2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
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41 päivää sitten
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| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
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Dataa ei löytynyt
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·1 päivä sittenSILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?
·14.8.I think mxrobban is unusually well-informed and up-to-date about Igrene, but he simultaneously tends to interpret developments from the positive side. There are still more uncertainties than certainties. We know too little about long-term production profiles, recoverable volumes, and commercial economics to speak too confidently about ”resources in the billions”. And then we have today's political reality: natural gas extraction has been prohibited by Swedish law since 1 July 2022, and I have not seen any public decision or concrete signal about a special exemption for Igrene. With the parliamentary election already on 13 September 2026, the political risk is also significant. The ban was introduced under the then S-led government, and it is difficult to see why the Social Democrats together with the environmental movement would now prioritize opening up for Swedish natural gas extraction. The potential exists, absolutely. But the path from gas in the mountain to permits, stable production, and commercial profitability is still long and uncertain.- ·14.8.SWEDEN PREPARES FOR ENDURANCE - THE GAS IS ALREADY IN SILJAN Yesterday's publicly released minutes from the closed meeting of the defense and foreign affairs committees gave a crystal-clear signal. When the information about Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence immediately transitioned into a formal decision on confidentiality regarding "planned operations", it was definitively confirmed: Swedish defense planning is now in a strictly operational phase. This operational reality cannot be decoupled from the laws of physics. A resilient total defense is not driven solely by electricity. Military logistics, transport, backup power, and critical infrastructure require physically storable energy molecules - especially when power grids or international supply chains are put under pressure. At the same time, the state is now accelerating the build-up of supply preparedness. Through concrete decisions, the government acts executively to secure national sovereignty over strategic resources in the Swedish bedrock. It is in light of this new, offensive security doctrine - and yesterday's confidential information about planned operations within Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense – that Sweden's own energy resource must now be evaluated. In the Siljan Ring, there is a large-scale, prospected Swedish gas deposit comprising potential gas volumes in the billion-class. That this geological system is active and that methane is newly formed in Siljan's deep bedrock is scientifically documented today. At the same time, research from Chalmers has identified strong, locally concentrated, and persistent natural methane emissions from the lakes of the Siljan Ring, with measured values up to 300 times higher than what normally occurs. The molecules are demonstrably there, in a persistent natural flow. As the state now builds a modern doctrine around reduced import dependency, this resource constitutes a unique strategic asset. Through its extensive exploration history, AB Igrene already possesses the industrial platform, boreholes, and production data to immediately assist the state with a fact-based evaluation of the resource's operational potential. When yesterday's meeting in the Riksdag now confirms that NATO integration includes concrete, planned operations, Swedish logistics are put to the test. The only relevant question is therefore how long the state can base its operational defense planning on national sovereignty and resilience - without even evaluating the strategic importance of the country's own energy resource.
Indeed, there is no problem agreeing with what is written here in this forum. We can share the feeling. If you go to Igrene's website, you are struck by the solid work the company has done, a fundamental work to form one's own opinion about the presence of gas that exists around the Siljan region. Boreholes have been prepared where gas has been able to be extracted with measured values. All preliminary work out in the field means that the process of commissioning after a decision on a permit - for gas extraction - can proceed efficiently. With those words, it remains to be seen how the upcoming government prioritizes and determines the necessity that permits can be issued. MP can have a significant impact on decisions being delayed, partly because the government's work with the documentation takes time, and because many other things considered more important, such as economy and climate issues, are prioritized. This means that the conservative bloc must win for the work to continue in the same direction as before. Vote blue ! - ·13.8.NATO'S DETERRENCE IS BUILT ON ENDURANCE – BUT WHERE WILL THE ENERGY MOLECULES COME FROM? Today, Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense was on the agenda when the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees received information from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Armed Forces. This is an issue that extends significantly deeper than the number of soldiers and combat vehicles. According to the government's total defense bill, functioning logistics constitute the absolute foundation for military units to be sustainably supplied, protected, moved, and led. Furthermore, our geographical location makes Sweden a central basing and transit area for NATO's operations in northern Europe. The ability to receive and provide host nation support to allied units on Swedish territory is directly dependent on our own supply capacity. The government is also explicit: the ambition to secure energy supply includes not only electricity, but also liquid fuels and gas – at the same time as NATO membership affects total defense planning in the energy sector. This capacity is ultimately dictated by an undeniable physical fact. Combat vehicles, heavy logistics, backup power, and critical infrastructure are not powered by security policy declarations. They require physical energy. Energy molecules – in plain text: among other things, gas, diesel, and jet fuel. Sweden finds itself in a concrete strategic vulnerability here. Sweden has no own natural gas production but is dependent on imports. At the same time, there is an extensive prospected geological gas resource in the Siljan Ring. At the same time, the government is now translating its ambition to reduce strategic import dependencies through increased access to Swedish resources into concrete decisions. Yesterday, the green light for Laver was motivated, among other things, by reduced import dependence, the ability to stand on one's own feet, and the need for copper for both electricity grids and defense. When the same security policy logic is applied to metals in the Swedish bedrock, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why Sweden's own geological gas resource should not be analyzed from the same supply-strategic perspective. In parallel, AB Igrene has once again positioned its operations towards large-scale extraction and production of Siljan gas. If the state chooses to re-evaluate the Swedish gas resource based on total defense and supply preparedness, there is already an industrial project with a long exploration history to consider. Deterrence requires defense. Defense requires endurance. Endurance requires logistics and supply. And supply requires national sovereignty over energy molecules.
- ·13.8.SWEDEN REDRAWS THE ENERGY MAP – GAS BECOMES TOTAL DEFENSE The security policy agenda is now undergoing a clear shift where supply preparedness becomes a core of total defense. On July 30, the government established Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. The strategy aims to ensure that Sweden can maintain supply flows, compensate for market disruptions, and prioritize resources in shortage situations. Robust energy supply is explicitly pointed out as part of this capability. On August 11, the government decided to invest 500 million kronor in supply security for ammunition. The state thus provides financial means for investments that increase strategic production capacity and eliminate bottlenecks in the supply chain for peace, crisis, and war. The same strategic logic is simultaneously applied to energy supply. The Swedish Energy Agency has established that energy supply is crucial for total defense capability. Disruptions in gas availability can mean that Sweden cannot produce products or materiel needed during heightened alert or war. The agency's principle is crystal clear: "Heightened alert and war: Gas shall be prioritized for the needs of total defense." The link between gas and preparedness was further strengthened by the government's mandate on May 7, 2026. The directive concerns nationally produced biogas, but the supply policy direction is clear: more input points, increased national production on the gas grid, strengthened supply security, and greater national control. The needs of total defense shall be explicitly considered. And yesterday, another crucial puzzle piece fell into place. On August 12, the government gave Boliden the green light to proceed with the copper mine in Laver. The government's argumentation is security policy-related. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch states that Swedish copper production can reduce Europe's import dependence and that Sweden must be able to "stand on its own feet" in a troubled world. Copper is needed, according to the government, for both the electricity grid and defense. She summarizes the new direction: "It's about being master in one's own house and not letting other countries hold us in a strategic stranglehold." It is here that the political contradiction becomes increasingly clear. Swedish bedrock. Reduced import dependence. National control. Supply security. Needs of total defense. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of Swedish natural gas remains. It is against precisely this changed state playing field that AB Igrene's industrial repositioning should be evaluated. Through the Q3 report's formal strategic shift back to large-scale gas extraction, the strengthened cash position, and the industrially strengthened board – including Henrik Badin, Robert Tingvall, and Ragnar Krefting – Igrene has already prepared the organization for the next phase. The company's stated main priority is now: direct industrialization of Siljan gas. Igrene has thus already made its strategic choice. At the same time, the state is making its own. In just a few months, Sweden has gained: Gas as an explicit total defense issue. Increased national production on the gas grid as a government mandate. National control as a stated goal. Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. 500 million kronor for strategic production capacity for defense. And now a concrete government decision where Swedish bedrock is directly linked to reduced import dependence and defense needs. What remains is a regulatory framework from 2022 that prohibits the extraction of Swedish natural gas. Sweden is redrawing the map for how strategic raw materials and energy flows are valued in the new security policy situation. Siljan gas is right in the middle of that map."How long will they beat around the bush". One might think the sun always shines even if there's a single cloud that can get in the way. When will a decision be made about gas extraction in Sweden. Tried to get a clear picture of it, where it could appear on the Riksdag's agenda with a date where it is decided, but perhaps one is too bad at finding? Then what happens if the decision is delayed after 13/9 .... when possibly others will govern
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
41 päivää sitten
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·1 päivä sittenSILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?
- ·14.8.I think mxrobban is unusually well-informed and up-to-date about Igrene, but he simultaneously tends to interpret developments from the positive side. There are still more uncertainties than certainties. We know too little about long-term production profiles, recoverable volumes, and commercial economics to speak too confidently about ”resources in the billions”. And then we have today's political reality: natural gas extraction has been prohibited by Swedish law since 1 July 2022, and I have not seen any public decision or concrete signal about a special exemption for Igrene. With the parliamentary election already on 13 September 2026, the political risk is also significant. The ban was introduced under the then S-led government, and it is difficult to see why the Social Democrats together with the environmental movement would now prioritize opening up for Swedish natural gas extraction. The potential exists, absolutely. But the path from gas in the mountain to permits, stable production, and commercial profitability is still long and uncertain.
- ·14.8.SWEDEN PREPARES FOR ENDURANCE - THE GAS IS ALREADY IN SILJAN Yesterday's publicly released minutes from the closed meeting of the defense and foreign affairs committees gave a crystal-clear signal. When the information about Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence immediately transitioned into a formal decision on confidentiality regarding "planned operations", it was definitively confirmed: Swedish defense planning is now in a strictly operational phase. This operational reality cannot be decoupled from the laws of physics. A resilient total defense is not driven solely by electricity. Military logistics, transport, backup power, and critical infrastructure require physically storable energy molecules - especially when power grids or international supply chains are put under pressure. At the same time, the state is now accelerating the build-up of supply preparedness. Through concrete decisions, the government acts executively to secure national sovereignty over strategic resources in the Swedish bedrock. It is in light of this new, offensive security doctrine - and yesterday's confidential information about planned operations within Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense – that Sweden's own energy resource must now be evaluated. In the Siljan Ring, there is a large-scale, prospected Swedish gas deposit comprising potential gas volumes in the billion-class. That this geological system is active and that methane is newly formed in Siljan's deep bedrock is scientifically documented today. At the same time, research from Chalmers has identified strong, locally concentrated, and persistent natural methane emissions from the lakes of the Siljan Ring, with measured values up to 300 times higher than what normally occurs. The molecules are demonstrably there, in a persistent natural flow. As the state now builds a modern doctrine around reduced import dependency, this resource constitutes a unique strategic asset. Through its extensive exploration history, AB Igrene already possesses the industrial platform, boreholes, and production data to immediately assist the state with a fact-based evaluation of the resource's operational potential. When yesterday's meeting in the Riksdag now confirms that NATO integration includes concrete, planned operations, Swedish logistics are put to the test. The only relevant question is therefore how long the state can base its operational defense planning on national sovereignty and resilience - without even evaluating the strategic importance of the country's own energy resource.Indeed, there is no problem agreeing with what is written here in this forum. We can share the feeling. If you go to Igrene's website, you are struck by the solid work the company has done, a fundamental work to form one's own opinion about the presence of gas that exists around the Siljan region. Boreholes have been prepared where gas has been able to be extracted with measured values. All preliminary work out in the field means that the process of commissioning after a decision on a permit - for gas extraction - can proceed efficiently. With those words, it remains to be seen how the upcoming government prioritizes and determines the necessity that permits can be issued. MP can have a significant impact on decisions being delayed, partly because the government's work with the documentation takes time, and because many other things considered more important, such as economy and climate issues, are prioritized. This means that the conservative bloc must win for the work to continue in the same direction as before. Vote blue !
- ·13.8.NATO'S DETERRENCE IS BUILT ON ENDURANCE – BUT WHERE WILL THE ENERGY MOLECULES COME FROM? Today, Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense was on the agenda when the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees received information from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Armed Forces. This is an issue that extends significantly deeper than the number of soldiers and combat vehicles. According to the government's total defense bill, functioning logistics constitute the absolute foundation for military units to be sustainably supplied, protected, moved, and led. Furthermore, our geographical location makes Sweden a central basing and transit area for NATO's operations in northern Europe. The ability to receive and provide host nation support to allied units on Swedish territory is directly dependent on our own supply capacity. The government is also explicit: the ambition to secure energy supply includes not only electricity, but also liquid fuels and gas – at the same time as NATO membership affects total defense planning in the energy sector. This capacity is ultimately dictated by an undeniable physical fact. Combat vehicles, heavy logistics, backup power, and critical infrastructure are not powered by security policy declarations. They require physical energy. Energy molecules – in plain text: among other things, gas, diesel, and jet fuel. Sweden finds itself in a concrete strategic vulnerability here. Sweden has no own natural gas production but is dependent on imports. At the same time, there is an extensive prospected geological gas resource in the Siljan Ring. At the same time, the government is now translating its ambition to reduce strategic import dependencies through increased access to Swedish resources into concrete decisions. Yesterday, the green light for Laver was motivated, among other things, by reduced import dependence, the ability to stand on one's own feet, and the need for copper for both electricity grids and defense. When the same security policy logic is applied to metals in the Swedish bedrock, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why Sweden's own geological gas resource should not be analyzed from the same supply-strategic perspective. In parallel, AB Igrene has once again positioned its operations towards large-scale extraction and production of Siljan gas. If the state chooses to re-evaluate the Swedish gas resource based on total defense and supply preparedness, there is already an industrial project with a long exploration history to consider. Deterrence requires defense. Defense requires endurance. Endurance requires logistics and supply. And supply requires national sovereignty over energy molecules.
- ·13.8.SWEDEN REDRAWS THE ENERGY MAP – GAS BECOMES TOTAL DEFENSE The security policy agenda is now undergoing a clear shift where supply preparedness becomes a core of total defense. On July 30, the government established Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. The strategy aims to ensure that Sweden can maintain supply flows, compensate for market disruptions, and prioritize resources in shortage situations. Robust energy supply is explicitly pointed out as part of this capability. On August 11, the government decided to invest 500 million kronor in supply security for ammunition. The state thus provides financial means for investments that increase strategic production capacity and eliminate bottlenecks in the supply chain for peace, crisis, and war. The same strategic logic is simultaneously applied to energy supply. The Swedish Energy Agency has established that energy supply is crucial for total defense capability. Disruptions in gas availability can mean that Sweden cannot produce products or materiel needed during heightened alert or war. The agency's principle is crystal clear: "Heightened alert and war: Gas shall be prioritized for the needs of total defense." The link between gas and preparedness was further strengthened by the government's mandate on May 7, 2026. The directive concerns nationally produced biogas, but the supply policy direction is clear: more input points, increased national production on the gas grid, strengthened supply security, and greater national control. The needs of total defense shall be explicitly considered. And yesterday, another crucial puzzle piece fell into place. On August 12, the government gave Boliden the green light to proceed with the copper mine in Laver. The government's argumentation is security policy-related. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch states that Swedish copper production can reduce Europe's import dependence and that Sweden must be able to "stand on its own feet" in a troubled world. Copper is needed, according to the government, for both the electricity grid and defense. She summarizes the new direction: "It's about being master in one's own house and not letting other countries hold us in a strategic stranglehold." It is here that the political contradiction becomes increasingly clear. Swedish bedrock. Reduced import dependence. National control. Supply security. Needs of total defense. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of Swedish natural gas remains. It is against precisely this changed state playing field that AB Igrene's industrial repositioning should be evaluated. Through the Q3 report's formal strategic shift back to large-scale gas extraction, the strengthened cash position, and the industrially strengthened board – including Henrik Badin, Robert Tingvall, and Ragnar Krefting – Igrene has already prepared the organization for the next phase. The company's stated main priority is now: direct industrialization of Siljan gas. Igrene has thus already made its strategic choice. At the same time, the state is making its own. In just a few months, Sweden has gained: Gas as an explicit total defense issue. Increased national production on the gas grid as a government mandate. National control as a stated goal. Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. 500 million kronor for strategic production capacity for defense. And now a concrete government decision where Swedish bedrock is directly linked to reduced import dependence and defense needs. What remains is a regulatory framework from 2022 that prohibits the extraction of Swedish natural gas. Sweden is redrawing the map for how strategic raw materials and energy flows are valued in the new security policy situation. Siljan gas is right in the middle of that map."How long will they beat around the bush". One might think the sun always shines even if there's a single cloud that can get in the way. When will a decision be made about gas extraction in Sweden. Tried to get a clear picture of it, where it could appear on the Riksdag's agenda with a date where it is decided, but perhaps one is too bad at finding? Then what happens if the decision is delayed after 13/9 .... when possibly others will govern
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Ei dataa
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | - | - | - |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Välittäjätilasto
Dataa ei löytynyt
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti
Vain PDF
41 päivää sitten
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 -tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 -tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 -tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·1 päivä sittenSILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?
- ·14.8.I think mxrobban is unusually well-informed and up-to-date about Igrene, but he simultaneously tends to interpret developments from the positive side. There are still more uncertainties than certainties. We know too little about long-term production profiles, recoverable volumes, and commercial economics to speak too confidently about ”resources in the billions”. And then we have today's political reality: natural gas extraction has been prohibited by Swedish law since 1 July 2022, and I have not seen any public decision or concrete signal about a special exemption for Igrene. With the parliamentary election already on 13 September 2026, the political risk is also significant. The ban was introduced under the then S-led government, and it is difficult to see why the Social Democrats together with the environmental movement would now prioritize opening up for Swedish natural gas extraction. The potential exists, absolutely. But the path from gas in the mountain to permits, stable production, and commercial profitability is still long and uncertain.
- ·14.8.SWEDEN PREPARES FOR ENDURANCE - THE GAS IS ALREADY IN SILJAN Yesterday's publicly released minutes from the closed meeting of the defense and foreign affairs committees gave a crystal-clear signal. When the information about Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence immediately transitioned into a formal decision on confidentiality regarding "planned operations", it was definitively confirmed: Swedish defense planning is now in a strictly operational phase. This operational reality cannot be decoupled from the laws of physics. A resilient total defense is not driven solely by electricity. Military logistics, transport, backup power, and critical infrastructure require physically storable energy molecules - especially when power grids or international supply chains are put under pressure. At the same time, the state is now accelerating the build-up of supply preparedness. Through concrete decisions, the government acts executively to secure national sovereignty over strategic resources in the Swedish bedrock. It is in light of this new, offensive security doctrine - and yesterday's confidential information about planned operations within Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense – that Sweden's own energy resource must now be evaluated. In the Siljan Ring, there is a large-scale, prospected Swedish gas deposit comprising potential gas volumes in the billion-class. That this geological system is active and that methane is newly formed in Siljan's deep bedrock is scientifically documented today. At the same time, research from Chalmers has identified strong, locally concentrated, and persistent natural methane emissions from the lakes of the Siljan Ring, with measured values up to 300 times higher than what normally occurs. The molecules are demonstrably there, in a persistent natural flow. As the state now builds a modern doctrine around reduced import dependency, this resource constitutes a unique strategic asset. Through its extensive exploration history, AB Igrene already possesses the industrial platform, boreholes, and production data to immediately assist the state with a fact-based evaluation of the resource's operational potential. When yesterday's meeting in the Riksdag now confirms that NATO integration includes concrete, planned operations, Swedish logistics are put to the test. The only relevant question is therefore how long the state can base its operational defense planning on national sovereignty and resilience - without even evaluating the strategic importance of the country's own energy resource.Indeed, there is no problem agreeing with what is written here in this forum. We can share the feeling. If you go to Igrene's website, you are struck by the solid work the company has done, a fundamental work to form one's own opinion about the presence of gas that exists around the Siljan region. Boreholes have been prepared where gas has been able to be extracted with measured values. All preliminary work out in the field means that the process of commissioning after a decision on a permit - for gas extraction - can proceed efficiently. With those words, it remains to be seen how the upcoming government prioritizes and determines the necessity that permits can be issued. MP can have a significant impact on decisions being delayed, partly because the government's work with the documentation takes time, and because many other things considered more important, such as economy and climate issues, are prioritized. This means that the conservative bloc must win for the work to continue in the same direction as before. Vote blue !
- ·13.8.NATO'S DETERRENCE IS BUILT ON ENDURANCE – BUT WHERE WILL THE ENERGY MOLECULES COME FROM? Today, Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence and defense was on the agenda when the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees received information from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Armed Forces. This is an issue that extends significantly deeper than the number of soldiers and combat vehicles. According to the government's total defense bill, functioning logistics constitute the absolute foundation for military units to be sustainably supplied, protected, moved, and led. Furthermore, our geographical location makes Sweden a central basing and transit area for NATO's operations in northern Europe. The ability to receive and provide host nation support to allied units on Swedish territory is directly dependent on our own supply capacity. The government is also explicit: the ambition to secure energy supply includes not only electricity, but also liquid fuels and gas – at the same time as NATO membership affects total defense planning in the energy sector. This capacity is ultimately dictated by an undeniable physical fact. Combat vehicles, heavy logistics, backup power, and critical infrastructure are not powered by security policy declarations. They require physical energy. Energy molecules – in plain text: among other things, gas, diesel, and jet fuel. Sweden finds itself in a concrete strategic vulnerability here. Sweden has no own natural gas production but is dependent on imports. At the same time, there is an extensive prospected geological gas resource in the Siljan Ring. At the same time, the government is now translating its ambition to reduce strategic import dependencies through increased access to Swedish resources into concrete decisions. Yesterday, the green light for Laver was motivated, among other things, by reduced import dependence, the ability to stand on one's own feet, and the need for copper for both electricity grids and defense. When the same security policy logic is applied to metals in the Swedish bedrock, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why Sweden's own geological gas resource should not be analyzed from the same supply-strategic perspective. In parallel, AB Igrene has once again positioned its operations towards large-scale extraction and production of Siljan gas. If the state chooses to re-evaluate the Swedish gas resource based on total defense and supply preparedness, there is already an industrial project with a long exploration history to consider. Deterrence requires defense. Defense requires endurance. Endurance requires logistics and supply. And supply requires national sovereignty over energy molecules.
- ·13.8.SWEDEN REDRAWS THE ENERGY MAP – GAS BECOMES TOTAL DEFENSE The security policy agenda is now undergoing a clear shift where supply preparedness becomes a core of total defense. On July 30, the government established Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. The strategy aims to ensure that Sweden can maintain supply flows, compensate for market disruptions, and prioritize resources in shortage situations. Robust energy supply is explicitly pointed out as part of this capability. On August 11, the government decided to invest 500 million kronor in supply security for ammunition. The state thus provides financial means for investments that increase strategic production capacity and eliminate bottlenecks in the supply chain for peace, crisis, and war. The same strategic logic is simultaneously applied to energy supply. The Swedish Energy Agency has established that energy supply is crucial for total defense capability. Disruptions in gas availability can mean that Sweden cannot produce products or materiel needed during heightened alert or war. The agency's principle is crystal clear: "Heightened alert and war: Gas shall be prioritized for the needs of total defense." The link between gas and preparedness was further strengthened by the government's mandate on May 7, 2026. The directive concerns nationally produced biogas, but the supply policy direction is clear: more input points, increased national production on the gas grid, strengthened supply security, and greater national control. The needs of total defense shall be explicitly considered. And yesterday, another crucial puzzle piece fell into place. On August 12, the government gave Boliden the green light to proceed with the copper mine in Laver. The government's argumentation is security policy-related. Minister for Energy and Business Ebba Busch states that Swedish copper production can reduce Europe's import dependence and that Sweden must be able to "stand on its own feet" in a troubled world. Copper is needed, according to the government, for both the electricity grid and defense. She summarizes the new direction: "It's about being master in one's own house and not letting other countries hold us in a strategic stranglehold." It is here that the political contradiction becomes increasingly clear. Swedish bedrock. Reduced import dependence. National control. Supply security. Needs of total defense. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of Swedish natural gas remains. It is against precisely this changed state playing field that AB Igrene's industrial repositioning should be evaluated. Through the Q3 report's formal strategic shift back to large-scale gas extraction, the strengthened cash position, and the industrially strengthened board – including Henrik Badin, Robert Tingvall, and Ragnar Krefting – Igrene has already prepared the organization for the next phase. The company's stated main priority is now: direct industrialization of Siljan gas. Igrene has thus already made its strategic choice. At the same time, the state is making its own. In just a few months, Sweden has gained: Gas as an explicit total defense issue. Increased national production on the gas grid as a government mandate. National control as a stated goal. Sweden's first national strategy for supply preparedness. 500 million kronor for strategic production capacity for defense. And now a concrete government decision where Swedish bedrock is directly linked to reduced import dependence and defense needs. What remains is a regulatory framework from 2022 that prohibits the extraction of Swedish natural gas. Sweden is redrawing the map for how strategic raw materials and energy flows are valued in the new security policy situation. Siljan gas is right in the middle of that map."How long will they beat around the bush". One might think the sun always shines even if there's a single cloud that can get in the way. When will a decision be made about gas extraction in Sweden. Tried to get a clear picture of it, where it could appear on the Riksdag's agenda with a date where it is decided, but perhaps one is too bad at finding? Then what happens if the decision is delayed after 13/9 .... when possibly others will govern
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