2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
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Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
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2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. | 7 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuONLY ONE PIPE FROM DENMARK – THE STATE IS FORCED TO SEEK DOMESTIC GAS PRODUCTION The European energy crisis is forcing rapid regulatory adjustments. EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently confirmed that the union intends to postpone the new methane requirements for imported oil and gas. Schedules are being adjusted when physical delivery and security of supply are threatened. THE SWEDISH BOTTLENECK In Sweden, the vulnerability is extremely concrete. The Swedish Energy Agency has now put its finger on a strategic failure: the West Swedish gas grid is currently "mainly dependent on input from a single input point, from Denmark". This grid alone consumes around 7–8 TWh of gas per year, where some 90 facilities account for 80 percent of consumption. For a country rapidly building up its total defense, the dependence on a single import route for heavy, socially critical industry is an unacceptable vulnerability. A single interruption in this node paralyzes the system. THE STATE'S COUNTERMOVE AND THE MATHEMATICAL REALITY This vulnerability is now forcing direct state action. Through government assignment RU2026-00039, the Energy Agency has been ordered to propose measures for "more input points and increased national production" of biogas. The agency must weigh the needs of total defense and submit sharp legislative proposals. An information meeting is held as early as this Friday, October 9th. But here mathematics puts a stop to it. Sweden's total consumption of natural gas is around 10 TWh per year. At the same time, total Swedish biogas production in 2025 amounted to only 2.688 TWh, of which just over 1.8 TWh was upgraded to biomethane that can replace natural gas in the grid. Replacing import dependence and securing total defense's large-scale volume needs with complex and energy-intensive biogas production is a mathematical and practical impossibility. The assignment exposes a brutal security-policy insight: the state is screaming for domestic gas production and redundancy, but the volumes from biogas are nowhere near enough. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST While the state is desperately trying to engineer away its dangerous import dependence, another state investigation track remains locked. The state preparedness inquiry (SOU 2025:68) clearly states that it is not realistic to wait until a crisis occurs before domestic extraction is established – commercial actors must be able to invest in advance. The Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU) explicitly shares this assessment: the ban on domestic extraction of natural gas needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for security of supply. Despite the state recognizing the vulnerability in a single import pipe, and despite the experts' demands, the 2022 extraction ban remains – thereby blocking the extraction of large-scale natural gas resources in the Siljan Ring. When the gas grid's bottlenecks are classified as a threat to total defense, domestic control is no longer an abstract question of energy sources. Preparedness ultimately comes down to volume and physical control: which energy molecules the state is actually permitted to produce the day the import cable is cut.- ·2 päivää sittenEMERGENCY RESERVES ONLY BUY ONE WINTER – PRODUCTION CAPACITY MUST BE BUILT IN PEACETIME The conditions for Europe's energy supply have been brought to a head in just a few days. When global logistics falter, a harsh reality is exposed: in a turbulent environment, access to energy on a world market is not the same as physical delivery. At the EU Energy Council meeting, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently noted that over the past year the EU has paid over 100 billion euros extra for its energy without getting a single additional molecule of gas or oil. LOGISTICS IS THE NEW BOTTLENECK This structural import dependency is no longer just about production volumes, but about the extreme vulnerability of logistics. Even when export flows from the Middle East occasionally recover, the transport routes are the bottleneck. According to Reuters, freight rates for large tankers on certain routes have exploded from 30,000 dollars to upwards of 1.2 million dollars per day, meaning that transport and insurance can account for nearly 27 percent of the delivered price. As Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser stated in London today, October 5: "What matters is whether the right energy can reach the right place, in the right form, at the right time." THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC RESERVES When logistics become more expensive and disrupted, governments are forced to act. G7 countries are now coordinating the use of strategic reserves, and according to the IEA, around 325 million barrels of the spring's coordinated crisis package of 400 million barrels have already been released. However, emergency reserves are a highly temporary lifeline. Amin Nasser made the decisive statement today regarding this strategy: "Emergency reserves might buy us a winter. They cannot fix long-term supply." A strategic reserve can at best buy one winter, but creates no sustainable production capacity. According to Aramco, it can subsequently take up to two years to even restore global buffers. NATO AND THE SWEDISH OPERATIONAL REALITY In parallel, energy supply has become a purely operational security problem. On September 30, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence conducted a sharp war game in the European Parliament concerning how energy disruptions impact both civil infrastructure and military defense. Sweden is physically acting on this threat picture. The Swedish Energy Agency has, through the Energy Preparedness Initiative (Energiberedskapsklivet), allocated at least 60 million SEK to the gas sector, where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for support for backup power during heightened preparedness. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST Here, an inescapable institutional contrast arises. Saudi Aramco's macro logic – that reserves buy very little time but that long-term capacity is required – is directly mirrored in the Swedish government official report SOU 2025:68. The report, which presents the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring, makes a central preparedness assessment: waiting until a crisis occurs and only then trying to establish extraction is not a realistic solution. If the government wants the freedom of action to utilize domestic assets during disrupted trade flows, the report assesses that the extraction ban needs to be abolished. SGU (Geological Survey of Sweden) shares this assessment in its referral response and notes that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas needs to be lifted to once again enable extraction for security of supply purposes. The 2022 general ban on natural gas extraction in the Swedish Environmental Code nevertheless remains. When the G7 is forced to use its strategic reserves, when Aramco warns that reserves only last one winter, and when SGU shares the assessment that a legislative change is required, the issue becomes a decisive strategic choice. Preparedness is not determined by what the state hopes to buy and ship across disrupted world oceans, but by what sustainable production capacity has been built up in peacetime – before supply chains break.
- ·22.9.NATO'S SHARP PLANS ARE EXERCISED IN SWEDEN – SUPPLY READINESS BECOMES OPERATIONAL Sweden's build-up of total defense is becoming increasingly operational. On September 18, Sweden and Germany conducted a reinforcement operation on Gotland. The Swedish Armed Forces explicitly state: "It is NATO's sharp plans that are being exercised." Visby harbor was secured for the transport of additional soldiers and materiel, while Swedish and German naval and air forces secured the fairway. The ability to maintain operational logistics and sustainable supply is the foundation for such operations. This places the developments of recent weeks in an unavoidable context. Several lines of development are now running in parallel: SEPT 18 – OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS NATO's sharp reinforcement plans are physically exercised on Swedish soil. The Swedish Armed Forces describe secured harbors, shipping, and air transport as a prerequisite for military units to be able to move within NATO. SEPT 16 – GLOBAL LOGISTICS DISRUPTIONS The Swedish Energy Agency reports that ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has continued to decrease sharply. Swedish energy supply is still stable, but the agency notes that important transport routes for energy are affected and that the situation can change rapidly. SEPT 10 – LEGAL REVIEW The government is appointing an inquiry into the Environmental Code and defense. The background is explicitly the deteriorated security policy situation and Sweden's NATO membership. The mandate includes, among other things, more effective application and possible adaptations of the Environmental Code for military defense activities and the defense industry. ONGOING – PHYSICAL GAS READINESS The Swedish Energy Agency has opened the Energy Preparedness Boost. At least 60 million kronor is allocated to the gas sector. Gas network operators and gas producers can explicitly apply for support for backup power needed for gas supply during peacetime crises and heightened alert. FROM STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY Sweden is thus no longer building supply readiness solely through strategies and inquiries. The state is financing physical energy preparedness while the Swedish Armed Forces, together with allies, are exercising the logistics that must function when normal international supply flows can no longer be taken for granted. Here, the strategic paradox surrounding Swedish natural gas comes to a head. SOU 2025:68 reports the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring of 200 million–1 billion cubic meters. The inquiry simultaneously notes that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to begin extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas only during a peacetime crisis, heightened alert, or war. Sweden is now building systems and financing so that gas supply can function even under disturbed conditions. At the same time, the 2022 ban on Swedish natural gas extraction is maintained. The security policy context surrounding this legislation has fundamentally changed. When the Swedish Armed Forces exercise NATO's sharp reinforcement plans, the state invests in physical gas preparedness, and the Swedish Energy Agency simultaneously monitors disruptions on some of the world's most important energy transport routes, the question of domestic production capacity becomes impossible to treat in isolation from Sweden's supply readiness. SOU 2025:68 has already identified the dilemma: extraction capacity must be in place before the crisis is a fact. It is based on this new security and supply policy reality that the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring must now be assessed.
- ·17.9.EUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality.You correctly identify the physical threat. Stifled flows through Bab al-Mandab, soaring world market prices, and the direct threat to Swedish heavy industry are highly real scenarios. It is precisely this reality that is driving the state's emergency preparedness apparatus to rapidly allocate capital to physical gas infrastructure. But you draw entirely the wrong conclusion when you once again reduce crisis management to a question of Swedish bloc politics, "betrayal debates" and party-political prestige. Drawing parallels to the government formation in 2018 or worrying about the "red/green camp" is to apply an outdated peacetime logic to an entirely new security policy normal state. When international logistics chains are broken and the survival of national industry is threatened, conventional political rules of the game are erased. Swedish supply preparedness in this situation is not governed by who wins an election debate. It is relentlessly driven forward by the Armed Forces, NATO's requirements, and the absolute need for logistical endurance. The state machinery is currently building structures to handle precisely the "predicted guesses" about crises that you yourself mention. We monitor the institutional shift and the state's capital allocation because that is where the future control over Swedish natural gas will be decided – not in the short-term party-political buzz.
- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.
We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
Vain PDF
84 päivää sitten
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuONLY ONE PIPE FROM DENMARK – THE STATE IS FORCED TO SEEK DOMESTIC GAS PRODUCTION The European energy crisis is forcing rapid regulatory adjustments. EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently confirmed that the union intends to postpone the new methane requirements for imported oil and gas. Schedules are being adjusted when physical delivery and security of supply are threatened. THE SWEDISH BOTTLENECK In Sweden, the vulnerability is extremely concrete. The Swedish Energy Agency has now put its finger on a strategic failure: the West Swedish gas grid is currently "mainly dependent on input from a single input point, from Denmark". This grid alone consumes around 7–8 TWh of gas per year, where some 90 facilities account for 80 percent of consumption. For a country rapidly building up its total defense, the dependence on a single import route for heavy, socially critical industry is an unacceptable vulnerability. A single interruption in this node paralyzes the system. THE STATE'S COUNTERMOVE AND THE MATHEMATICAL REALITY This vulnerability is now forcing direct state action. Through government assignment RU2026-00039, the Energy Agency has been ordered to propose measures for "more input points and increased national production" of biogas. The agency must weigh the needs of total defense and submit sharp legislative proposals. An information meeting is held as early as this Friday, October 9th. But here mathematics puts a stop to it. Sweden's total consumption of natural gas is around 10 TWh per year. At the same time, total Swedish biogas production in 2025 amounted to only 2.688 TWh, of which just over 1.8 TWh was upgraded to biomethane that can replace natural gas in the grid. Replacing import dependence and securing total defense's large-scale volume needs with complex and energy-intensive biogas production is a mathematical and practical impossibility. The assignment exposes a brutal security-policy insight: the state is screaming for domestic gas production and redundancy, but the volumes from biogas are nowhere near enough. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST While the state is desperately trying to engineer away its dangerous import dependence, another state investigation track remains locked. The state preparedness inquiry (SOU 2025:68) clearly states that it is not realistic to wait until a crisis occurs before domestic extraction is established – commercial actors must be able to invest in advance. The Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU) explicitly shares this assessment: the ban on domestic extraction of natural gas needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for security of supply. Despite the state recognizing the vulnerability in a single import pipe, and despite the experts' demands, the 2022 extraction ban remains – thereby blocking the extraction of large-scale natural gas resources in the Siljan Ring. When the gas grid's bottlenecks are classified as a threat to total defense, domestic control is no longer an abstract question of energy sources. Preparedness ultimately comes down to volume and physical control: which energy molecules the state is actually permitted to produce the day the import cable is cut.
- ·2 päivää sittenEMERGENCY RESERVES ONLY BUY ONE WINTER – PRODUCTION CAPACITY MUST BE BUILT IN PEACETIME The conditions for Europe's energy supply have been brought to a head in just a few days. When global logistics falter, a harsh reality is exposed: in a turbulent environment, access to energy on a world market is not the same as physical delivery. At the EU Energy Council meeting, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently noted that over the past year the EU has paid over 100 billion euros extra for its energy without getting a single additional molecule of gas or oil. LOGISTICS IS THE NEW BOTTLENECK This structural import dependency is no longer just about production volumes, but about the extreme vulnerability of logistics. Even when export flows from the Middle East occasionally recover, the transport routes are the bottleneck. According to Reuters, freight rates for large tankers on certain routes have exploded from 30,000 dollars to upwards of 1.2 million dollars per day, meaning that transport and insurance can account for nearly 27 percent of the delivered price. As Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser stated in London today, October 5: "What matters is whether the right energy can reach the right place, in the right form, at the right time." THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC RESERVES When logistics become more expensive and disrupted, governments are forced to act. G7 countries are now coordinating the use of strategic reserves, and according to the IEA, around 325 million barrels of the spring's coordinated crisis package of 400 million barrels have already been released. However, emergency reserves are a highly temporary lifeline. Amin Nasser made the decisive statement today regarding this strategy: "Emergency reserves might buy us a winter. They cannot fix long-term supply." A strategic reserve can at best buy one winter, but creates no sustainable production capacity. According to Aramco, it can subsequently take up to two years to even restore global buffers. NATO AND THE SWEDISH OPERATIONAL REALITY In parallel, energy supply has become a purely operational security problem. On September 30, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence conducted a sharp war game in the European Parliament concerning how energy disruptions impact both civil infrastructure and military defense. Sweden is physically acting on this threat picture. The Swedish Energy Agency has, through the Energy Preparedness Initiative (Energiberedskapsklivet), allocated at least 60 million SEK to the gas sector, where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for support for backup power during heightened preparedness. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST Here, an inescapable institutional contrast arises. Saudi Aramco's macro logic – that reserves buy very little time but that long-term capacity is required – is directly mirrored in the Swedish government official report SOU 2025:68. The report, which presents the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring, makes a central preparedness assessment: waiting until a crisis occurs and only then trying to establish extraction is not a realistic solution. If the government wants the freedom of action to utilize domestic assets during disrupted trade flows, the report assesses that the extraction ban needs to be abolished. SGU (Geological Survey of Sweden) shares this assessment in its referral response and notes that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas needs to be lifted to once again enable extraction for security of supply purposes. The 2022 general ban on natural gas extraction in the Swedish Environmental Code nevertheless remains. When the G7 is forced to use its strategic reserves, when Aramco warns that reserves only last one winter, and when SGU shares the assessment that a legislative change is required, the issue becomes a decisive strategic choice. Preparedness is not determined by what the state hopes to buy and ship across disrupted world oceans, but by what sustainable production capacity has been built up in peacetime – before supply chains break.
- ·22.9.NATO'S SHARP PLANS ARE EXERCISED IN SWEDEN – SUPPLY READINESS BECOMES OPERATIONAL Sweden's build-up of total defense is becoming increasingly operational. On September 18, Sweden and Germany conducted a reinforcement operation on Gotland. The Swedish Armed Forces explicitly state: "It is NATO's sharp plans that are being exercised." Visby harbor was secured for the transport of additional soldiers and materiel, while Swedish and German naval and air forces secured the fairway. The ability to maintain operational logistics and sustainable supply is the foundation for such operations. This places the developments of recent weeks in an unavoidable context. Several lines of development are now running in parallel: SEPT 18 – OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS NATO's sharp reinforcement plans are physically exercised on Swedish soil. The Swedish Armed Forces describe secured harbors, shipping, and air transport as a prerequisite for military units to be able to move within NATO. SEPT 16 – GLOBAL LOGISTICS DISRUPTIONS The Swedish Energy Agency reports that ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has continued to decrease sharply. Swedish energy supply is still stable, but the agency notes that important transport routes for energy are affected and that the situation can change rapidly. SEPT 10 – LEGAL REVIEW The government is appointing an inquiry into the Environmental Code and defense. The background is explicitly the deteriorated security policy situation and Sweden's NATO membership. The mandate includes, among other things, more effective application and possible adaptations of the Environmental Code for military defense activities and the defense industry. ONGOING – PHYSICAL GAS READINESS The Swedish Energy Agency has opened the Energy Preparedness Boost. At least 60 million kronor is allocated to the gas sector. Gas network operators and gas producers can explicitly apply for support for backup power needed for gas supply during peacetime crises and heightened alert. FROM STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY Sweden is thus no longer building supply readiness solely through strategies and inquiries. The state is financing physical energy preparedness while the Swedish Armed Forces, together with allies, are exercising the logistics that must function when normal international supply flows can no longer be taken for granted. Here, the strategic paradox surrounding Swedish natural gas comes to a head. SOU 2025:68 reports the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring of 200 million–1 billion cubic meters. The inquiry simultaneously notes that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to begin extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas only during a peacetime crisis, heightened alert, or war. Sweden is now building systems and financing so that gas supply can function even under disturbed conditions. At the same time, the 2022 ban on Swedish natural gas extraction is maintained. The security policy context surrounding this legislation has fundamentally changed. When the Swedish Armed Forces exercise NATO's sharp reinforcement plans, the state invests in physical gas preparedness, and the Swedish Energy Agency simultaneously monitors disruptions on some of the world's most important energy transport routes, the question of domestic production capacity becomes impossible to treat in isolation from Sweden's supply readiness. SOU 2025:68 has already identified the dilemma: extraction capacity must be in place before the crisis is a fact. It is based on this new security and supply policy reality that the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring must now be assessed.
- ·17.9.EUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality.You correctly identify the physical threat. Stifled flows through Bab al-Mandab, soaring world market prices, and the direct threat to Swedish heavy industry are highly real scenarios. It is precisely this reality that is driving the state's emergency preparedness apparatus to rapidly allocate capital to physical gas infrastructure. But you draw entirely the wrong conclusion when you once again reduce crisis management to a question of Swedish bloc politics, "betrayal debates" and party-political prestige. Drawing parallels to the government formation in 2018 or worrying about the "red/green camp" is to apply an outdated peacetime logic to an entirely new security policy normal state. When international logistics chains are broken and the survival of national industry is threatened, conventional political rules of the game are erased. Swedish supply preparedness in this situation is not governed by who wins an election debate. It is relentlessly driven forward by the Armed Forces, NATO's requirements, and the absolute need for logistical endurance. The state machinery is currently building structures to handle precisely the "predicted guesses" about crises that you yourself mention. We monitor the institutional shift and the state's capital allocation because that is where the future control over Swedish natural gas will be decided – not in the short-term party-political buzz.
- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
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2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. | 7 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
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2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
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Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. | 7 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
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Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
- ·1 päivä sitten · MuokattuONLY ONE PIPE FROM DENMARK – THE STATE IS FORCED TO SEEK DOMESTIC GAS PRODUCTION The European energy crisis is forcing rapid regulatory adjustments. EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently confirmed that the union intends to postpone the new methane requirements for imported oil and gas. Schedules are being adjusted when physical delivery and security of supply are threatened. THE SWEDISH BOTTLENECK In Sweden, the vulnerability is extremely concrete. The Swedish Energy Agency has now put its finger on a strategic failure: the West Swedish gas grid is currently "mainly dependent on input from a single input point, from Denmark". This grid alone consumes around 7–8 TWh of gas per year, where some 90 facilities account for 80 percent of consumption. For a country rapidly building up its total defense, the dependence on a single import route for heavy, socially critical industry is an unacceptable vulnerability. A single interruption in this node paralyzes the system. THE STATE'S COUNTERMOVE AND THE MATHEMATICAL REALITY This vulnerability is now forcing direct state action. Through government assignment RU2026-00039, the Energy Agency has been ordered to propose measures for "more input points and increased national production" of biogas. The agency must weigh the needs of total defense and submit sharp legislative proposals. An information meeting is held as early as this Friday, October 9th. But here mathematics puts a stop to it. Sweden's total consumption of natural gas is around 10 TWh per year. At the same time, total Swedish biogas production in 2025 amounted to only 2.688 TWh, of which just over 1.8 TWh was upgraded to biomethane that can replace natural gas in the grid. Replacing import dependence and securing total defense's large-scale volume needs with complex and energy-intensive biogas production is a mathematical and practical impossibility. The assignment exposes a brutal security-policy insight: the state is screaming for domestic gas production and redundancy, but the volumes from biogas are nowhere near enough. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST While the state is desperately trying to engineer away its dangerous import dependence, another state investigation track remains locked. The state preparedness inquiry (SOU 2025:68) clearly states that it is not realistic to wait until a crisis occurs before domestic extraction is established – commercial actors must be able to invest in advance. The Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU) explicitly shares this assessment: the ban on domestic extraction of natural gas needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for security of supply. Despite the state recognizing the vulnerability in a single import pipe, and despite the experts' demands, the 2022 extraction ban remains – thereby blocking the extraction of large-scale natural gas resources in the Siljan Ring. When the gas grid's bottlenecks are classified as a threat to total defense, domestic control is no longer an abstract question of energy sources. Preparedness ultimately comes down to volume and physical control: which energy molecules the state is actually permitted to produce the day the import cable is cut.
- ·2 päivää sittenEMERGENCY RESERVES ONLY BUY ONE WINTER – PRODUCTION CAPACITY MUST BE BUILT IN PEACETIME The conditions for Europe's energy supply have been brought to a head in just a few days. When global logistics falter, a harsh reality is exposed: in a turbulent environment, access to energy on a world market is not the same as physical delivery. At the EU Energy Council meeting, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently noted that over the past year the EU has paid over 100 billion euros extra for its energy without getting a single additional molecule of gas or oil. LOGISTICS IS THE NEW BOTTLENECK This structural import dependency is no longer just about production volumes, but about the extreme vulnerability of logistics. Even when export flows from the Middle East occasionally recover, the transport routes are the bottleneck. According to Reuters, freight rates for large tankers on certain routes have exploded from 30,000 dollars to upwards of 1.2 million dollars per day, meaning that transport and insurance can account for nearly 27 percent of the delivered price. As Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser stated in London today, October 5: "What matters is whether the right energy can reach the right place, in the right form, at the right time." THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC RESERVES When logistics become more expensive and disrupted, governments are forced to act. G7 countries are now coordinating the use of strategic reserves, and according to the IEA, around 325 million barrels of the spring's coordinated crisis package of 400 million barrels have already been released. However, emergency reserves are a highly temporary lifeline. Amin Nasser made the decisive statement today regarding this strategy: "Emergency reserves might buy us a winter. They cannot fix long-term supply." A strategic reserve can at best buy one winter, but creates no sustainable production capacity. According to Aramco, it can subsequently take up to two years to even restore global buffers. NATO AND THE SWEDISH OPERATIONAL REALITY In parallel, energy supply has become a purely operational security problem. On September 30, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence conducted a sharp war game in the European Parliament concerning how energy disruptions impact both civil infrastructure and military defense. Sweden is physically acting on this threat picture. The Swedish Energy Agency has, through the Energy Preparedness Initiative (Energiberedskapsklivet), allocated at least 60 million SEK to the gas sector, where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for support for backup power during heightened preparedness. THE STRATEGIC CONTRAST Here, an inescapable institutional contrast arises. Saudi Aramco's macro logic – that reserves buy very little time but that long-term capacity is required – is directly mirrored in the Swedish government official report SOU 2025:68. The report, which presents the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring, makes a central preparedness assessment: waiting until a crisis occurs and only then trying to establish extraction is not a realistic solution. If the government wants the freedom of action to utilize domestic assets during disrupted trade flows, the report assesses that the extraction ban needs to be abolished. SGU (Geological Survey of Sweden) shares this assessment in its referral response and notes that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas needs to be lifted to once again enable extraction for security of supply purposes. The 2022 general ban on natural gas extraction in the Swedish Environmental Code nevertheless remains. When the G7 is forced to use its strategic reserves, when Aramco warns that reserves only last one winter, and when SGU shares the assessment that a legislative change is required, the issue becomes a decisive strategic choice. Preparedness is not determined by what the state hopes to buy and ship across disrupted world oceans, but by what sustainable production capacity has been built up in peacetime – before supply chains break.
- ·22.9.NATO'S SHARP PLANS ARE EXERCISED IN SWEDEN – SUPPLY READINESS BECOMES OPERATIONAL Sweden's build-up of total defense is becoming increasingly operational. On September 18, Sweden and Germany conducted a reinforcement operation on Gotland. The Swedish Armed Forces explicitly state: "It is NATO's sharp plans that are being exercised." Visby harbor was secured for the transport of additional soldiers and materiel, while Swedish and German naval and air forces secured the fairway. The ability to maintain operational logistics and sustainable supply is the foundation for such operations. This places the developments of recent weeks in an unavoidable context. Several lines of development are now running in parallel: SEPT 18 – OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS NATO's sharp reinforcement plans are physically exercised on Swedish soil. The Swedish Armed Forces describe secured harbors, shipping, and air transport as a prerequisite for military units to be able to move within NATO. SEPT 16 – GLOBAL LOGISTICS DISRUPTIONS The Swedish Energy Agency reports that ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has continued to decrease sharply. Swedish energy supply is still stable, but the agency notes that important transport routes for energy are affected and that the situation can change rapidly. SEPT 10 – LEGAL REVIEW The government is appointing an inquiry into the Environmental Code and defense. The background is explicitly the deteriorated security policy situation and Sweden's NATO membership. The mandate includes, among other things, more effective application and possible adaptations of the Environmental Code for military defense activities and the defense industry. ONGOING – PHYSICAL GAS READINESS The Swedish Energy Agency has opened the Energy Preparedness Boost. At least 60 million kronor is allocated to the gas sector. Gas network operators and gas producers can explicitly apply for support for backup power needed for gas supply during peacetime crises and heightened alert. FROM STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY Sweden is thus no longer building supply readiness solely through strategies and inquiries. The state is financing physical energy preparedness while the Swedish Armed Forces, together with allies, are exercising the logistics that must function when normal international supply flows can no longer be taken for granted. Here, the strategic paradox surrounding Swedish natural gas comes to a head. SOU 2025:68 reports the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring of 200 million–1 billion cubic meters. The inquiry simultaneously notes that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to begin extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas only during a peacetime crisis, heightened alert, or war. Sweden is now building systems and financing so that gas supply can function even under disturbed conditions. At the same time, the 2022 ban on Swedish natural gas extraction is maintained. The security policy context surrounding this legislation has fundamentally changed. When the Swedish Armed Forces exercise NATO's sharp reinforcement plans, the state invests in physical gas preparedness, and the Swedish Energy Agency simultaneously monitors disruptions on some of the world's most important energy transport routes, the question of domestic production capacity becomes impossible to treat in isolation from Sweden's supply readiness. SOU 2025:68 has already identified the dilemma: extraction capacity must be in place before the crisis is a fact. It is based on this new security and supply policy reality that the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring must now be assessed.
- ·17.9.EUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality.You correctly identify the physical threat. Stifled flows through Bab al-Mandab, soaring world market prices, and the direct threat to Swedish heavy industry are highly real scenarios. It is precisely this reality that is driving the state's emergency preparedness apparatus to rapidly allocate capital to physical gas infrastructure. But you draw entirely the wrong conclusion when you once again reduce crisis management to a question of Swedish bloc politics, "betrayal debates" and party-political prestige. Drawing parallels to the government formation in 2018 or worrying about the "red/green camp" is to apply an outdated peacetime logic to an entirely new security policy normal state. When international logistics chains are broken and the survival of national industry is threatened, conventional political rules of the game are erased. Swedish supply preparedness in this situation is not governed by who wins an election debate. It is relentlessly driven forward by the Armed Forces, NATO's requirements, and the absolute need for logistical endurance. The state machinery is currently building structures to handle precisely the "predicted guesses" about crises that you yourself mention. We monitor the institutional shift and the state's capital allocation because that is where the future control over Swedish natural gas will be decided – not in the short-term party-political buzz.
- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | - | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
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