2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
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13 päivää sitten
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Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
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Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·1 päivä sittenEBBA BUSCH: "ALL WARS ARE ENERGY WARS" – THE WESTERN WORLD MUST REGAIN CONTROL OVER THE RESOURCES BENEATH OUR FEET AND THE ENERGY THAT REFINES THEM The government is now executing a consistent security policy repositioning regarding energy and the Western world's industrial independence. In an interview with CNN on January 21, Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch pointed out the direction for NATO: The Alliance cannot only be strengthened militarily. The Western world must immediately regain control over the natural resources, the energy and the industrial capacity on which common security ultimately rests. On June 1st this year, again on CNN, this was brought to a head. The geopolitical reality was summarized in five words: "All wars are energy wars." The strategic principle is thus established from the highest authority: He who does not control his energy supply does not fully control his industry or his total defense either. When the government subsequently presented Sweden's mineral strategy, the next piece of the puzzle was added: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock. "But a mineral resource in the bedrock in itself constitutes neither an industrial nor a military capability. The ore must be mined, transported, reduced, melted, heated and rolled before it is transformed into steel, vehicles and defense material. This requires physical energy. Heavy industry cannot build its resilience solely on electrons. It requires physical, storable energy molecules for high-temperature processes, heavy transport, backup power and reduction. The molecules can shift over time - it's okay go to hell it's calm I can take I can I'm on your side you have liquor Ovako, for example, uses hydrogen to heat steel - but industry's fundamental need for physical energy carriers does not disappear. It is precisely here that Siljansgasen's industrial position becomes highly interesting from a security policy perspective. Igrene has identified an enormous concentration of heavy industry within a defined geographical area: - SSAB in Borlänge - approx. 102 km from Mora. - Ovako in Hofors - approx. 125 km. - Outokumpu in Avesta - approx. 155 km. This involves a full-scale prospected natural gas resource located in direct proximity to Sweden's most important cluster for steel and metal refining, with direct access to the railway network. Igrene's primary focus and executive strategy is now large-scale gas extraction. The possibility of liquefying the resource into LNG establishes a transportable energy carrier for industry. As a strategically important complement, the company, through SEID and ColdSpark, has also developed the technology to split methane into hydrogen and solid carbon - exactly the input materials industry demands. This leads to the core security policy question: What value is there in securing Swedish metals, if Sweden remains dependent on imported energy molecules to refine them? An executive supply strategy must encompass the entire chain: Swedish raw materials, Swedish energy and Swedish refining. It is institutionally unsustainable to combine the government's new security policy logic with a ban on even testing the possibility of utilizing Sweden's natural gas. The Minister for Energy and Business has herself established the foundation: We sit on strategic assets in our own bedrock, and all wars are energy wars. A mineral strategy without a molecule strategy leaves Sweden's supply chain unprotected. What good are the metals beneath our feet if we lack the domestic energy required to refine them? The machinery requires molecules.
The big question becomes: where will the gas come from. If the global situation continues as it now appears with war in Russia/Ukraine where developments have gone so far that Putin himself has mentioned that any export of oil and natural gas is currently forbidden, because domestic oil demand does not allow it p.g.a. that Ukrainian drones and missiles incapacitating depots and refineries around Russia. Thus, all conceivable trade with the Russian petroleum industry becomes completely impossible to establish in the future. Likewise, the war in Iran tends to be a long way to complete, because Muslim countries generally never compromise on anything, not with more than one gets advantages that exceed a pure capitulation of the opponent USA. The Strait of Hormuz can become a stumbling block for years given that Iran's leadership must never be criticized regardless of whether the war itself meets the same fate as in Gaza. Sooner or later, gas and oil demand will leave its mark - not least during the winter half-year - with high energy prices if the situation continues without improvement. How important then does it become for Sweden's security in the question of natural resources possible, the thought of a national shortage in that we do not ourselves utilize our deposits then becomes a big setback not least for our and others' economies for coming times. Regardless of government, but preferably with the conservative one, should and not just should but shall with "frenzy" and authorizing legislate a permit for prospecting and extraction of gas here at home. The gas located around the Siljan region is confirmed available for extraction, and can be started on short notice where the company Igrene is in the starting blocks to enable a domestic petroleum establishment. If the government wants - and nothing unforeseen politically happens - nothing can stop that objective.- ·1 päivä sittenPOLITICAL RESTART IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER RECESS - THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY AND TRADE BACK ON THE CALENDAR The political calendar is now entering an executive and extremely concentrated phase. The institutional mechanics require that three dates from this spring are placed in direct context: 17 March: The Riksdag debates the Committee on Industry and Trade's report NU16, which included the motion regarding Siljansgasen. 18 March: The Chamber formally decides and rejects the motion with direct reference to ongoing government preparation. 19 March: The day after the decision, the Speaker announces that the Riksdag is breaking its summer recess. The purpose is for late-submitted government bills to be prepared in the committees and subsequently decided in the Chamber. The August work is thus organized according to the following exact work order: 11 August: Interpellation debates in the Chamber. 12 August at 09.00: The Chamber begins the debate on the committees' proposals. 12 August at 11.00: The Committee on Industry and Trade convenes. 13 August: Continued debates and concluding decisions in the Chamber. The placement is politically highly interesting. The same committee that dealt with Siljansgasen during the spring is now convening in the middle of the Riksdag's special August work - strictly between the Chamber's initial debates and the concluding decision day on 13 August. The calendar fact remains: The Committee on Industry and Trade is back in active work in the very center of the August window. At the same time, SOU 2025:68 (The Inquiry into the business sector's supply preparedness) is being further processed within the Government Offices. It was exactly this ongoing preparation that the Committee on Industry and Trade referred to in NU16. The issue was never closed by a policy-based stance against Swedish gas extraction - it was handed over to the government's table. This must be weighed against the calendar. Ordinary parliamentary elections are held on 13 September. If the government is to anchor crucial reforms concerning Sweden's preparedness before a potential change of power, the time window is extremely limited. August is the next concrete political checkpoint. The parliamentary machinery is back in operation. And while politics is working against the clock, Igrene has already shifted its main strategy to large-scale gas extraction and direct industrialization of Siljansgasen. Politics is now entering the August window. Igrene has already chosen its direction.Gas extraction in the Siljan Ring must not "stumble at the finish line" when the chamber is to decide such an important issue for the future. If an intense debate is expected and if the basis for anchoring decisive reforms on August 13 is strongly criticized by public opinion, for any irregularities and deficiencies in the basis, which in that case will cause the proposals to be tabled until after the election. Would be a great harm to Igrene's future
- ·24.7.EBBA BUSCH: "WE LITERALLY SIT ON THE SOLUTION IN OUR OWN BEDROCK" - DOES THAT ALSO APPLY TO SWEDEN'S ENERGY MOLECULES? Yesterday, the government presented Sweden's new mineral strategy. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch summarized the new security policy situation with great clarity: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy." She also stated: "Sweden has a unique opportunity. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock." The government's stated goal is to strengthen Sweden's security of supply, reduce import dependence, shorten permit processes, and facilitate investments. Access to strategic raw materials is now explicitly treated as a matter of national security and resilience. This is a necessary and welcome paradigm shift for Swedish preparedness. The logical consequence is that the same security policy principle must also be applied to the country's other strategic resources. A sustainable total defense cannot rely solely on metals and electricity. It also requires access to physical energy molecules - gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored, transported, and used even in the event of serious disruptions in the electricity grid and international supply chains. Sweden is currently vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? The government has established that Sweden literally sits on the solution in its own bedrock. It is now of strategic importance to clarify whether that insight encompasses the entire total defense's supply preparedness - or only the resources covered by the new mineral strategy. A complete total defense needs metals, electrons, and molecules.Sweden is today vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? " Are we to believe that natural gas and possibly hydrogen gas "within reasonable time" can come onto the government's table. That will be the next contribution to the debate.
- ·23.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND SWEDEN'S ONLY MOLECULAR RESOURCE: WHY ELECTRICITY IS NOT ENOUGH IN WAR It is interesting to follow how the government's work develops as the global situation has dramatically worsened. Over the past year, concepts such as total defence, supply preparedness, robust energy supply, and socially critical activities have gained an increasingly clear place in the government's bills, agency assignments, and legislative work. At the same time, the environmental review system is being reformed to streamline permit processes. But in the debate surrounding Swedish preparedness, a crucial logistical reality is often missed: a robust total defence cannot be built solely on electrons. It is a security policy truth that a nation in crisis, or a prolonged war, cannot be run exclusively with electricity. Society and the armed forces require uninterrupted access to physical energy molecules – gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored securely, transported completely independently of a vulnerable electricity grid, and used immediately where electricity is no longer an option. Sweden has strong electricity production fundamentally. But when it comes to naturally occurring energy molecules in our own bedrock, there is, as far as is known, only a single prospected domestic resource: Siljansgasen. As a full member of NATO, Sweden is now covered by the alliance's requirements for national resilience, which entails a strict obligation to manage crises and maintain society's basic functions independently. In addition, the bilateral defence agreement (DCA) with the USA places far-reaching demands on robust host nation support, where secure access to fuel and energy for allied forces on Swedish soil is absolutely critical. In the ongoing preparedness work concerning total defence, however, no concrete initiatives have so far been presented to secure the supply of physical energy molecules. When the energy issue almost exclusively focuses on electricity production, is it then justifiable to exclude Sweden's only known geological gas resource from the security policy agenda? It is not about anticipating the government's decisions. It is about demanding that Sweden's collective resources be tested based on today's serious security policy situation, free from the constraints created by yesterday's environmental debate.What you yourself write about here, are largely the same thoughts one "tosses around". If an S-led government with the support of a green power party cannot even utter the word natural gas, then what will be the upshot of such a collaboration? Something needs to happen in the near future before time runs out, and all the work that Igrene has put in for a bright future prospect with the extraction and sale of the raw material, which seemingly should be completely obvious for Sweden's own management of the valuable gas. If one looks at what is happening in our surrounding world and Russia, but also - if one so wishes - a billion income for the Swedish heavy steel industry. Hope is not lost yet, if nuclear power could be started up at a good pace, then why shouldn't natural gas and hydrogen be developed in the same way in an advantageous and well-founded concept as well?
- ·17.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND THE PARADIGM SHIFT: IGRENE RETURNS TO LARGE-SCALE EXTRACTION Today's quarterly report from Igrene is undoubtedly the most important strategic communication from the company since the legislative change in 2022. For the first time in several years, Igrene openly declares a strategic shift back to the company's original core idea: large-scale extraction of Siljansgasen. In recent years, the focus has gradually shifted towards ColdSpark, hydrogen, and methane splitting. Today's report fundamentally overturns that prioritization. SEID and ColdSpark remain important assets, but the main focus is now once again the direct industrialization of the gas deposits in Mora. What the report actually says: The board justifies this shift with the changed geopolitical situation and an increased focus on Sweden's energy security. It explicitly refers to the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) and the government's ongoing work on supply preparedness. The most remarkable aspect, however, is the board's conclusion: it assesses that the conditions for obtaining permits for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened. What this means in practice: Why is a board formulating itself like this right now? For those who understand the geopolitical situation, the industrial logic is indisputable. Through the recently signed defense agreement with the USA (DCA) and NATO's requirements for robust host nation support, the security policy foundation has been redrawn. A functioning total defense cannot rely on vulnerable energy imports via the coasts, which makes a protected inland resource a strategic necessity. When the board now openly links Siljansgasen to Sweden's national supply preparedness, the issue is lifted out of the local environmental bureaucracy. For those in the know, it is clear that this paves the way for the state's executive tools, not least Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, where activities can be permitted if they are of crucial importance for total defense. The industrial setup: When one takes a broader view, this shift is confirmed by an aggressive organizational restructuring: - The new share issue has strengthened the cash position (over 19 MSEK in liquid assets). - A new, heavily industrial board has been formed. Robert Tingvall's deep energy system expertise was secured already this spring, and is now complemented by Henrik Badin (industrialization) stepping in as chairman and Ragnar Krefting returning. - The previous administrative CEO solution is terminated to make way for a new operational management. Boards do not randomly replace their entire competence profile, recruit new management, and reformulate the company's strategic direction simultaneously. This is done when the company enters a new phase that requires industrial decisiveness. Igrene no longer communicates how the gas will be handled if it is one day allowed to be extracted. The organization is now being set up for how the actual extraction operations will be built in symbiosis with the state's security policy interests.ColdAsIce, your observation that permit processes take time is correct, but the interpretation of the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) misses the procedural context. That the Riksdag rejected the motions in March was not due to substantial political opposition to extraction. The committee's explicit justification for the rejection was that the issue is already being handled within the government's ongoing preparatory work (SOU 2025:68) and that one therefore did not consider it appropriate to preempt this executive process. The matter is thus already in a more advanced stage at government level. The central point in this context, however, is not outsiders' interpretation of the legislative process, but the company's own. The Board explicitly communicates its assessment that the conditions for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened in light of the changed security policy situation. It is strictly based on this assessment that the company is now implementing a total strategic shift back to its core business, supplemented by a change of board and management. This constitutes concrete industrial and financial decisions, not theoretical hopes.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
13 päivää sitten
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·1 päivä sittenEBBA BUSCH: "ALL WARS ARE ENERGY WARS" – THE WESTERN WORLD MUST REGAIN CONTROL OVER THE RESOURCES BENEATH OUR FEET AND THE ENERGY THAT REFINES THEM The government is now executing a consistent security policy repositioning regarding energy and the Western world's industrial independence. In an interview with CNN on January 21, Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch pointed out the direction for NATO: The Alliance cannot only be strengthened militarily. The Western world must immediately regain control over the natural resources, the energy and the industrial capacity on which common security ultimately rests. On June 1st this year, again on CNN, this was brought to a head. The geopolitical reality was summarized in five words: "All wars are energy wars." The strategic principle is thus established from the highest authority: He who does not control his energy supply does not fully control his industry or his total defense either. When the government subsequently presented Sweden's mineral strategy, the next piece of the puzzle was added: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock. "But a mineral resource in the bedrock in itself constitutes neither an industrial nor a military capability. The ore must be mined, transported, reduced, melted, heated and rolled before it is transformed into steel, vehicles and defense material. This requires physical energy. Heavy industry cannot build its resilience solely on electrons. It requires physical, storable energy molecules for high-temperature processes, heavy transport, backup power and reduction. The molecules can shift over time - it's okay go to hell it's calm I can take I can I'm on your side you have liquor Ovako, for example, uses hydrogen to heat steel - but industry's fundamental need for physical energy carriers does not disappear. It is precisely here that Siljansgasen's industrial position becomes highly interesting from a security policy perspective. Igrene has identified an enormous concentration of heavy industry within a defined geographical area: - SSAB in Borlänge - approx. 102 km from Mora. - Ovako in Hofors - approx. 125 km. - Outokumpu in Avesta - approx. 155 km. This involves a full-scale prospected natural gas resource located in direct proximity to Sweden's most important cluster for steel and metal refining, with direct access to the railway network. Igrene's primary focus and executive strategy is now large-scale gas extraction. The possibility of liquefying the resource into LNG establishes a transportable energy carrier for industry. As a strategically important complement, the company, through SEID and ColdSpark, has also developed the technology to split methane into hydrogen and solid carbon - exactly the input materials industry demands. This leads to the core security policy question: What value is there in securing Swedish metals, if Sweden remains dependent on imported energy molecules to refine them? An executive supply strategy must encompass the entire chain: Swedish raw materials, Swedish energy and Swedish refining. It is institutionally unsustainable to combine the government's new security policy logic with a ban on even testing the possibility of utilizing Sweden's natural gas. The Minister for Energy and Business has herself established the foundation: We sit on strategic assets in our own bedrock, and all wars are energy wars. A mineral strategy without a molecule strategy leaves Sweden's supply chain unprotected. What good are the metals beneath our feet if we lack the domestic energy required to refine them? The machinery requires molecules.The big question becomes: where will the gas come from. If the global situation continues as it now appears with war in Russia/Ukraine where developments have gone so far that Putin himself has mentioned that any export of oil and natural gas is currently forbidden, because domestic oil demand does not allow it p.g.a. that Ukrainian drones and missiles incapacitating depots and refineries around Russia. Thus, all conceivable trade with the Russian petroleum industry becomes completely impossible to establish in the future. Likewise, the war in Iran tends to be a long way to complete, because Muslim countries generally never compromise on anything, not with more than one gets advantages that exceed a pure capitulation of the opponent USA. The Strait of Hormuz can become a stumbling block for years given that Iran's leadership must never be criticized regardless of whether the war itself meets the same fate as in Gaza. Sooner or later, gas and oil demand will leave its mark - not least during the winter half-year - with high energy prices if the situation continues without improvement. How important then does it become for Sweden's security in the question of natural resources possible, the thought of a national shortage in that we do not ourselves utilize our deposits then becomes a big setback not least for our and others' economies for coming times. Regardless of government, but preferably with the conservative one, should and not just should but shall with "frenzy" and authorizing legislate a permit for prospecting and extraction of gas here at home. The gas located around the Siljan region is confirmed available for extraction, and can be started on short notice where the company Igrene is in the starting blocks to enable a domestic petroleum establishment. If the government wants - and nothing unforeseen politically happens - nothing can stop that objective.
- ·1 päivä sittenPOLITICAL RESTART IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER RECESS - THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY AND TRADE BACK ON THE CALENDAR The political calendar is now entering an executive and extremely concentrated phase. The institutional mechanics require that three dates from this spring are placed in direct context: 17 March: The Riksdag debates the Committee on Industry and Trade's report NU16, which included the motion regarding Siljansgasen. 18 March: The Chamber formally decides and rejects the motion with direct reference to ongoing government preparation. 19 March: The day after the decision, the Speaker announces that the Riksdag is breaking its summer recess. The purpose is for late-submitted government bills to be prepared in the committees and subsequently decided in the Chamber. The August work is thus organized according to the following exact work order: 11 August: Interpellation debates in the Chamber. 12 August at 09.00: The Chamber begins the debate on the committees' proposals. 12 August at 11.00: The Committee on Industry and Trade convenes. 13 August: Continued debates and concluding decisions in the Chamber. The placement is politically highly interesting. The same committee that dealt with Siljansgasen during the spring is now convening in the middle of the Riksdag's special August work - strictly between the Chamber's initial debates and the concluding decision day on 13 August. The calendar fact remains: The Committee on Industry and Trade is back in active work in the very center of the August window. At the same time, SOU 2025:68 (The Inquiry into the business sector's supply preparedness) is being further processed within the Government Offices. It was exactly this ongoing preparation that the Committee on Industry and Trade referred to in NU16. The issue was never closed by a policy-based stance against Swedish gas extraction - it was handed over to the government's table. This must be weighed against the calendar. Ordinary parliamentary elections are held on 13 September. If the government is to anchor crucial reforms concerning Sweden's preparedness before a potential change of power, the time window is extremely limited. August is the next concrete political checkpoint. The parliamentary machinery is back in operation. And while politics is working against the clock, Igrene has already shifted its main strategy to large-scale gas extraction and direct industrialization of Siljansgasen. Politics is now entering the August window. Igrene has already chosen its direction.Gas extraction in the Siljan Ring must not "stumble at the finish line" when the chamber is to decide such an important issue for the future. If an intense debate is expected and if the basis for anchoring decisive reforms on August 13 is strongly criticized by public opinion, for any irregularities and deficiencies in the basis, which in that case will cause the proposals to be tabled until after the election. Would be a great harm to Igrene's future
- ·24.7.EBBA BUSCH: "WE LITERALLY SIT ON THE SOLUTION IN OUR OWN BEDROCK" - DOES THAT ALSO APPLY TO SWEDEN'S ENERGY MOLECULES? Yesterday, the government presented Sweden's new mineral strategy. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch summarized the new security policy situation with great clarity: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy." She also stated: "Sweden has a unique opportunity. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock." The government's stated goal is to strengthen Sweden's security of supply, reduce import dependence, shorten permit processes, and facilitate investments. Access to strategic raw materials is now explicitly treated as a matter of national security and resilience. This is a necessary and welcome paradigm shift for Swedish preparedness. The logical consequence is that the same security policy principle must also be applied to the country's other strategic resources. A sustainable total defense cannot rely solely on metals and electricity. It also requires access to physical energy molecules - gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored, transported, and used even in the event of serious disruptions in the electricity grid and international supply chains. Sweden is currently vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? The government has established that Sweden literally sits on the solution in its own bedrock. It is now of strategic importance to clarify whether that insight encompasses the entire total defense's supply preparedness - or only the resources covered by the new mineral strategy. A complete total defense needs metals, electrons, and molecules.Sweden is today vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? " Are we to believe that natural gas and possibly hydrogen gas "within reasonable time" can come onto the government's table. That will be the next contribution to the debate.
- ·23.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND SWEDEN'S ONLY MOLECULAR RESOURCE: WHY ELECTRICITY IS NOT ENOUGH IN WAR It is interesting to follow how the government's work develops as the global situation has dramatically worsened. Over the past year, concepts such as total defence, supply preparedness, robust energy supply, and socially critical activities have gained an increasingly clear place in the government's bills, agency assignments, and legislative work. At the same time, the environmental review system is being reformed to streamline permit processes. But in the debate surrounding Swedish preparedness, a crucial logistical reality is often missed: a robust total defence cannot be built solely on electrons. It is a security policy truth that a nation in crisis, or a prolonged war, cannot be run exclusively with electricity. Society and the armed forces require uninterrupted access to physical energy molecules – gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored securely, transported completely independently of a vulnerable electricity grid, and used immediately where electricity is no longer an option. Sweden has strong electricity production fundamentally. But when it comes to naturally occurring energy molecules in our own bedrock, there is, as far as is known, only a single prospected domestic resource: Siljansgasen. As a full member of NATO, Sweden is now covered by the alliance's requirements for national resilience, which entails a strict obligation to manage crises and maintain society's basic functions independently. In addition, the bilateral defence agreement (DCA) with the USA places far-reaching demands on robust host nation support, where secure access to fuel and energy for allied forces on Swedish soil is absolutely critical. In the ongoing preparedness work concerning total defence, however, no concrete initiatives have so far been presented to secure the supply of physical energy molecules. When the energy issue almost exclusively focuses on electricity production, is it then justifiable to exclude Sweden's only known geological gas resource from the security policy agenda? It is not about anticipating the government's decisions. It is about demanding that Sweden's collective resources be tested based on today's serious security policy situation, free from the constraints created by yesterday's environmental debate.What you yourself write about here, are largely the same thoughts one "tosses around". If an S-led government with the support of a green power party cannot even utter the word natural gas, then what will be the upshot of such a collaboration? Something needs to happen in the near future before time runs out, and all the work that Igrene has put in for a bright future prospect with the extraction and sale of the raw material, which seemingly should be completely obvious for Sweden's own management of the valuable gas. If one looks at what is happening in our surrounding world and Russia, but also - if one so wishes - a billion income for the Swedish heavy steel industry. Hope is not lost yet, if nuclear power could be started up at a good pace, then why shouldn't natural gas and hydrogen be developed in the same way in an advantageous and well-founded concept as well?
- ·17.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND THE PARADIGM SHIFT: IGRENE RETURNS TO LARGE-SCALE EXTRACTION Today's quarterly report from Igrene is undoubtedly the most important strategic communication from the company since the legislative change in 2022. For the first time in several years, Igrene openly declares a strategic shift back to the company's original core idea: large-scale extraction of Siljansgasen. In recent years, the focus has gradually shifted towards ColdSpark, hydrogen, and methane splitting. Today's report fundamentally overturns that prioritization. SEID and ColdSpark remain important assets, but the main focus is now once again the direct industrialization of the gas deposits in Mora. What the report actually says: The board justifies this shift with the changed geopolitical situation and an increased focus on Sweden's energy security. It explicitly refers to the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) and the government's ongoing work on supply preparedness. The most remarkable aspect, however, is the board's conclusion: it assesses that the conditions for obtaining permits for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened. What this means in practice: Why is a board formulating itself like this right now? For those who understand the geopolitical situation, the industrial logic is indisputable. Through the recently signed defense agreement with the USA (DCA) and NATO's requirements for robust host nation support, the security policy foundation has been redrawn. A functioning total defense cannot rely on vulnerable energy imports via the coasts, which makes a protected inland resource a strategic necessity. When the board now openly links Siljansgasen to Sweden's national supply preparedness, the issue is lifted out of the local environmental bureaucracy. For those in the know, it is clear that this paves the way for the state's executive tools, not least Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, where activities can be permitted if they are of crucial importance for total defense. The industrial setup: When one takes a broader view, this shift is confirmed by an aggressive organizational restructuring: - The new share issue has strengthened the cash position (over 19 MSEK in liquid assets). - A new, heavily industrial board has been formed. Robert Tingvall's deep energy system expertise was secured already this spring, and is now complemented by Henrik Badin (industrialization) stepping in as chairman and Ragnar Krefting returning. - The previous administrative CEO solution is terminated to make way for a new operational management. Boards do not randomly replace their entire competence profile, recruit new management, and reformulate the company's strategic direction simultaneously. This is done when the company enters a new phase that requires industrial decisiveness. Igrene no longer communicates how the gas will be handled if it is one day allowed to be extracted. The organization is now being set up for how the actual extraction operations will be built in symbiosis with the state's security policy interests.ColdAsIce, your observation that permit processes take time is correct, but the interpretation of the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) misses the procedural context. That the Riksdag rejected the motions in March was not due to substantial political opposition to extraction. The committee's explicit justification for the rejection was that the issue is already being handled within the government's ongoing preparatory work (SOU 2025:68) and that one therefore did not consider it appropriate to preempt this executive process. The matter is thus already in a more advanced stage at government level. The central point in this context, however, is not outsiders' interpretation of the legislative process, but the company's own. The Board explicitly communicates its assessment that the conditions for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened in light of the changed security policy situation. It is strictly based on this assessment that the company is now implementing a total strategic shift back to its core business, supplemented by a change of board and management. This constitutes concrete industrial and financial decisions, not theoretical hopes.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
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13 päivää sitten
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
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- ·1 päivä sittenEBBA BUSCH: "ALL WARS ARE ENERGY WARS" – THE WESTERN WORLD MUST REGAIN CONTROL OVER THE RESOURCES BENEATH OUR FEET AND THE ENERGY THAT REFINES THEM The government is now executing a consistent security policy repositioning regarding energy and the Western world's industrial independence. In an interview with CNN on January 21, Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch pointed out the direction for NATO: The Alliance cannot only be strengthened militarily. The Western world must immediately regain control over the natural resources, the energy and the industrial capacity on which common security ultimately rests. On June 1st this year, again on CNN, this was brought to a head. The geopolitical reality was summarized in five words: "All wars are energy wars." The strategic principle is thus established from the highest authority: He who does not control his energy supply does not fully control his industry or his total defense either. When the government subsequently presented Sweden's mineral strategy, the next piece of the puzzle was added: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock. "But a mineral resource in the bedrock in itself constitutes neither an industrial nor a military capability. The ore must be mined, transported, reduced, melted, heated and rolled before it is transformed into steel, vehicles and defense material. This requires physical energy. Heavy industry cannot build its resilience solely on electrons. It requires physical, storable energy molecules for high-temperature processes, heavy transport, backup power and reduction. The molecules can shift over time - it's okay go to hell it's calm I can take I can I'm on your side you have liquor Ovako, for example, uses hydrogen to heat steel - but industry's fundamental need for physical energy carriers does not disappear. It is precisely here that Siljansgasen's industrial position becomes highly interesting from a security policy perspective. Igrene has identified an enormous concentration of heavy industry within a defined geographical area: - SSAB in Borlänge - approx. 102 km from Mora. - Ovako in Hofors - approx. 125 km. - Outokumpu in Avesta - approx. 155 km. This involves a full-scale prospected natural gas resource located in direct proximity to Sweden's most important cluster for steel and metal refining, with direct access to the railway network. Igrene's primary focus and executive strategy is now large-scale gas extraction. The possibility of liquefying the resource into LNG establishes a transportable energy carrier for industry. As a strategically important complement, the company, through SEID and ColdSpark, has also developed the technology to split methane into hydrogen and solid carbon - exactly the input materials industry demands. This leads to the core security policy question: What value is there in securing Swedish metals, if Sweden remains dependent on imported energy molecules to refine them? An executive supply strategy must encompass the entire chain: Swedish raw materials, Swedish energy and Swedish refining. It is institutionally unsustainable to combine the government's new security policy logic with a ban on even testing the possibility of utilizing Sweden's natural gas. The Minister for Energy and Business has herself established the foundation: We sit on strategic assets in our own bedrock, and all wars are energy wars. A mineral strategy without a molecule strategy leaves Sweden's supply chain unprotected. What good are the metals beneath our feet if we lack the domestic energy required to refine them? The machinery requires molecules.The big question becomes: where will the gas come from. If the global situation continues as it now appears with war in Russia/Ukraine where developments have gone so far that Putin himself has mentioned that any export of oil and natural gas is currently forbidden, because domestic oil demand does not allow it p.g.a. that Ukrainian drones and missiles incapacitating depots and refineries around Russia. Thus, all conceivable trade with the Russian petroleum industry becomes completely impossible to establish in the future. Likewise, the war in Iran tends to be a long way to complete, because Muslim countries generally never compromise on anything, not with more than one gets advantages that exceed a pure capitulation of the opponent USA. The Strait of Hormuz can become a stumbling block for years given that Iran's leadership must never be criticized regardless of whether the war itself meets the same fate as in Gaza. Sooner or later, gas and oil demand will leave its mark - not least during the winter half-year - with high energy prices if the situation continues without improvement. How important then does it become for Sweden's security in the question of natural resources possible, the thought of a national shortage in that we do not ourselves utilize our deposits then becomes a big setback not least for our and others' economies for coming times. Regardless of government, but preferably with the conservative one, should and not just should but shall with "frenzy" and authorizing legislate a permit for prospecting and extraction of gas here at home. The gas located around the Siljan region is confirmed available for extraction, and can be started on short notice where the company Igrene is in the starting blocks to enable a domestic petroleum establishment. If the government wants - and nothing unforeseen politically happens - nothing can stop that objective.
- ·1 päivä sittenPOLITICAL RESTART IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER RECESS - THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY AND TRADE BACK ON THE CALENDAR The political calendar is now entering an executive and extremely concentrated phase. The institutional mechanics require that three dates from this spring are placed in direct context: 17 March: The Riksdag debates the Committee on Industry and Trade's report NU16, which included the motion regarding Siljansgasen. 18 March: The Chamber formally decides and rejects the motion with direct reference to ongoing government preparation. 19 March: The day after the decision, the Speaker announces that the Riksdag is breaking its summer recess. The purpose is for late-submitted government bills to be prepared in the committees and subsequently decided in the Chamber. The August work is thus organized according to the following exact work order: 11 August: Interpellation debates in the Chamber. 12 August at 09.00: The Chamber begins the debate on the committees' proposals. 12 August at 11.00: The Committee on Industry and Trade convenes. 13 August: Continued debates and concluding decisions in the Chamber. The placement is politically highly interesting. The same committee that dealt with Siljansgasen during the spring is now convening in the middle of the Riksdag's special August work - strictly between the Chamber's initial debates and the concluding decision day on 13 August. The calendar fact remains: The Committee on Industry and Trade is back in active work in the very center of the August window. At the same time, SOU 2025:68 (The Inquiry into the business sector's supply preparedness) is being further processed within the Government Offices. It was exactly this ongoing preparation that the Committee on Industry and Trade referred to in NU16. The issue was never closed by a policy-based stance against Swedish gas extraction - it was handed over to the government's table. This must be weighed against the calendar. Ordinary parliamentary elections are held on 13 September. If the government is to anchor crucial reforms concerning Sweden's preparedness before a potential change of power, the time window is extremely limited. August is the next concrete political checkpoint. The parliamentary machinery is back in operation. And while politics is working against the clock, Igrene has already shifted its main strategy to large-scale gas extraction and direct industrialization of Siljansgasen. Politics is now entering the August window. Igrene has already chosen its direction.Gas extraction in the Siljan Ring must not "stumble at the finish line" when the chamber is to decide such an important issue for the future. If an intense debate is expected and if the basis for anchoring decisive reforms on August 13 is strongly criticized by public opinion, for any irregularities and deficiencies in the basis, which in that case will cause the proposals to be tabled until after the election. Would be a great harm to Igrene's future
- ·24.7.EBBA BUSCH: "WE LITERALLY SIT ON THE SOLUTION IN OUR OWN BEDROCK" - DOES THAT ALSO APPLY TO SWEDEN'S ENERGY MOLECULES? Yesterday, the government presented Sweden's new mineral strategy. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch summarized the new security policy situation with great clarity: "Access to metals is no longer industrial policy. It is security policy." She also stated: "Sweden has a unique opportunity. We literally sit on the solution in our own bedrock." The government's stated goal is to strengthen Sweden's security of supply, reduce import dependence, shorten permit processes, and facilitate investments. Access to strategic raw materials is now explicitly treated as a matter of national security and resilience. This is a necessary and welcome paradigm shift for Swedish preparedness. The logical consequence is that the same security policy principle must also be applied to the country's other strategic resources. A sustainable total defense cannot rely solely on metals and electricity. It also requires access to physical energy molecules - gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored, transported, and used even in the event of serious disruptions in the electricity grid and international supply chains. Sweden is currently vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? The government has established that Sweden literally sits on the solution in its own bedrock. It is now of strategic importance to clarify whether that insight encompasses the entire total defense's supply preparedness - or only the resources covered by the new mineral strategy. A complete total defense needs metals, electrons, and molecules.Sweden is today vulnerable due to its great dependence on imported energy molecules. At the same time, the country's only known, extensively prospected geological gas resource exists in our own bedrock: Siljan gas. The inevitable question therefore becomes: If access to Swedish metals is now considered security policy - why shouldn't Swedish energy molecules in the same bedrock be evaluated based on the same security and supply policy premises? " Are we to believe that natural gas and possibly hydrogen gas "within reasonable time" can come onto the government's table. That will be the next contribution to the debate.
- ·23.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND SWEDEN'S ONLY MOLECULAR RESOURCE: WHY ELECTRICITY IS NOT ENOUGH IN WAR It is interesting to follow how the government's work develops as the global situation has dramatically worsened. Over the past year, concepts such as total defence, supply preparedness, robust energy supply, and socially critical activities have gained an increasingly clear place in the government's bills, agency assignments, and legislative work. At the same time, the environmental review system is being reformed to streamline permit processes. But in the debate surrounding Swedish preparedness, a crucial logistical reality is often missed: a robust total defence cannot be built solely on electrons. It is a security policy truth that a nation in crisis, or a prolonged war, cannot be run exclusively with electricity. Society and the armed forces require uninterrupted access to physical energy molecules – gas and liquid fuels that can be long-term stored securely, transported completely independently of a vulnerable electricity grid, and used immediately where electricity is no longer an option. Sweden has strong electricity production fundamentally. But when it comes to naturally occurring energy molecules in our own bedrock, there is, as far as is known, only a single prospected domestic resource: Siljansgasen. As a full member of NATO, Sweden is now covered by the alliance's requirements for national resilience, which entails a strict obligation to manage crises and maintain society's basic functions independently. In addition, the bilateral defence agreement (DCA) with the USA places far-reaching demands on robust host nation support, where secure access to fuel and energy for allied forces on Swedish soil is absolutely critical. In the ongoing preparedness work concerning total defence, however, no concrete initiatives have so far been presented to secure the supply of physical energy molecules. When the energy issue almost exclusively focuses on electricity production, is it then justifiable to exclude Sweden's only known geological gas resource from the security policy agenda? It is not about anticipating the government's decisions. It is about demanding that Sweden's collective resources be tested based on today's serious security policy situation, free from the constraints created by yesterday's environmental debate.What you yourself write about here, are largely the same thoughts one "tosses around". If an S-led government with the support of a green power party cannot even utter the word natural gas, then what will be the upshot of such a collaboration? Something needs to happen in the near future before time runs out, and all the work that Igrene has put in for a bright future prospect with the extraction and sale of the raw material, which seemingly should be completely obvious for Sweden's own management of the valuable gas. If one looks at what is happening in our surrounding world and Russia, but also - if one so wishes - a billion income for the Swedish heavy steel industry. Hope is not lost yet, if nuclear power could be started up at a good pace, then why shouldn't natural gas and hydrogen be developed in the same way in an advantageous and well-founded concept as well?
- ·17.7.TOTAL DEFENCE AND THE PARADIGM SHIFT: IGRENE RETURNS TO LARGE-SCALE EXTRACTION Today's quarterly report from Igrene is undoubtedly the most important strategic communication from the company since the legislative change in 2022. For the first time in several years, Igrene openly declares a strategic shift back to the company's original core idea: large-scale extraction of Siljansgasen. In recent years, the focus has gradually shifted towards ColdSpark, hydrogen, and methane splitting. Today's report fundamentally overturns that prioritization. SEID and ColdSpark remain important assets, but the main focus is now once again the direct industrialization of the gas deposits in Mora. What the report actually says: The board justifies this shift with the changed geopolitical situation and an increased focus on Sweden's energy security. It explicitly refers to the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) and the government's ongoing work on supply preparedness. The most remarkable aspect, however, is the board's conclusion: it assesses that the conditions for obtaining permits for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened. What this means in practice: Why is a board formulating itself like this right now? For those who understand the geopolitical situation, the industrial logic is indisputable. Through the recently signed defense agreement with the USA (DCA) and NATO's requirements for robust host nation support, the security policy foundation has been redrawn. A functioning total defense cannot rely on vulnerable energy imports via the coasts, which makes a protected inland resource a strategic necessity. When the board now openly links Siljansgasen to Sweden's national supply preparedness, the issue is lifted out of the local environmental bureaucracy. For those in the know, it is clear that this paves the way for the state's executive tools, not least Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, where activities can be permitted if they are of crucial importance for total defense. The industrial setup: When one takes a broader view, this shift is confirmed by an aggressive organizational restructuring: - The new share issue has strengthened the cash position (over 19 MSEK in liquid assets). - A new, heavily industrial board has been formed. Robert Tingvall's deep energy system expertise was secured already this spring, and is now complemented by Henrik Badin (industrialization) stepping in as chairman and Ragnar Krefting returning. - The previous administrative CEO solution is terminated to make way for a new operational management. Boards do not randomly replace their entire competence profile, recruit new management, and reformulate the company's strategic direction simultaneously. This is done when the company enters a new phase that requires industrial decisiveness. Igrene no longer communicates how the gas will be handled if it is one day allowed to be extracted. The organization is now being set up for how the actual extraction operations will be built in symbiosis with the state's security policy interests.ColdAsIce, your observation that permit processes take time is correct, but the interpretation of the Committee on Industry and Trade's report (NU16) misses the procedural context. That the Riksdag rejected the motions in March was not due to substantial political opposition to extraction. The committee's explicit justification for the rejection was that the issue is already being handled within the government's ongoing preparatory work (SOU 2025:68) and that one therefore did not consider it appropriate to preempt this executive process. The matter is thus already in a more advanced stage at government level. The central point in this context, however, is not outsiders' interpretation of the legislative process, but the company's own. The Board explicitly communicates its assessment that the conditions for traditional extraction have significantly strengthened in light of the changed security policy situation. It is strictly based on this assessment that the company is now implementing a total strategic shift back to its core business, supplemented by a change of board and management. This constitutes concrete industrial and financial decisions, not theoretical hopes.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
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Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
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| - | - | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
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