenue 31.1 MSEK, operating costs -39.8 MSEK → gap approx. 8.7 MSEK before interest. Q2-2025 Q3 2025: Recurring revenue 30.3 MSEK, operating costs -41.1 MSEK → gap approx. 10.8 MSEK before interest. Q3-2025 (1) This means: in actual reporting during 2025, recurring revenue does not cover operating costs, and interest is also on top of that. What SDS does in Q2/Q3 is to show a “pro forma 2026” comparison where they adjust down operating costs with savings that “have already been made but have not yet had full effect”. This may be reasonable as a scenario — but it is not the same as it already being true in the 2025 outcome. 2) “66 MSEK cost savings, full effect from January 2026” Here, the reports become more consistent as the year progresses: Q1 talks about a program of 30–40 MSEK. Q1-2025 Q2 says program “total 60 MSEK”, of which 44 MSEK already implemented, full effect Jan 2026. Q2-2025 Q3 goes further and says that SDS “achieves 66.0 MSEK in savings” and directly links this to recurring revenue then covering operating costs and interest. Q3-2025 (1) So: the claim of 66 MSEK itself is clearly present in Q3, but it is still in practice a run-rate-/future assumption because the full effect will only be visible from January 2026 (according to themselves). Q3-2025 (1) 3) “Low churn / long contracts / stable revenue base” Q1 states outright that they have lost approx. 5 MSEK in recurring revenue, partly due to FX but also because some customers did not want to renew contracts (e.g., linked to migration from PayMobile to ERS). Q1-2025 And actual recurring revenue decreases Q1→Q3 (32.2 → 31.1 → 30.3). This makes “low churn” feel weakly substantiated in the material you provided (they do not report churn-%), and the trend in recurring is not upwards during 2025. 4) “Transformation completed / stable financial foundation / low risk” The reports, on the contrary, describe a rather strained financial situation during 2025: Repeated covenant breaches (minimum cash 10 MSEK) and need for standstill/waiver. Q3: they raise a new share issue and a new loan of 10 MSEK, plus a standstill on covenants. Q3-2025 (1) This does not contradict that a turnaround can succeed — but “stable financial foundation” is difficult to call it when covenants are still being breached and new capital/loans are needed to get to 2026. 5) 2025 earnings picture: it is primarily “adjusted/pro forma” that carries the narrative Q2 contains a large write-down of intangible assets (approx. 30 MSEK) and they talk about “underlying positive” if one cleanses for FX, write-downs, and specific Belgium costs. Q2-2025 Q3 takes this further and shows a pro forma bridge where they arrive at an “adjusted profit before tax (pro forma 2026)” based on the same turnover as 1–9M 2025 but with a new run-rate for costs/depreciation/FX/interest. This is relevant as a scenario — but that is also exactly where the “substance” hangs: that 2026 truly achieves full impact and that revenues do not continue to fall. Conclusion: Do I arrive at anything different than before? A bit more nuanced, but not “more positive”: Yes, there is more support that they have implemented a large savings program (they scale up from 30–40 → 60 → 66 MSEK during the year). No, Q1–Q3 does not show that they have already reached break-even on recurring; on the contrary, recurring is below operating costs every quarter. “Stable financial foundation” and “low risk” are difficult to fully accept when covenant breaches/standstill and capital injections still characterize the year. The press release (Jan 2026) is in line with Q3's pro forma narrative, but it is still an assumption that must be proven in Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.
31.1.2022 · Muokattu31.1.2022 · MuokattuUtdrag veckobrev v39 "Ursprungliga Seamless på väg tillbaka. I veckans våg av tillkännagivanden av planerade nyemissioner från mindre bolag fastnar jag för Seamless Distribution Systems SDS, som ska ta in ca 25 MSEK (med en rabatt om 10%) för att bredda aktieägarbasen. Namnet Seamless får nog många att sluta läsa eftersom SDS tidigare moderbolag med snarlikt namn gick i konkurs för något år sedan efter storvulna planer att revolutionera inte bara den svenska utan även internationella betalningsmarknaden. I SDS finns den ursprungliga verksamheten kvar med innovativa lösningar för digital distribution av samtalstid och mobildata främst genom mobiloperatörer, vilken i stort sett alltid varit lönsam. Bolaget är verksamt i 50 länder och hanterar mer än 15 miljarder transaktioner årligen och når 500 miljoner abonnenter. I år verkar det ha lossnat - efter ett besvärligt 2018 och 2019 - och omsättningen ökade under första halvåret med nästan 50% (delvis via förvärv men ändå) till 156 MSEK och rörelsemarginalen steg till 8,4% (under Q2 separat var marginalen hela 10%). Då var ändå verksamheten enligt företagsledningen under kvartalet negativt påverkad av pandemin. Vändningen i SDS har inte gått marknaden förbi och aktien är i år upp 50% men ett börsvärde på 370 MSEK och en nettoskuld på ca 50 MSEK är inte högt i jämförelse med hur marknaden värderar framgångsrika mjukvaruföretag. Eventuell kurspress från emissionen kan vara en intressant möjlighet att komma in i bolaget. "
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
62 päivää sitten
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
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Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·16 t sittenOur friend, c-gpt, reads the Q1-Q3 reports and cross-references them with the press release and is not entirely convinced. ---------------------------------------- When reading Q1–Q3 2025 in more detail, the picture becomes clearer, but I don't arrive at a more “proven” substance behind the press release. Rather: the message in the press release is largely a pro forma narrative about 2026, while actual 2025 figures up to Q3 do not show break-even. Below are the most important data points and what they mean. 1) “Recurring revenue covers operating costs and interest / break-even before 2026” The reports actually contain the two series you need: recurring revenue and operating costs per quarter. Q1 2025: Recurring revenue 32.2 MSEK, operating costs -40.4 MSEK → gap approx. 8.2 MSEK before interest. Q1-2025 Q2 2025: Recurring revenue 31.1 MSEK, operating costs -39.8 MSEK → gap approx. 8.7 MSEK before interest. Q2-2025 Q3 2025: Recurring revenue 30.3 MSEK, operating costs -41.1 MSEK → gap approx. 10.8 MSEK before interest. Q3-2025 (1) This means: in actual reporting during 2025, recurring revenue does not cover operating costs, and interest is also on top of that. What SDS does in Q2/Q3 is to show a “pro forma 2026” comparison where they adjust down operating costs with savings that “have already been made but have not yet had full effect”. This may be reasonable as a scenario — but it is not the same as it already being true in the 2025 outcome. 2) “66 MSEK cost savings, full effect from January 2026” Here, the reports become more consistent as the year progresses: Q1 talks about a program of 30–40 MSEK. Q1-2025 Q2 says program “total 60 MSEK”, of which 44 MSEK already implemented, full effect Jan 2026. Q2-2025 Q3 goes further and says that SDS “achieves 66.0 MSEK in savings” and directly links this to recurring revenue then covering operating costs and interest. Q3-2025 (1) So: the claim of 66 MSEK itself is clearly present in Q3, but it is still in practice a run-rate-/future assumption because the full effect will only be visible from January 2026 (according to themselves). Q3-2025 (1) 3) “Low churn / long contracts / stable revenue base” Q1 states outright that they have lost approx. 5 MSEK in recurring revenue, partly due to FX but also because some customers did not want to renew contracts (e.g., linked to migration from PayMobile to ERS). Q1-2025 And actual recurring revenue decreases Q1→Q3 (32.2 → 31.1 → 30.3). This makes “low churn” feel weakly substantiated in the material you provided (they do not report churn-%), and the trend in recurring is not upwards during 2025. 4) “Transformation completed / stable financial foundation / low risk” The reports, on the contrary, describe a rather strained financial situation during 2025: Repeated covenant breaches (minimum cash 10 MSEK) and need for standstill/waiver. Q3: they raise a new share issue and a new loan of 10 MSEK, plus a standstill on covenants. Q3-2025 (1) This does not contradict that a turnaround can succeed — but “stable financial foundation” is difficult to call it when covenants are still being breached and new capital/loans are needed to get to 2026. 5) 2025 earnings picture: it is primarily “adjusted/pro forma” that carries the narrative Q2 contains a large write-down of intangible assets (approx. 30 MSEK) and they talk about “underlying positive” if one cleanses for FX, write-downs, and specific Belgium costs. Q2-2025 Q3 takes this further and shows a pro forma bridge where they arrive at an “adjusted profit before tax (pro forma 2026)” based on the same turnover as 1–9M 2025 but with a new run-rate for costs/depreciation/FX/interest. This is relevant as a scenario — but that is also exactly where the “substance” hangs: that 2026 truly achieves full impact and that revenues do not continue to fall. Conclusion: Do I arrive at anything different than before? A bit more nuanced, but not “more positive”: Yes, there is more support that they have implemented a large savings program (they scale up from 30–40 → 60 → 66 MSEK during the year). No, Q1–Q3 does not show that they have already reached break-even on recurring; on the contrary, recurring is below operating costs every quarter. “Stable financial foundation” and “low risk” are difficult to fully accept when covenant breaches/standstill and capital injections still characterize the year. The press release (Jan 2026) is in line with Q3's pro forma narrative, but it is still an assumption that must be proven in Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.
- 31.1.2022 · Muokattu31.1.2022 · MuokattuUtdrag veckobrev v39 "Ursprungliga Seamless på väg tillbaka. I veckans våg av tillkännagivanden av planerade nyemissioner från mindre bolag fastnar jag för Seamless Distribution Systems SDS, som ska ta in ca 25 MSEK (med en rabatt om 10%) för att bredda aktieägarbasen. Namnet Seamless får nog många att sluta läsa eftersom SDS tidigare moderbolag med snarlikt namn gick i konkurs för något år sedan efter storvulna planer att revolutionera inte bara den svenska utan även internationella betalningsmarknaden. I SDS finns den ursprungliga verksamheten kvar med innovativa lösningar för digital distribution av samtalstid och mobildata främst genom mobiloperatörer, vilken i stort sett alltid varit lönsam. Bolaget är verksamt i 50 länder och hanterar mer än 15 miljarder transaktioner årligen och når 500 miljoner abonnenter. I år verkar det ha lossnat - efter ett besvärligt 2018 och 2019 - och omsättningen ökade under första halvåret med nästan 50% (delvis via förvärv men ändå) till 156 MSEK och rörelsemarginalen steg till 8,4% (under Q2 separat var marginalen hela 10%). Då var ändå verksamheten enligt företagsledningen under kvartalet negativt påverkad av pandemin. Vändningen i SDS har inte gått marknaden förbi och aktien är i år upp 50% men ett börsvärde på 370 MSEK och en nettoskuld på ca 50 MSEK är inte högt i jämförelse med hur marknaden värderar framgångsrika mjukvaruföretag. Eventuell kurspress från emissionen kan vara en intressant möjlighet att komma in i bolaget. "
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
NGM - Nordic SME
Määrä
Osto
494
Myynti
Määrä
958
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 4 | AVA | NON | ||
| 95 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 7 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 28 | AVA | AVA |
Ylin
19,9VWAP
Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
VWAP
Ylin
19,9Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 34 317 | 26 205 | +8 112 | 21 206 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nordnet Bank AB | 17 320 | 22 224 | −4 904 | 10 258 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 12.2. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 13.11.2025 | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 14.8.2025 | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 15.5.2025 | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 27.2.2025 | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 31.10.2024 |
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
62 päivää sitten
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
| 2025 Q4 -tulosraportti | 12.2. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q3 -tulosraportti | 13.11.2025 | |
| 2025 Q2 -tulosraportti | 14.8.2025 | |
| 2025 Q1 -tulosraportti | 15.5.2025 | |
| 2024 Q4 -tulosraportti | 27.2.2025 | |
| 2024 Q3 -tulosraportti | 31.10.2024 |
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·16 t sittenOur friend, c-gpt, reads the Q1-Q3 reports and cross-references them with the press release and is not entirely convinced. ---------------------------------------- When reading Q1–Q3 2025 in more detail, the picture becomes clearer, but I don't arrive at a more “proven” substance behind the press release. Rather: the message in the press release is largely a pro forma narrative about 2026, while actual 2025 figures up to Q3 do not show break-even. Below are the most important data points and what they mean. 1) “Recurring revenue covers operating costs and interest / break-even before 2026” The reports actually contain the two series you need: recurring revenue and operating costs per quarter. Q1 2025: Recurring revenue 32.2 MSEK, operating costs -40.4 MSEK → gap approx. 8.2 MSEK before interest. Q1-2025 Q2 2025: Recurring revenue 31.1 MSEK, operating costs -39.8 MSEK → gap approx. 8.7 MSEK before interest. Q2-2025 Q3 2025: Recurring revenue 30.3 MSEK, operating costs -41.1 MSEK → gap approx. 10.8 MSEK before interest. Q3-2025 (1) This means: in actual reporting during 2025, recurring revenue does not cover operating costs, and interest is also on top of that. What SDS does in Q2/Q3 is to show a “pro forma 2026” comparison where they adjust down operating costs with savings that “have already been made but have not yet had full effect”. This may be reasonable as a scenario — but it is not the same as it already being true in the 2025 outcome. 2) “66 MSEK cost savings, full effect from January 2026” Here, the reports become more consistent as the year progresses: Q1 talks about a program of 30–40 MSEK. Q1-2025 Q2 says program “total 60 MSEK”, of which 44 MSEK already implemented, full effect Jan 2026. Q2-2025 Q3 goes further and says that SDS “achieves 66.0 MSEK in savings” and directly links this to recurring revenue then covering operating costs and interest. Q3-2025 (1) So: the claim of 66 MSEK itself is clearly present in Q3, but it is still in practice a run-rate-/future assumption because the full effect will only be visible from January 2026 (according to themselves). Q3-2025 (1) 3) “Low churn / long contracts / stable revenue base” Q1 states outright that they have lost approx. 5 MSEK in recurring revenue, partly due to FX but also because some customers did not want to renew contracts (e.g., linked to migration from PayMobile to ERS). Q1-2025 And actual recurring revenue decreases Q1→Q3 (32.2 → 31.1 → 30.3). This makes “low churn” feel weakly substantiated in the material you provided (they do not report churn-%), and the trend in recurring is not upwards during 2025. 4) “Transformation completed / stable financial foundation / low risk” The reports, on the contrary, describe a rather strained financial situation during 2025: Repeated covenant breaches (minimum cash 10 MSEK) and need for standstill/waiver. Q3: they raise a new share issue and a new loan of 10 MSEK, plus a standstill on covenants. Q3-2025 (1) This does not contradict that a turnaround can succeed — but “stable financial foundation” is difficult to call it when covenants are still being breached and new capital/loans are needed to get to 2026. 5) 2025 earnings picture: it is primarily “adjusted/pro forma” that carries the narrative Q2 contains a large write-down of intangible assets (approx. 30 MSEK) and they talk about “underlying positive” if one cleanses for FX, write-downs, and specific Belgium costs. Q2-2025 Q3 takes this further and shows a pro forma bridge where they arrive at an “adjusted profit before tax (pro forma 2026)” based on the same turnover as 1–9M 2025 but with a new run-rate for costs/depreciation/FX/interest. This is relevant as a scenario — but that is also exactly where the “substance” hangs: that 2026 truly achieves full impact and that revenues do not continue to fall. Conclusion: Do I arrive at anything different than before? A bit more nuanced, but not “more positive”: Yes, there is more support that they have implemented a large savings program (they scale up from 30–40 → 60 → 66 MSEK during the year). No, Q1–Q3 does not show that they have already reached break-even on recurring; on the contrary, recurring is below operating costs every quarter. “Stable financial foundation” and “low risk” are difficult to fully accept when covenant breaches/standstill and capital injections still characterize the year. The press release (Jan 2026) is in line with Q3's pro forma narrative, but it is still an assumption that must be proven in Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.
- 31.1.2022 · Muokattu31.1.2022 · MuokattuUtdrag veckobrev v39 "Ursprungliga Seamless på väg tillbaka. I veckans våg av tillkännagivanden av planerade nyemissioner från mindre bolag fastnar jag för Seamless Distribution Systems SDS, som ska ta in ca 25 MSEK (med en rabatt om 10%) för att bredda aktieägarbasen. Namnet Seamless får nog många att sluta läsa eftersom SDS tidigare moderbolag med snarlikt namn gick i konkurs för något år sedan efter storvulna planer att revolutionera inte bara den svenska utan även internationella betalningsmarknaden. I SDS finns den ursprungliga verksamheten kvar med innovativa lösningar för digital distribution av samtalstid och mobildata främst genom mobiloperatörer, vilken i stort sett alltid varit lönsam. Bolaget är verksamt i 50 länder och hanterar mer än 15 miljarder transaktioner årligen och når 500 miljoner abonnenter. I år verkar det ha lossnat - efter ett besvärligt 2018 och 2019 - och omsättningen ökade under första halvåret med nästan 50% (delvis via förvärv men ändå) till 156 MSEK och rörelsemarginalen steg till 8,4% (under Q2 separat var marginalen hela 10%). Då var ändå verksamheten enligt företagsledningen under kvartalet negativt påverkad av pandemin. Vändningen i SDS har inte gått marknaden förbi och aktien är i år upp 50% men ett börsvärde på 370 MSEK och en nettoskuld på ca 50 MSEK är inte högt i jämförelse med hur marknaden värderar framgångsrika mjukvaruföretag. Eventuell kurspress från emissionen kan vara en intressant möjlighet att komma in i bolaget. "
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
NGM - Nordic SME
Määrä
Osto
494
Myynti
Määrä
958
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 4 | AVA | NON | ||
| 95 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 7 | AVA | AVA | ||
| 28 | AVA | AVA |
Ylin
19,9VWAP
Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
VWAP
Ylin
19,9Alin
13,3VaihtoMäärä
0,8 54 202
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 34 317 | 26 205 | +8 112 | 21 206 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nordnet Bank AB | 17 320 | 22 224 | −4 904 | 10 258 |
| Svenska Handelsbanken AB | 6 | 3 934 | −3 928 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 1 000 | 1 170 | −170 | 0 |
| Nordea Bank Abp | 250 | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Carnegie Investment Bank AB | 289 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 1 040 | 150 | +890 | 0 |