2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
77 päivää sitten
‧1 t 0 min
Tarjoustasot
Oslo Børs
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 604 | - | - | ||
| 5 000 | - | - | ||
| 774 | - | - | ||
| 10 253 | - | - | ||
| 359 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 12.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 12.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 14.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 13.2.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·7 t sitten · MuokattuI see that some are selling out for fear that the short sellers might be right. So, it might be fun to ask Copilot for examples where the short sellers WERE right and the share price plummeted. The answer was as follows: ********************************************************************** Yes – high short‑interest often ends with a price increase, but there are also many clear examples where the short‑sold got it right and the share price fell sharply. The common denominator in these cases is that fundamental problems materialized, and that no positive trigger (event, recall, capital injection) came in time. Below are relevant and instructive examples, also from the Oslo Stock Exchange. Cases where high short‑interest → sharp price fall 1. Norwegian Air Shuttle (2018–2020) Short‑interest: 15–25 % in several periods Outcome: Price fall >90 % What happened? The short‑thesis was fundamentally correct: high debt, weak cash flow, complex structure Several short‑term rallies and “mini‑squeezes” But every positive movement was used for new shorting Why did short win? Capital requirements were continuous No sustained positive cash flow Ultimately: restructuring and massive dilution 📌 Learning: High short + structural financing risk = short has long‑term advantage 2. ESA Group / PetroNor / IOX Explorers (small OSE‑shares) Short‑interest: 10–20 % Outcome: Price fall 70–100 % What happened? Short selling signaled low confidence in accounting, governance or assets Small rallies were met by capital raises Fatal individual announcements (delays, lost licenses) 📌 Learning: In illiquid shares, high short is often an early warning, not a squeeze‑setup 3. Seadrill (2015–2017) Short‑interest: High in periods (10–20 %) Outcome: Bankruptcy / restructuring What happened? Short warned of unsustainable debt Temporary upturns during oil price rallies Ultimately, the equity was worthless 📌 Learning: Short only loses if the timeline is broken – here they were right in the end 4. SAS (2019–2023) Short‑interest: High repeatedly Outcome: Near total equity wipeout What happened? Often repriced on “turnaround‑hope” But cash flow and cost base never matched the narrative 📌 Learning: High short + chronically low profitability → shareholders lose over time 5. Wirecard (Frankfurt, but illustrative) Short‑interest: Extremely high Outcome: Share to zero Ironically: Short‑sellers were viewed with suspicion Turned out to be completely right 📌 Learning: High short can be the market's best investigation What distinguishes these from the LINK‑situation? Factor Fall‑cases Link Mobility Cash flow Negative / unstable Positive and stable✅ Capital requirements Repeated capital raises No capital raise distress ✅ Debt risk High / unbalanced Manageable ✅ Business model Cyclical / weak Structural growth (CPaaS) ✅ Event‑risk for short Low High (GF, buyback, recall) ✅ Important conclusion High short‑interest is not bullish in itself. It is bullish only when these three are met: ✅ The company survives without new capital ✅ Short lacks an “exit‑event” on the downside ✅ There are concrete triggers (GF, buyback, recalls) In: Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill → ✅(3), ❌(1) Link Mobility → ✅✅✅ Briefly summarized: Yes, many high‑short‑shares have collapsed In almost all such cases there was: - structural financing weakness - debt or need for capital raise Link lacks these characteristics Thus, Link is in the same short‑category as: Kahoot / NEL / REC (before turnaround) and not like Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill.
·5 t sittenGreat post mister. Now it only remains for link to show organic growth!
·1 päivä sittenShorts remain stable and are gradually increasing. It seems they are determined to hold through Q1. I reduced my position today, based on the short positions remaining so strong leading up to the report.- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuPersonally, I have not previously been "on the inside" of such a heavily shorted stock. Therefore, I did a Copilot search for similar past events on the Oslo Stock Exchange related to the upcoming OGF (29 days). I found the result somewhat interesting. It seems that all the situations listed have ended with more or less "action". **********************************************************************' Historical comparable cases – Oslo Stock Exchange 1. **Kahoot! (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** ~15–22 % (periodically) **Event:** Capital raising, strategic owners, GM / EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate before the rally What happened? * Several rounds of **high shorting into defined events** * Positive news flow + increasing institutional interest * **Short covering first gradual, then accelerating** Price response * Several **30–50 % movements in weeks** * Strong daily movements on relatively low volume 📌 Learning: When short >15 % and the stock starts to rise *before* the event → short loses control quickly. 2. **NEL ASA (2019–2020)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Contracts, sector momentum, capital markets days **Liquidity:** High – but the short is large What happened? * Short positions built on "overpricing" * Event-driven news flow made it impossible to stay short * Covering happened **in waves** Price response * Rapid doubling from local bottoms * Typical pattern: * sideways * sudden breakout * **short-driven momentum** 📌 Learning: Even in liquid stocks, collective shorting can face structural problems due to event risk. 3. **REC Silicon (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** >20 % at its highest **Event:** Negotiations, strategic uncertainty, possible turn-around **Liquidity:** Low–moderate What happened? * Short built on rational fundamental thesis * Small positive signals → **unexpected covering** * Very little supply of shares on the upside Price response * Extreme movements: * +100 % in a short time * Several days with "no sellers" 📌 Learning: When **free float is small and short is large**, the market loses price discovery control. 4. **Borr Drilling (several periods 2019–2022)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Refinancing, debt clarifications, GM/EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate What happened? * The short was correct in the long term * **Event risk** forced covering in the short term * Short was "right, but too early" Price response * 25–40 % up in a few weeks * Then new shorting at a higher level 📌 **Learning:** Shorts may be fundamentally right – but **event risk always wins in the short term**. 5. **ArcticZymes (2020)** **Short interest:** ~15 % **Event:** Positive signals / inefficient information **Liquidity:** Low Price response * Abrupt price doubling * Short almost completely disappeared 📌 **Learning:** In small/mid-cap OSE stocks, **20 % short is extremely much**. *** Comparison against **Link Mobility – today's situation** | Factor | Historical squeezes | Link Mobility | | ---------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | | Short interest | 15–25 % | **>20 %** ✅ | | Liquidity | Low–moderate | **Moderate** ✅ | | Defined event | GM / EGM / news | **GM in 29 days** ✅ | | Buyback / capital return | Often a trigger | **Ongoing buyback** ✅ | Institutional ownership | Concentrated | **Very concentrated** ✅ | 🔴 **Important point:** In several of the cases above, the short was **lower than in Link** and still enough for strong movements. What history suggests for Link Mobility Based on Oslo Stock Exchange precedent: **Upside before GM is far more common than neutral development** Shorts tend to: * Cover **too early and expensively** * Underestimate recall risk Price movements often occur: * without news * on low volume * in short, steep bursts Sober estimate (no guarantee): * +10–20 %**: fully plausible without specific news * +25–40 %**: likely if parts of the short must cover * >50 %**: requires either coordinated recall, buyback escalation or positive guidance.
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuIn yesterday's shareholder overview, Folketrygdfondet is still listed with only 3.9 million shares. The status is therefore the same as mentioned in Knash's previous post, i.e., that they still have 18.6 million shares outstanding for short selling. No recall so far. 17 trading days left until the general meeting, and if FTF wants to vote, the shares must probably be registered in the account a few days before. Combined with normal daily turnover in Link, this provides a basis for some exciting calculations…. But it seems the short sellers are calm. Price movements and volume appear to be quite normal.
·1 päivä sittenCould get pretty ugly for all short sellers going forward.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
77 päivää sitten
‧1 t 0 min
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·7 t sitten · MuokattuI see that some are selling out for fear that the short sellers might be right. So, it might be fun to ask Copilot for examples where the short sellers WERE right and the share price plummeted. The answer was as follows: ********************************************************************** Yes – high short‑interest often ends with a price increase, but there are also many clear examples where the short‑sold got it right and the share price fell sharply. The common denominator in these cases is that fundamental problems materialized, and that no positive trigger (event, recall, capital injection) came in time. Below are relevant and instructive examples, also from the Oslo Stock Exchange. Cases where high short‑interest → sharp price fall 1. Norwegian Air Shuttle (2018–2020) Short‑interest: 15–25 % in several periods Outcome: Price fall >90 % What happened? The short‑thesis was fundamentally correct: high debt, weak cash flow, complex structure Several short‑term rallies and “mini‑squeezes” But every positive movement was used for new shorting Why did short win? Capital requirements were continuous No sustained positive cash flow Ultimately: restructuring and massive dilution 📌 Learning: High short + structural financing risk = short has long‑term advantage 2. ESA Group / PetroNor / IOX Explorers (small OSE‑shares) Short‑interest: 10–20 % Outcome: Price fall 70–100 % What happened? Short selling signaled low confidence in accounting, governance or assets Small rallies were met by capital raises Fatal individual announcements (delays, lost licenses) 📌 Learning: In illiquid shares, high short is often an early warning, not a squeeze‑setup 3. Seadrill (2015–2017) Short‑interest: High in periods (10–20 %) Outcome: Bankruptcy / restructuring What happened? Short warned of unsustainable debt Temporary upturns during oil price rallies Ultimately, the equity was worthless 📌 Learning: Short only loses if the timeline is broken – here they were right in the end 4. SAS (2019–2023) Short‑interest: High repeatedly Outcome: Near total equity wipeout What happened? Often repriced on “turnaround‑hope” But cash flow and cost base never matched the narrative 📌 Learning: High short + chronically low profitability → shareholders lose over time 5. Wirecard (Frankfurt, but illustrative) Short‑interest: Extremely high Outcome: Share to zero Ironically: Short‑sellers were viewed with suspicion Turned out to be completely right 📌 Learning: High short can be the market's best investigation What distinguishes these from the LINK‑situation? Factor Fall‑cases Link Mobility Cash flow Negative / unstable Positive and stable✅ Capital requirements Repeated capital raises No capital raise distress ✅ Debt risk High / unbalanced Manageable ✅ Business model Cyclical / weak Structural growth (CPaaS) ✅ Event‑risk for short Low High (GF, buyback, recall) ✅ Important conclusion High short‑interest is not bullish in itself. It is bullish only when these three are met: ✅ The company survives without new capital ✅ Short lacks an “exit‑event” on the downside ✅ There are concrete triggers (GF, buyback, recalls) In: Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill → ✅(3), ❌(1) Link Mobility → ✅✅✅ Briefly summarized: Yes, many high‑short‑shares have collapsed In almost all such cases there was: - structural financing weakness - debt or need for capital raise Link lacks these characteristics Thus, Link is in the same short‑category as: Kahoot / NEL / REC (before turnaround) and not like Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill.·5 t sittenGreat post mister. Now it only remains for link to show organic growth!
- ·1 päivä sittenShorts remain stable and are gradually increasing. It seems they are determined to hold through Q1. I reduced my position today, based on the short positions remaining so strong leading up to the report.
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuPersonally, I have not previously been "on the inside" of such a heavily shorted stock. Therefore, I did a Copilot search for similar past events on the Oslo Stock Exchange related to the upcoming OGF (29 days). I found the result somewhat interesting. It seems that all the situations listed have ended with more or less "action". **********************************************************************' Historical comparable cases – Oslo Stock Exchange 1. **Kahoot! (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** ~15–22 % (periodically) **Event:** Capital raising, strategic owners, GM / EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate before the rally What happened? * Several rounds of **high shorting into defined events** * Positive news flow + increasing institutional interest * **Short covering first gradual, then accelerating** Price response * Several **30–50 % movements in weeks** * Strong daily movements on relatively low volume 📌 Learning: When short >15 % and the stock starts to rise *before* the event → short loses control quickly. 2. **NEL ASA (2019–2020)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Contracts, sector momentum, capital markets days **Liquidity:** High – but the short is large What happened? * Short positions built on "overpricing" * Event-driven news flow made it impossible to stay short * Covering happened **in waves** Price response * Rapid doubling from local bottoms * Typical pattern: * sideways * sudden breakout * **short-driven momentum** 📌 Learning: Even in liquid stocks, collective shorting can face structural problems due to event risk. 3. **REC Silicon (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** >20 % at its highest **Event:** Negotiations, strategic uncertainty, possible turn-around **Liquidity:** Low–moderate What happened? * Short built on rational fundamental thesis * Small positive signals → **unexpected covering** * Very little supply of shares on the upside Price response * Extreme movements: * +100 % in a short time * Several days with "no sellers" 📌 Learning: When **free float is small and short is large**, the market loses price discovery control. 4. **Borr Drilling (several periods 2019–2022)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Refinancing, debt clarifications, GM/EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate What happened? * The short was correct in the long term * **Event risk** forced covering in the short term * Short was "right, but too early" Price response * 25–40 % up in a few weeks * Then new shorting at a higher level 📌 **Learning:** Shorts may be fundamentally right – but **event risk always wins in the short term**. 5. **ArcticZymes (2020)** **Short interest:** ~15 % **Event:** Positive signals / inefficient information **Liquidity:** Low Price response * Abrupt price doubling * Short almost completely disappeared 📌 **Learning:** In small/mid-cap OSE stocks, **20 % short is extremely much**. *** Comparison against **Link Mobility – today's situation** | Factor | Historical squeezes | Link Mobility | | ---------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | | Short interest | 15–25 % | **>20 %** ✅ | | Liquidity | Low–moderate | **Moderate** ✅ | | Defined event | GM / EGM / news | **GM in 29 days** ✅ | | Buyback / capital return | Often a trigger | **Ongoing buyback** ✅ | Institutional ownership | Concentrated | **Very concentrated** ✅ | 🔴 **Important point:** In several of the cases above, the short was **lower than in Link** and still enough for strong movements. What history suggests for Link Mobility Based on Oslo Stock Exchange precedent: **Upside before GM is far more common than neutral development** Shorts tend to: * Cover **too early and expensively** * Underestimate recall risk Price movements often occur: * without news * on low volume * in short, steep bursts Sober estimate (no guarantee): * +10–20 %**: fully plausible without specific news * +25–40 %**: likely if parts of the short must cover * >50 %**: requires either coordinated recall, buyback escalation or positive guidance.
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuIn yesterday's shareholder overview, Folketrygdfondet is still listed with only 3.9 million shares. The status is therefore the same as mentioned in Knash's previous post, i.e., that they still have 18.6 million shares outstanding for short selling. No recall so far. 17 trading days left until the general meeting, and if FTF wants to vote, the shares must probably be registered in the account a few days before. Combined with normal daily turnover in Link, this provides a basis for some exciting calculations…. But it seems the short sellers are calm. Price movements and volume appear to be quite normal.
- ·1 päivä sittenCould get pretty ugly for all short sellers going forward.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Oslo Børs
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 604 | - | - | ||
| 5 000 | - | - | ||
| 774 | - | - | ||
| 10 253 | - | - | ||
| 359 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 12.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 12.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 14.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 13.2.2025 |
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
77 päivää sitten
‧1 t 0 min
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 12.5. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 12.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 20.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 14.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 13.2.2025 |
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·7 t sitten · MuokattuI see that some are selling out for fear that the short sellers might be right. So, it might be fun to ask Copilot for examples where the short sellers WERE right and the share price plummeted. The answer was as follows: ********************************************************************** Yes – high short‑interest often ends with a price increase, but there are also many clear examples where the short‑sold got it right and the share price fell sharply. The common denominator in these cases is that fundamental problems materialized, and that no positive trigger (event, recall, capital injection) came in time. Below are relevant and instructive examples, also from the Oslo Stock Exchange. Cases where high short‑interest → sharp price fall 1. Norwegian Air Shuttle (2018–2020) Short‑interest: 15–25 % in several periods Outcome: Price fall >90 % What happened? The short‑thesis was fundamentally correct: high debt, weak cash flow, complex structure Several short‑term rallies and “mini‑squeezes” But every positive movement was used for new shorting Why did short win? Capital requirements were continuous No sustained positive cash flow Ultimately: restructuring and massive dilution 📌 Learning: High short + structural financing risk = short has long‑term advantage 2. ESA Group / PetroNor / IOX Explorers (small OSE‑shares) Short‑interest: 10–20 % Outcome: Price fall 70–100 % What happened? Short selling signaled low confidence in accounting, governance or assets Small rallies were met by capital raises Fatal individual announcements (delays, lost licenses) 📌 Learning: In illiquid shares, high short is often an early warning, not a squeeze‑setup 3. Seadrill (2015–2017) Short‑interest: High in periods (10–20 %) Outcome: Bankruptcy / restructuring What happened? Short warned of unsustainable debt Temporary upturns during oil price rallies Ultimately, the equity was worthless 📌 Learning: Short only loses if the timeline is broken – here they were right in the end 4. SAS (2019–2023) Short‑interest: High repeatedly Outcome: Near total equity wipeout What happened? Often repriced on “turnaround‑hope” But cash flow and cost base never matched the narrative 📌 Learning: High short + chronically low profitability → shareholders lose over time 5. Wirecard (Frankfurt, but illustrative) Short‑interest: Extremely high Outcome: Share to zero Ironically: Short‑sellers were viewed with suspicion Turned out to be completely right 📌 Learning: High short can be the market's best investigation What distinguishes these from the LINK‑situation? Factor Fall‑cases Link Mobility Cash flow Negative / unstable Positive and stable✅ Capital requirements Repeated capital raises No capital raise distress ✅ Debt risk High / unbalanced Manageable ✅ Business model Cyclical / weak Structural growth (CPaaS) ✅ Event‑risk for short Low High (GF, buyback, recall) ✅ Important conclusion High short‑interest is not bullish in itself. It is bullish only when these three are met: ✅ The company survives without new capital ✅ Short lacks an “exit‑event” on the downside ✅ There are concrete triggers (GF, buyback, recalls) In: Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill → ✅(3), ❌(1) Link Mobility → ✅✅✅ Briefly summarized: Yes, many high‑short‑shares have collapsed In almost all such cases there was: - structural financing weakness - debt or need for capital raise Link lacks these characteristics Thus, Link is in the same short‑category as: Kahoot / NEL / REC (before turnaround) and not like Norwegian / SAS / Seadrill.·5 t sittenGreat post mister. Now it only remains for link to show organic growth!
- ·1 päivä sittenShorts remain stable and are gradually increasing. It seems they are determined to hold through Q1. I reduced my position today, based on the short positions remaining so strong leading up to the report.
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuPersonally, I have not previously been "on the inside" of such a heavily shorted stock. Therefore, I did a Copilot search for similar past events on the Oslo Stock Exchange related to the upcoming OGF (29 days). I found the result somewhat interesting. It seems that all the situations listed have ended with more or less "action". **********************************************************************' Historical comparable cases – Oslo Stock Exchange 1. **Kahoot! (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** ~15–22 % (periodically) **Event:** Capital raising, strategic owners, GM / EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate before the rally What happened? * Several rounds of **high shorting into defined events** * Positive news flow + increasing institutional interest * **Short covering first gradual, then accelerating** Price response * Several **30–50 % movements in weeks** * Strong daily movements on relatively low volume 📌 Learning: When short >15 % and the stock starts to rise *before* the event → short loses control quickly. 2. **NEL ASA (2019–2020)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Contracts, sector momentum, capital markets days **Liquidity:** High – but the short is large What happened? * Short positions built on "overpricing" * Event-driven news flow made it impossible to stay short * Covering happened **in waves** Price response * Rapid doubling from local bottoms * Typical pattern: * sideways * sudden breakout * **short-driven momentum** 📌 Learning: Even in liquid stocks, collective shorting can face structural problems due to event risk. 3. **REC Silicon (2020–2021)** **Short interest:** >20 % at its highest **Event:** Negotiations, strategic uncertainty, possible turn-around **Liquidity:** Low–moderate What happened? * Short built on rational fundamental thesis * Small positive signals → **unexpected covering** * Very little supply of shares on the upside Price response * Extreme movements: * +100 % in a short time * Several days with "no sellers" 📌 Learning: When **free float is small and short is large**, the market loses price discovery control. 4. **Borr Drilling (several periods 2019–2022)** **Short interest:** 10–18 % **Event:** Refinancing, debt clarifications, GM/EGM **Liquidity:** Moderate What happened? * The short was correct in the long term * **Event risk** forced covering in the short term * Short was "right, but too early" Price response * 25–40 % up in a few weeks * Then new shorting at a higher level 📌 **Learning:** Shorts may be fundamentally right – but **event risk always wins in the short term**. 5. **ArcticZymes (2020)** **Short interest:** ~15 % **Event:** Positive signals / inefficient information **Liquidity:** Low Price response * Abrupt price doubling * Short almost completely disappeared 📌 **Learning:** In small/mid-cap OSE stocks, **20 % short is extremely much**. *** Comparison against **Link Mobility – today's situation** | Factor | Historical squeezes | Link Mobility | | ---------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | | Short interest | 15–25 % | **>20 %** ✅ | | Liquidity | Low–moderate | **Moderate** ✅ | | Defined event | GM / EGM / news | **GM in 29 days** ✅ | | Buyback / capital return | Often a trigger | **Ongoing buyback** ✅ | Institutional ownership | Concentrated | **Very concentrated** ✅ | 🔴 **Important point:** In several of the cases above, the short was **lower than in Link** and still enough for strong movements. What history suggests for Link Mobility Based on Oslo Stock Exchange precedent: **Upside before GM is far more common than neutral development** Shorts tend to: * Cover **too early and expensively** * Underestimate recall risk Price movements often occur: * without news * on low volume * in short, steep bursts Sober estimate (no guarantee): * +10–20 %**: fully plausible without specific news * +25–40 %**: likely if parts of the short must cover * >50 %**: requires either coordinated recall, buyback escalation or positive guidance.
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuIn yesterday's shareholder overview, Folketrygdfondet is still listed with only 3.9 million shares. The status is therefore the same as mentioned in Knash's previous post, i.e., that they still have 18.6 million shares outstanding for short selling. No recall so far. 17 trading days left until the general meeting, and if FTF wants to vote, the shares must probably be registered in the account a few days before. Combined with normal daily turnover in Link, this provides a basis for some exciting calculations…. But it seems the short sellers are calm. Price movements and volume appear to be quite normal.
- ·1 päivä sittenCould get pretty ugly for all short sellers going forward.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Oslo Børs
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 604 | - | - | ||
| 5 000 | - | - | ||
| 774 | - | - | ||
| 10 253 | - | - | ||
| 359 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt