2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29 päivää sitten
‧1 t 33 min
0,39 USD/osake
Irtoamispäivä 13.5.
4,95%Tuotto/v
Tarjoustasot
Oslo Børs
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 182 | - | - | ||
| 181 | - | - | ||
| 362 | - | - | ||
| 150 | - | - | ||
| 250 | - | - |
Ylin
308,6VWAP
Alin
295,7VaihtoMäärä
2 420,9 7 968 414
VWAP
Ylin
308,6Alin
295,7VaihtoMäärä
2 420,9 7 968 414
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 4.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 29.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 23.7.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 30.4.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 5.2.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
·4 t sittenThe Strait of Hormuz and the invisible blockade — what is actually stopping the oil flow It is easy to imagine a military blockade as cannons and warships physically blocking ship traffic. What is happening now is more refined, and potentially more effective. The Gulf countries are not in a situation where they lack oil to sell. On the contrary: Saudi Arabia and Iran prepared for the war by freeing up storage capacity in advance. In the period February 15–20, Iran increased exports to three times the normal level and deliberately emptied its stores. Saudi Arabia attempted similar measures. The strategy was to get as much oil out of the region before the situation escalated — and that somewhat mitigates the immediate supply shock. But the problem is not production capacity. It is the insurance market. All commercial tankers are dependent on two types of insurance to operate: hull insurance on the vessel itself, and P&I insurance which covers liability for cargo, crew, and third-party damages. Without both, banks cannot finance operations, and ports refuse to receive the ships. Effective from March 5, P&I insurance was withdrawn for the Strait of Hormuz. It is not a political decision — it is the insurance companies' risk assessment. The consequence is the same as a physical blockade. Already in the weeks before the attacks, war insurance premiums had risen from 0.125 % to between 0.2 and 0.4 % of the ship's insured value per single voyage. For large oil tankers, this corresponded to a cost increase of around 250 000 dollars per transit — and that was before the war broke out. When premiums explode and coverage is withdrawn, no one needs to give orders. Shipowners withdraw voluntarily. It is the market logic's precautionary principle: insurance companies can lose money by being right, but go bankrupt by being wrong once with a 100 million dollar tanker. Iran therefore does not need to attack every ship. An IRGC announcement on the VHF emergency frequency — which all ships in the area are obliged to monitor — was enough for most to stop. Uncertainty alone is sufficient for the market to price the risk as if the threat is real. Saudi Arabia and UAE have pipelines that can bypass the strait, but the total available capacity is estimated at 2.6 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia alone produces 9–10 million barrels daily. The pipelines are a safety valve, not a replacement. OPEC+ announced a modest production increase of 206 000 barrels per day on March 1, but that did not calm the markets — and it is not surprising: production increases help little when the transit problem is the real obstacle. If the blockade lasts for weeks rather than days, the stores in the Gulf will gradually fill up. And when the stores are full, production is forced down — not by political decisions, but by pure physics. This is exactly what happened during COVID in April 2020, when the oil price temporarily went negative. The truly dangerous scenario, however, is not the strait itself, but direct attacks on production infrastructure. The Abqaiq attack in 2019 took out half of Saudi production capacity overnight. In an active war, with already ongoing Iranian attacks on targets in UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, the risk of similar events is real. The markets do not just price in lost Iranian barrels. They price in the uncertainty about the entire regional production capacity. Sources: Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis Kpler – US-Iran conflict: Strait of Hormuz crisis reshapes global oil markets (March 1, 2026) https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-iran-conflict-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-reshapes-global-oil-markets Al Jazeera – How US-Israel attacks on Iran threaten the Strait of Hormuz (March 1, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/how-us-israel-attacks-on-iran-threaten-the-strait-of-hormuz-oil-markets Al Jazeera – Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (March 3, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/3/shutdown-of-hormuz-strait-raises-fears-of-soaring-oil-prices Janes – Iran conflict 2026: Disruption to Strait of Hormuz increases energy and food production risks https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/iran-conflict-2026-disruption-to-strait-of-hormuz-increases-energy-and-food-production-risks The Conversation – Strait of Hormuz: if the Iran conflict shuts world’s most important oil chokepoint (March 1, 2026) https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-if-the-iran-conflict-shuts-worlds-most-important-oil-chokepoint-global-economic-chaos-could-follow-277199 Middle East Briefing – The Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Iran Conflict Impact on Oil and Markets https://www.middleeastbriefing.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-crisis-iran-conflic-energy-business/ CNBC – Experts weigh potential scenarios for oil if Strait of Hormuz closes (March 1, 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/01/experts-weigh-potential-scenarios-for-oil-if-strait-of-hormuz-closes.html
·3 t sittenGood points. But I think some will argue that the market has not priced in the many risk factors you mention. Or, the market is pricing in that the situation will be short-lived and the risk factors will not manifest in a real shortage of oil and gas. If the situation persists, the upside potential is formidable.
·3 t sittenWell said. It almost seems like the market is pricing in that this will be a relatively short-lived situation, and that the logistics problems do not actually end in a real shortage of oil. At the same time, if it were to drag on and the insurance and transit problems actually start to affect the flow more permanently, the repricing could be quite strong. The question is probably how long inventories and alternative routes can dampen the effect before the market reacts more strongly. Anyway, this is quite a special situation, and difficult to see far into the future. Interesting to hear what others think as well.
·8 t sitten · Muokattuthat this performs almost 3 times as well as Vår Energi today, I had not expected that.
·8 t sittenThe size of the company does not necessarily correlate with stock performance.- ·11 t sittenNATO chief Rutte supports USA: "Iran was close to becoming a threat to Europe" NATO chief Mark Rutte made a clear statement on Thursday in the wake of the missile incident over Turkey on Wednesday, where NATO's air defense stopped a ballistic missile on its way from Iran into Turkish airspace. "Iran was also close to becoming a threat to Europe. We support Trump in having taken out Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities," said Rutte – and added that his impression is that the USA knows what it is doing. The incident is geopolitically significant for several reasons. Firstly, it confirms that Iran actually fired a ballistic missile at a NATO country, even though Iran denies this. Secondly, it shows that Rutte now explicitly puts NATO behind the American operation against Iran's military infrastructure – which gives the USA stronger diplomatic backing. It is worth remembering that Norway itself has been in a similar situation. In 2011, Norwegian F16 jets participated in the NATO operation in Libya, where we dropped 588 bombs – a full 10 percent of all air attacks in the operation. The UN mandate through resolution 1973 gave permission to protect civilians, but not explicitly for regime change. UN veteran Ian Martin, who led the UN's planning from April 2011, has since stated that it is difficult to say exactly when the line between protection of civilians and regime change was crossed – but that it was clearly overstepped. The Libya Committee concluded in 2018 that Norway did not violate international law, but international law professor Geir Ulfstein at UiO disagrees and believes that the royal resolution from 17. June 2011 shows that the UN mandate was broken. The question of international law is thus not black and white. The American operation against Iran lacks a UN mandate, but the NATO chief supports it nonetheless – just as Norway in 2011 went further than many believed the UN mandate allowed. The double standard is not new, but it is worth keeping in mind. For those who follow the defense and security sector as an investment theme, this is a reminder that the geopolitical pressure driving demand for air defense, missile defense, and defense investments in general, is not transient. The situation continues to develop rapidly. Sources: ∙ Dagbladet – https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/80616-angrepet-mot-iran/11201194 ∙ Store norske leksikon – https://snl.no/Krigen_i_Libya_2011 ∙ Panorama Nyheter (Ian Martin/FN) – https://www.panoramanyheter.no/diplomati-fn-krig-og-konflikt/helt-klart-at-mandatet-ble-overskredet/331571 ∙ Aftenposten/Geir Ulfstein – https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/VR8ep1/norge-broet-folkeretten-i-libya-geir-ulfstein ∙ NRK – https://www.nrk.no/urix/utvalg-om-libya-bombing_-politikerne-hadde-svaert-begrenset-kunnskap-1.14205087
- ·12 t sittenWho is behind Iran – and what does it mean for the markets? Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026 changed the Middle East in hours. The USA and Israel killed Ayatollah Khamenei and knocked out large parts of Iran's military infrastructure. But a state like Iran does not disappear when its leader falls. The question the markets are now asking is not whether the war is over – it is who will keep it going, and for how long. The Axis of Resistance – weakened, but not gone For several decades, Iran has built a regional network of non-state actors: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq. Norwegian intelligence describes this as "the Axis of Resistance". Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel immediately after Khamenei's death – all were shot down. The Houthi movement has announced the resumption of attacks against Israeli-affiliated shipping. The Iraqi Shia militias, which are the most capable remaining proxy forces and geographically closest to American bases, are the big unknown going forward. It is nevertheless worth noting that this network is noticeably weakened after two years of Israeli offensive. Hassan Nasrallah was killed in the autumn of 2024. Hamas is significantly reduced. Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self compared to 2023. Iran spent more than a decade building these capabilities – Israel and the USA have spent two years tearing them down. Shia and Sunni – the dividing lines that never completely disappear Iran is a Shia power and primarily supports Shia populations and militias. The Sunni-dominated Gulf states have for years seen Iran as their foremost security challenge. Saudi Arabia expressed "strong condemnation" of Iran's missile attacks against the Gulf countries this week – but said nothing in support of the USA/Israel's attack on Iran. It is a telling signal: Riyadh is not on Tehran's side, but neither is it on Washington's. Nevertheless, there is a paradox. Hamas – a Sunni movement – mourned Khamenei and hailed him as a supporter of the Palestinian cause. North Korea called the USA "gangsters". Syria condemned the attacks. The Arab street in Cairo, Baghdad, and Karachi largely perceives this as Western imperialism against a Muslim country, regardless of sectarian affiliation. This is different from previous wars fought through proxies – this time Iran has been attacked on its own territory with its supreme leader killed, which provides a stronger emotional mobilization force. Russia and China – the silent supporters Two countries will not fire a single missile for Iran, but will nevertheless shape the outcome. Iran has supplied Shahed drones in large quantities to Russia for use in Ukraine, and the two countries have built a real defense cooperation. China is dependent on Iranian oil and has close trade relations with Tehran. Neither of them will escalate militarily – but both will block UN resolutions, provide diplomatic cover, and indirectly strengthen Iran's negotiating position. This makes any notion of a quick political settlement illusory. What does this mean for portfolios? The core of the risk picture is the Strait of Hormuz. Around 20 percent of the world's oil transport passes through this strait, and Iran has the capacity to threaten shipping there even with weakened military power. A lasting disruption will send energy prices to levels we have not seen since 2022. For the defense sector, the picture is the opposite: a conflict that directly involves the USA and requires continuous replenishment of missile stocks and advanced precision weapons, is exactly the scenario that drives demand in the defense industry. For silver and nuclear energy, much depends on whether the conflict intensifies the pressure for Western energy independence from unstable regions – for now, all signs point in that direction. This is not over. It is the beginning of a phase that could last years. --- Sources: NRK – Why Israel and the USA are attacking Iran (updated 03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/derfor-angriper-israel-og-usa-iran-1.17788905 NRK – The war in Iran: Regime change is wishful thinking (03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/krigen-i-iran_-_-regimeendring-er-onsketenking-1.17790295 VG – The war in the Middle East: Questions and answers (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/ArP98E/krigen-i-midtoesten-spoersmaal-og-svar VG – How the world reacts to the Iran attack and the Ayatollah's killing (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/rrlGxK/statsledere-verden-over-reagerer-paa-iran-konflikten FN-sambandet – The war between Iran, the USA and Israel: This is what the UN says (02.03.2026): https://fn.no/nyheter/krigen-mellom-iran-usa-og-israel-dette-sier-fn Etterretningstjenesten – Fokus 2026, Middle East chapter: https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/fokus2026_innhold/Fokus26_Kap7 SNL – Iran's defense: https://snl.no/Irans_forsvar
·13 t sittenThat there are any easy solutions here is not likely and negotiations with Iran now are just fake news, the stock is being held down because of this, but sooner or later demand will explode, OPEC will stop producing more oil when inventories are full, they will not increase production in the near future either. They will push the price up to compensate for the losses they are now incurring due to the Strait of Hormuz.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29 päivää sitten
‧1 t 33 min
0,39 USD/osake
Irtoamispäivä 13.5.
4,95%Tuotto/v
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Shareville
Liity keskusteluun SharevillessäShareville on aktiivisten yksityissijoittajien yhteisö, jossa voit seurata muiden asiakkaiden kaupankäyntiä ja omistuksia.
Kirjaudu
- ·4 t sittenThe Strait of Hormuz and the invisible blockade — what is actually stopping the oil flow It is easy to imagine a military blockade as cannons and warships physically blocking ship traffic. What is happening now is more refined, and potentially more effective. The Gulf countries are not in a situation where they lack oil to sell. On the contrary: Saudi Arabia and Iran prepared for the war by freeing up storage capacity in advance. In the period February 15–20, Iran increased exports to three times the normal level and deliberately emptied its stores. Saudi Arabia attempted similar measures. The strategy was to get as much oil out of the region before the situation escalated — and that somewhat mitigates the immediate supply shock. But the problem is not production capacity. It is the insurance market. All commercial tankers are dependent on two types of insurance to operate: hull insurance on the vessel itself, and P&I insurance which covers liability for cargo, crew, and third-party damages. Without both, banks cannot finance operations, and ports refuse to receive the ships. Effective from March 5, P&I insurance was withdrawn for the Strait of Hormuz. It is not a political decision — it is the insurance companies' risk assessment. The consequence is the same as a physical blockade. Already in the weeks before the attacks, war insurance premiums had risen from 0.125 % to between 0.2 and 0.4 % of the ship's insured value per single voyage. For large oil tankers, this corresponded to a cost increase of around 250 000 dollars per transit — and that was before the war broke out. When premiums explode and coverage is withdrawn, no one needs to give orders. Shipowners withdraw voluntarily. It is the market logic's precautionary principle: insurance companies can lose money by being right, but go bankrupt by being wrong once with a 100 million dollar tanker. Iran therefore does not need to attack every ship. An IRGC announcement on the VHF emergency frequency — which all ships in the area are obliged to monitor — was enough for most to stop. Uncertainty alone is sufficient for the market to price the risk as if the threat is real. Saudi Arabia and UAE have pipelines that can bypass the strait, but the total available capacity is estimated at 2.6 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia alone produces 9–10 million barrels daily. The pipelines are a safety valve, not a replacement. OPEC+ announced a modest production increase of 206 000 barrels per day on March 1, but that did not calm the markets — and it is not surprising: production increases help little when the transit problem is the real obstacle. If the blockade lasts for weeks rather than days, the stores in the Gulf will gradually fill up. And when the stores are full, production is forced down — not by political decisions, but by pure physics. This is exactly what happened during COVID in April 2020, when the oil price temporarily went negative. The truly dangerous scenario, however, is not the strait itself, but direct attacks on production infrastructure. The Abqaiq attack in 2019 took out half of Saudi production capacity overnight. In an active war, with already ongoing Iranian attacks on targets in UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, the risk of similar events is real. The markets do not just price in lost Iranian barrels. They price in the uncertainty about the entire regional production capacity. Sources: Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis Kpler – US-Iran conflict: Strait of Hormuz crisis reshapes global oil markets (March 1, 2026) https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-iran-conflict-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-reshapes-global-oil-markets Al Jazeera – How US-Israel attacks on Iran threaten the Strait of Hormuz (March 1, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/how-us-israel-attacks-on-iran-threaten-the-strait-of-hormuz-oil-markets Al Jazeera – Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (March 3, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/3/shutdown-of-hormuz-strait-raises-fears-of-soaring-oil-prices Janes – Iran conflict 2026: Disruption to Strait of Hormuz increases energy and food production risks https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/iran-conflict-2026-disruption-to-strait-of-hormuz-increases-energy-and-food-production-risks The Conversation – Strait of Hormuz: if the Iran conflict shuts world’s most important oil chokepoint (March 1, 2026) https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-if-the-iran-conflict-shuts-worlds-most-important-oil-chokepoint-global-economic-chaos-could-follow-277199 Middle East Briefing – The Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Iran Conflict Impact on Oil and Markets https://www.middleeastbriefing.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-crisis-iran-conflic-energy-business/ CNBC – Experts weigh potential scenarios for oil if Strait of Hormuz closes (March 1, 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/01/experts-weigh-potential-scenarios-for-oil-if-strait-of-hormuz-closes.html·3 t sittenGood points. But I think some will argue that the market has not priced in the many risk factors you mention. Or, the market is pricing in that the situation will be short-lived and the risk factors will not manifest in a real shortage of oil and gas. If the situation persists, the upside potential is formidable.·3 t sittenWell said. It almost seems like the market is pricing in that this will be a relatively short-lived situation, and that the logistics problems do not actually end in a real shortage of oil. At the same time, if it were to drag on and the insurance and transit problems actually start to affect the flow more permanently, the repricing could be quite strong. The question is probably how long inventories and alternative routes can dampen the effect before the market reacts more strongly. Anyway, this is quite a special situation, and difficult to see far into the future. Interesting to hear what others think as well.
- ·8 t sitten · Muokattuthat this performs almost 3 times as well as Vår Energi today, I had not expected that.·8 t sittenThe size of the company does not necessarily correlate with stock performance.
- ·11 t sittenNATO chief Rutte supports USA: "Iran was close to becoming a threat to Europe" NATO chief Mark Rutte made a clear statement on Thursday in the wake of the missile incident over Turkey on Wednesday, where NATO's air defense stopped a ballistic missile on its way from Iran into Turkish airspace. "Iran was also close to becoming a threat to Europe. We support Trump in having taken out Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities," said Rutte – and added that his impression is that the USA knows what it is doing. The incident is geopolitically significant for several reasons. Firstly, it confirms that Iran actually fired a ballistic missile at a NATO country, even though Iran denies this. Secondly, it shows that Rutte now explicitly puts NATO behind the American operation against Iran's military infrastructure – which gives the USA stronger diplomatic backing. It is worth remembering that Norway itself has been in a similar situation. In 2011, Norwegian F16 jets participated in the NATO operation in Libya, where we dropped 588 bombs – a full 10 percent of all air attacks in the operation. The UN mandate through resolution 1973 gave permission to protect civilians, but not explicitly for regime change. UN veteran Ian Martin, who led the UN's planning from April 2011, has since stated that it is difficult to say exactly when the line between protection of civilians and regime change was crossed – but that it was clearly overstepped. The Libya Committee concluded in 2018 that Norway did not violate international law, but international law professor Geir Ulfstein at UiO disagrees and believes that the royal resolution from 17. June 2011 shows that the UN mandate was broken. The question of international law is thus not black and white. The American operation against Iran lacks a UN mandate, but the NATO chief supports it nonetheless – just as Norway in 2011 went further than many believed the UN mandate allowed. The double standard is not new, but it is worth keeping in mind. For those who follow the defense and security sector as an investment theme, this is a reminder that the geopolitical pressure driving demand for air defense, missile defense, and defense investments in general, is not transient. The situation continues to develop rapidly. Sources: ∙ Dagbladet – https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/80616-angrepet-mot-iran/11201194 ∙ Store norske leksikon – https://snl.no/Krigen_i_Libya_2011 ∙ Panorama Nyheter (Ian Martin/FN) – https://www.panoramanyheter.no/diplomati-fn-krig-og-konflikt/helt-klart-at-mandatet-ble-overskredet/331571 ∙ Aftenposten/Geir Ulfstein – https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/VR8ep1/norge-broet-folkeretten-i-libya-geir-ulfstein ∙ NRK – https://www.nrk.no/urix/utvalg-om-libya-bombing_-politikerne-hadde-svaert-begrenset-kunnskap-1.14205087
- ·12 t sittenWho is behind Iran – and what does it mean for the markets? Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026 changed the Middle East in hours. The USA and Israel killed Ayatollah Khamenei and knocked out large parts of Iran's military infrastructure. But a state like Iran does not disappear when its leader falls. The question the markets are now asking is not whether the war is over – it is who will keep it going, and for how long. The Axis of Resistance – weakened, but not gone For several decades, Iran has built a regional network of non-state actors: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq. Norwegian intelligence describes this as "the Axis of Resistance". Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel immediately after Khamenei's death – all were shot down. The Houthi movement has announced the resumption of attacks against Israeli-affiliated shipping. The Iraqi Shia militias, which are the most capable remaining proxy forces and geographically closest to American bases, are the big unknown going forward. It is nevertheless worth noting that this network is noticeably weakened after two years of Israeli offensive. Hassan Nasrallah was killed in the autumn of 2024. Hamas is significantly reduced. Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self compared to 2023. Iran spent more than a decade building these capabilities – Israel and the USA have spent two years tearing them down. Shia and Sunni – the dividing lines that never completely disappear Iran is a Shia power and primarily supports Shia populations and militias. The Sunni-dominated Gulf states have for years seen Iran as their foremost security challenge. Saudi Arabia expressed "strong condemnation" of Iran's missile attacks against the Gulf countries this week – but said nothing in support of the USA/Israel's attack on Iran. It is a telling signal: Riyadh is not on Tehran's side, but neither is it on Washington's. Nevertheless, there is a paradox. Hamas – a Sunni movement – mourned Khamenei and hailed him as a supporter of the Palestinian cause. North Korea called the USA "gangsters". Syria condemned the attacks. The Arab street in Cairo, Baghdad, and Karachi largely perceives this as Western imperialism against a Muslim country, regardless of sectarian affiliation. This is different from previous wars fought through proxies – this time Iran has been attacked on its own territory with its supreme leader killed, which provides a stronger emotional mobilization force. Russia and China – the silent supporters Two countries will not fire a single missile for Iran, but will nevertheless shape the outcome. Iran has supplied Shahed drones in large quantities to Russia for use in Ukraine, and the two countries have built a real defense cooperation. China is dependent on Iranian oil and has close trade relations with Tehran. Neither of them will escalate militarily – but both will block UN resolutions, provide diplomatic cover, and indirectly strengthen Iran's negotiating position. This makes any notion of a quick political settlement illusory. What does this mean for portfolios? The core of the risk picture is the Strait of Hormuz. Around 20 percent of the world's oil transport passes through this strait, and Iran has the capacity to threaten shipping there even with weakened military power. A lasting disruption will send energy prices to levels we have not seen since 2022. For the defense sector, the picture is the opposite: a conflict that directly involves the USA and requires continuous replenishment of missile stocks and advanced precision weapons, is exactly the scenario that drives demand in the defense industry. For silver and nuclear energy, much depends on whether the conflict intensifies the pressure for Western energy independence from unstable regions – for now, all signs point in that direction. This is not over. It is the beginning of a phase that could last years. --- Sources: NRK – Why Israel and the USA are attacking Iran (updated 03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/derfor-angriper-israel-og-usa-iran-1.17788905 NRK – The war in Iran: Regime change is wishful thinking (03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/krigen-i-iran_-_-regimeendring-er-onsketenking-1.17790295 VG – The war in the Middle East: Questions and answers (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/ArP98E/krigen-i-midtoesten-spoersmaal-og-svar VG – How the world reacts to the Iran attack and the Ayatollah's killing (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/rrlGxK/statsledere-verden-over-reagerer-paa-iran-konflikten FN-sambandet – The war between Iran, the USA and Israel: This is what the UN says (02.03.2026): https://fn.no/nyheter/krigen-mellom-iran-usa-og-israel-dette-sier-fn Etterretningstjenesten – Fokus 2026, Middle East chapter: https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/fokus2026_innhold/Fokus26_Kap7 SNL – Iran's defense: https://snl.no/Irans_forsvar
- ·13 t sittenThat there are any easy solutions here is not likely and negotiations with Iran now are just fake news, the stock is being held down because of this, but sooner or later demand will explode, OPEC will stop producing more oil when inventories are full, they will not increase production in the near future either. They will push the price up to compensate for the losses they are now incurring due to the Strait of Hormuz.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Sharevillen käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 4.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 29.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 23.7.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 30.4.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 5.2.2025 |
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
29 päivää sitten
‧1 t 33 min
Uutiset
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Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 6.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 4.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 29.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 23.7.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 30.4.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 5.2.2025 |
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Irtoamispäivä 13.5.
4,95%Tuotto/v
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- ·4 t sittenThe Strait of Hormuz and the invisible blockade — what is actually stopping the oil flow It is easy to imagine a military blockade as cannons and warships physically blocking ship traffic. What is happening now is more refined, and potentially more effective. The Gulf countries are not in a situation where they lack oil to sell. On the contrary: Saudi Arabia and Iran prepared for the war by freeing up storage capacity in advance. In the period February 15–20, Iran increased exports to three times the normal level and deliberately emptied its stores. Saudi Arabia attempted similar measures. The strategy was to get as much oil out of the region before the situation escalated — and that somewhat mitigates the immediate supply shock. But the problem is not production capacity. It is the insurance market. All commercial tankers are dependent on two types of insurance to operate: hull insurance on the vessel itself, and P&I insurance which covers liability for cargo, crew, and third-party damages. Without both, banks cannot finance operations, and ports refuse to receive the ships. Effective from March 5, P&I insurance was withdrawn for the Strait of Hormuz. It is not a political decision — it is the insurance companies' risk assessment. The consequence is the same as a physical blockade. Already in the weeks before the attacks, war insurance premiums had risen from 0.125 % to between 0.2 and 0.4 % of the ship's insured value per single voyage. For large oil tankers, this corresponded to a cost increase of around 250 000 dollars per transit — and that was before the war broke out. When premiums explode and coverage is withdrawn, no one needs to give orders. Shipowners withdraw voluntarily. It is the market logic's precautionary principle: insurance companies can lose money by being right, but go bankrupt by being wrong once with a 100 million dollar tanker. Iran therefore does not need to attack every ship. An IRGC announcement on the VHF emergency frequency — which all ships in the area are obliged to monitor — was enough for most to stop. Uncertainty alone is sufficient for the market to price the risk as if the threat is real. Saudi Arabia and UAE have pipelines that can bypass the strait, but the total available capacity is estimated at 2.6 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia alone produces 9–10 million barrels daily. The pipelines are a safety valve, not a replacement. OPEC+ announced a modest production increase of 206 000 barrels per day on March 1, but that did not calm the markets — and it is not surprising: production increases help little when the transit problem is the real obstacle. If the blockade lasts for weeks rather than days, the stores in the Gulf will gradually fill up. And when the stores are full, production is forced down — not by political decisions, but by pure physics. This is exactly what happened during COVID in April 2020, when the oil price temporarily went negative. The truly dangerous scenario, however, is not the strait itself, but direct attacks on production infrastructure. The Abqaiq attack in 2019 took out half of Saudi production capacity overnight. In an active war, with already ongoing Iranian attacks on targets in UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, the risk of similar events is real. The markets do not just price in lost Iranian barrels. They price in the uncertainty about the entire regional production capacity. Sources: Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis Kpler – US-Iran conflict: Strait of Hormuz crisis reshapes global oil markets (March 1, 2026) https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-iran-conflict-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-reshapes-global-oil-markets Al Jazeera – How US-Israel attacks on Iran threaten the Strait of Hormuz (March 1, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/how-us-israel-attacks-on-iran-threaten-the-strait-of-hormuz-oil-markets Al Jazeera – Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (March 3, 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/3/shutdown-of-hormuz-strait-raises-fears-of-soaring-oil-prices Janes – Iran conflict 2026: Disruption to Strait of Hormuz increases energy and food production risks https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/iran-conflict-2026-disruption-to-strait-of-hormuz-increases-energy-and-food-production-risks The Conversation – Strait of Hormuz: if the Iran conflict shuts world’s most important oil chokepoint (March 1, 2026) https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-if-the-iran-conflict-shuts-worlds-most-important-oil-chokepoint-global-economic-chaos-could-follow-277199 Middle East Briefing – The Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Iran Conflict Impact on Oil and Markets https://www.middleeastbriefing.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-crisis-iran-conflic-energy-business/ CNBC – Experts weigh potential scenarios for oil if Strait of Hormuz closes (March 1, 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/01/experts-weigh-potential-scenarios-for-oil-if-strait-of-hormuz-closes.html·3 t sittenGood points. But I think some will argue that the market has not priced in the many risk factors you mention. Or, the market is pricing in that the situation will be short-lived and the risk factors will not manifest in a real shortage of oil and gas. If the situation persists, the upside potential is formidable.·3 t sittenWell said. It almost seems like the market is pricing in that this will be a relatively short-lived situation, and that the logistics problems do not actually end in a real shortage of oil. At the same time, if it were to drag on and the insurance and transit problems actually start to affect the flow more permanently, the repricing could be quite strong. The question is probably how long inventories and alternative routes can dampen the effect before the market reacts more strongly. Anyway, this is quite a special situation, and difficult to see far into the future. Interesting to hear what others think as well.
- ·8 t sitten · Muokattuthat this performs almost 3 times as well as Vår Energi today, I had not expected that.·8 t sittenThe size of the company does not necessarily correlate with stock performance.
- ·11 t sittenNATO chief Rutte supports USA: "Iran was close to becoming a threat to Europe" NATO chief Mark Rutte made a clear statement on Thursday in the wake of the missile incident over Turkey on Wednesday, where NATO's air defense stopped a ballistic missile on its way from Iran into Turkish airspace. "Iran was also close to becoming a threat to Europe. We support Trump in having taken out Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities," said Rutte – and added that his impression is that the USA knows what it is doing. The incident is geopolitically significant for several reasons. Firstly, it confirms that Iran actually fired a ballistic missile at a NATO country, even though Iran denies this. Secondly, it shows that Rutte now explicitly puts NATO behind the American operation against Iran's military infrastructure – which gives the USA stronger diplomatic backing. It is worth remembering that Norway itself has been in a similar situation. In 2011, Norwegian F16 jets participated in the NATO operation in Libya, where we dropped 588 bombs – a full 10 percent of all air attacks in the operation. The UN mandate through resolution 1973 gave permission to protect civilians, but not explicitly for regime change. UN veteran Ian Martin, who led the UN's planning from April 2011, has since stated that it is difficult to say exactly when the line between protection of civilians and regime change was crossed – but that it was clearly overstepped. The Libya Committee concluded in 2018 that Norway did not violate international law, but international law professor Geir Ulfstein at UiO disagrees and believes that the royal resolution from 17. June 2011 shows that the UN mandate was broken. The question of international law is thus not black and white. The American operation against Iran lacks a UN mandate, but the NATO chief supports it nonetheless – just as Norway in 2011 went further than many believed the UN mandate allowed. The double standard is not new, but it is worth keeping in mind. For those who follow the defense and security sector as an investment theme, this is a reminder that the geopolitical pressure driving demand for air defense, missile defense, and defense investments in general, is not transient. The situation continues to develop rapidly. Sources: ∙ Dagbladet – https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/80616-angrepet-mot-iran/11201194 ∙ Store norske leksikon – https://snl.no/Krigen_i_Libya_2011 ∙ Panorama Nyheter (Ian Martin/FN) – https://www.panoramanyheter.no/diplomati-fn-krig-og-konflikt/helt-klart-at-mandatet-ble-overskredet/331571 ∙ Aftenposten/Geir Ulfstein – https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/VR8ep1/norge-broet-folkeretten-i-libya-geir-ulfstein ∙ NRK – https://www.nrk.no/urix/utvalg-om-libya-bombing_-politikerne-hadde-svaert-begrenset-kunnskap-1.14205087
- ·12 t sittenWho is behind Iran – and what does it mean for the markets? Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026 changed the Middle East in hours. The USA and Israel killed Ayatollah Khamenei and knocked out large parts of Iran's military infrastructure. But a state like Iran does not disappear when its leader falls. The question the markets are now asking is not whether the war is over – it is who will keep it going, and for how long. The Axis of Resistance – weakened, but not gone For several decades, Iran has built a regional network of non-state actors: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq. Norwegian intelligence describes this as "the Axis of Resistance". Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel immediately after Khamenei's death – all were shot down. The Houthi movement has announced the resumption of attacks against Israeli-affiliated shipping. The Iraqi Shia militias, which are the most capable remaining proxy forces and geographically closest to American bases, are the big unknown going forward. It is nevertheless worth noting that this network is noticeably weakened after two years of Israeli offensive. Hassan Nasrallah was killed in the autumn of 2024. Hamas is significantly reduced. Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self compared to 2023. Iran spent more than a decade building these capabilities – Israel and the USA have spent two years tearing them down. Shia and Sunni – the dividing lines that never completely disappear Iran is a Shia power and primarily supports Shia populations and militias. The Sunni-dominated Gulf states have for years seen Iran as their foremost security challenge. Saudi Arabia expressed "strong condemnation" of Iran's missile attacks against the Gulf countries this week – but said nothing in support of the USA/Israel's attack on Iran. It is a telling signal: Riyadh is not on Tehran's side, but neither is it on Washington's. Nevertheless, there is a paradox. Hamas – a Sunni movement – mourned Khamenei and hailed him as a supporter of the Palestinian cause. North Korea called the USA "gangsters". Syria condemned the attacks. The Arab street in Cairo, Baghdad, and Karachi largely perceives this as Western imperialism against a Muslim country, regardless of sectarian affiliation. This is different from previous wars fought through proxies – this time Iran has been attacked on its own territory with its supreme leader killed, which provides a stronger emotional mobilization force. Russia and China – the silent supporters Two countries will not fire a single missile for Iran, but will nevertheless shape the outcome. Iran has supplied Shahed drones in large quantities to Russia for use in Ukraine, and the two countries have built a real defense cooperation. China is dependent on Iranian oil and has close trade relations with Tehran. Neither of them will escalate militarily – but both will block UN resolutions, provide diplomatic cover, and indirectly strengthen Iran's negotiating position. This makes any notion of a quick political settlement illusory. What does this mean for portfolios? The core of the risk picture is the Strait of Hormuz. Around 20 percent of the world's oil transport passes through this strait, and Iran has the capacity to threaten shipping there even with weakened military power. A lasting disruption will send energy prices to levels we have not seen since 2022. For the defense sector, the picture is the opposite: a conflict that directly involves the USA and requires continuous replenishment of missile stocks and advanced precision weapons, is exactly the scenario that drives demand in the defense industry. For silver and nuclear energy, much depends on whether the conflict intensifies the pressure for Western energy independence from unstable regions – for now, all signs point in that direction. This is not over. It is the beginning of a phase that could last years. --- Sources: NRK – Why Israel and the USA are attacking Iran (updated 03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/derfor-angriper-israel-og-usa-iran-1.17788905 NRK – The war in Iran: Regime change is wishful thinking (03.03.2026): https://www.nrk.no/urix/krigen-i-iran_-_-regimeendring-er-onsketenking-1.17790295 VG – The war in the Middle East: Questions and answers (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/ArP98E/krigen-i-midtoesten-spoersmaal-og-svar VG – How the world reacts to the Iran attack and the Ayatollah's killing (03.03.2026): https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/rrlGxK/statsledere-verden-over-reagerer-paa-iran-konflikten FN-sambandet – The war between Iran, the USA and Israel: This is what the UN says (02.03.2026): https://fn.no/nyheter/krigen-mellom-iran-usa-og-israel-dette-sier-fn Etterretningstjenesten – Fokus 2026, Middle East chapter: https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/fokus2026_innhold/Fokus26_Kap7 SNL – Iran's defense: https://snl.no/Irans_forsvar
- ·13 t sittenThat there are any easy solutions here is not likely and negotiations with Iran now are just fake news, the stock is being held down because of this, but sooner or later demand will explode, OPEC will stop producing more oil when inventories are full, they will not increase production in the near future either. They will push the price up to compensate for the losses they are now incurring due to the Strait of Hormuz.
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