2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
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Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
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·5 t sittenEUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality.
.... as well as the uncertain and unstable situation in Sweden's political situation, where the government's formation is not yet secured. Where will this "upcoming" fossil fuel capacity shortage with oil and gas lead (?), I'm not just thinking about fuel but also the need for natural gas for heavy industry. Should we already start worrying about shut-down ironworks and chemical industries. If there is now a stop also in the 1.5 mil narrow strait of Bab al-Mandab Strait off the Yemeni coast, then the price of oil will not be just 100 dollars/barrel as it is now, but significantly higher - a predicted guess. If it turns out like the 2018 election, we will in all likelihood have to await an unparalleled betrayal debate, because in the red/green camp, no new election will be an alternative due to prestige and power-craziness. Or should we believe in a miracle that everything will work out ..... for the best- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
- ·4.9.THE STATE BEGINS TO FINANCE GAS PREPAREDNESS – AND THE PRODUCER LEVEL IS INTEGRATED The day after reviewing the referral responses to SOU 2025:68, the state takes the next logical step. The strategy has now transitioned into concrete capital allocation, and the production stage is explicitly included. The Swedish Energy Agency has opened Energiberedskapsklivet 2026. Of the 790 million SEK allocated to energy preparedness, at least 60 million SEK are earmarked specifically for the gas sector. The central point of the call for applications is the wording regarding who is covered: The Swedish Energy Agency explicitly states that, in addition to gas grid operators, gas producers can also apply for support for backup power required for gas supply during power outages during peacetime crises and heightened alert. A new principle for the system The shift in the state's planning is fundamental. The state no longer solely builds preparedness around distribution and import, but now makes the production capability itself a direct part of the preparedness architecture. When we place the state documents side by side, an inevitable structure emerges: - Preparedness financing: The state identifies gas supply as critical and finances physical preparedness where gas producers are now explicitly included. - Requirement for peacetime capacity: SOU 2025:68 stipulates that extraction for preparedness reasons cannot be initiated only when the crisis is a fact. It must be prepared industrially in peacetime. - Total defense logistics: Sweden and the rest of the Nordic countries have, through a new declaration (September 2), established that supply preparedness shall ensure functioning production and logistics even during security policy crises and war. The structural consequence for Swedish natural gas The significance of this call for applications lies in the new state principle. The state now de facto treats gas production as a function whose resilience is so critical for the nation's supply preparedness that public capital is allocated to secure it. If the government, in accordance with the demands from SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv, repeals the 2022 gas ban to secure supply preparedness, the question therefore does not land in a vacuum. Sweden is already now building the structure where gas producers, gas infrastructure, and physical supply capability constitute an integrated part of energy preparedness. This confirms that the industrial logic behind Siljansgasen is now directly reflected in the state's own preparedness architecture.
- ·3.9.SWEDEN'S NEW PREPAREDNESS MODEL IS BEING BUILT IN PEACETIME - AND THE GAS BAN IS INCREASINGLY COMING INTO FOCUS The referral responses to SOU 2025:68 reveal a clear logic for Swedish supply preparedness: Strategic capacity must be built before the crisis occurs. Production, infrastructure, competence, stocks, and supply chains must be developed already in peacetime if they are to be usable during heightened preparedness and war. This is also the starting point for the new supply preparedness agreements, the F-agreements. Svenskt Näringsliv supports the system and describes the private business sector as the backbone of total defense and absolutely crucial for supply preparedness. The F-agreements refer to activities and deliveries needed for the population, critical societal functions, and military defense - including allied forces. THE GAS BAN COMES INTO FOCUS - SOU 2025:68 states that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to build preparedness where the extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas is to begin only during a peacetime crisis, heightened preparedness, or war. If domestic resources are to gain actual preparedness value, long lead times for investments, permits, competence, and infrastructure must therefore be managed in advance. The referral material reinforces the picture: - Svenskt Näringsliv: If the government, for preparedness reasons, wants to enable extraction, the most logical conclusion is that the 2022 ban is abolished, as commercial actors can then carry out necessary investments. - Installatörsföretagen: Expressly aligns itself with Svenskt Näringsliv's referral response in chapter 5 on coal, oil, and natural gas. - SGU: Shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. This does not mean that all referral bodies advocate for Swedish natural gas extraction. But the principle emerges clearly: Preparedness capacity that is to function in war must be prepared in peace. THE SILJAN RING - A DECADE-LONG FOUNDATION SOU 2025:68 reports on the Siljan Ring with a potential natural gas resource of 200–1 000 million m³, while only a smaller part is deemed likely to be technically extractable. Behind the figure there is extensive historical data: - 2015: Researchers from Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas and KTH estimated the gas volume of the Mora field alone at approximately 250–700 meters depth to be 0.5–1.0 billion m³, with potential at greater depths. - 2016–2017: Production tests exceeded previous expectations for the amount of gas in produced water. Igrene subsequently assessed that the volumes could be significantly larger and later described the potential as "billions of cubic meters with significant upside". - 2018–2019: A gas flow of approximately 1 000 Nm³/h was verified from a production well during the final part of a production test. Igrene assessed the following year that a first LNG plant of 50 000 tons/year would require 3–5 production wells. This was the company's then industrial planning and should not be equated with a verified extractable reserve. TWO PROCESSES ARE NOW BEGINNING TO CONVERGE Sweden is building a supply preparedness system where industrial capacity and private investments are to be prepared in peacetime for total defense and support for allies. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and natural gas remains in place. SOU 2025:68 has formulated the problem. SGU shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. Svenskt Näringsliv points to an abolished ban as the logical path if the government wants to create this preparedness opportunity. And the Siljan Ring already exists in the state's resource data. The crucial point is therefore no longer solely geological. Sweden must take a stand on whether the domestic natural gas resource that the state itself has identified should be able to be developed and evaluated in peacetime - when the entire new supply preparedness is simultaneously being built according to the principle that all strategic capacity must be prepared before the crisis occurs.What happens when the term of the current government expires, and a red/green government is to decide what will be a definitive decision for the handling of the gas in the Siljan Ring. Can MP - through horse-trading - once again become the pawn in the political game, which gives a NO to gas extraction for the company Igrene. Can Ebba Bosch "in the nick of time" become the saving angel in the domestic contingency plan for gas reserves in Sweden.
- ·25.8.SILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?
The Swedish investigation indicates a potential natural gas resource of 0.2–1.0 billion m³ and simultaneously emphasizes that only a MINOR part is likely technically extractable. Norway, by comparison, produced 121.8 billion Sm³ of marketable gas in 2025. This means that the entire Swedish "potential resource" corresponds to approximately: 0.2 billion m³ = approximately 0.6 days of Norwegian gas production 1.0 billion m³ = approximately 3 days of Norwegian gas production
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Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
Vain PDF
62 päivää sitten
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·5 t sittenEUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality..... as well as the uncertain and unstable situation in Sweden's political situation, where the government's formation is not yet secured. Where will this "upcoming" fossil fuel capacity shortage with oil and gas lead (?), I'm not just thinking about fuel but also the need for natural gas for heavy industry. Should we already start worrying about shut-down ironworks and chemical industries. If there is now a stop also in the 1.5 mil narrow strait of Bab al-Mandab Strait off the Yemeni coast, then the price of oil will not be just 100 dollars/barrel as it is now, but significantly higher - a predicted guess. If it turns out like the 2018 election, we will in all likelihood have to await an unparalleled betrayal debate, because in the red/green camp, no new election will be an alternative due to prestige and power-craziness. Or should we believe in a miracle that everything will work out ..... for the best
- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
- ·4.9.THE STATE BEGINS TO FINANCE GAS PREPAREDNESS – AND THE PRODUCER LEVEL IS INTEGRATED The day after reviewing the referral responses to SOU 2025:68, the state takes the next logical step. The strategy has now transitioned into concrete capital allocation, and the production stage is explicitly included. The Swedish Energy Agency has opened Energiberedskapsklivet 2026. Of the 790 million SEK allocated to energy preparedness, at least 60 million SEK are earmarked specifically for the gas sector. The central point of the call for applications is the wording regarding who is covered: The Swedish Energy Agency explicitly states that, in addition to gas grid operators, gas producers can also apply for support for backup power required for gas supply during power outages during peacetime crises and heightened alert. A new principle for the system The shift in the state's planning is fundamental. The state no longer solely builds preparedness around distribution and import, but now makes the production capability itself a direct part of the preparedness architecture. When we place the state documents side by side, an inevitable structure emerges: - Preparedness financing: The state identifies gas supply as critical and finances physical preparedness where gas producers are now explicitly included. - Requirement for peacetime capacity: SOU 2025:68 stipulates that extraction for preparedness reasons cannot be initiated only when the crisis is a fact. It must be prepared industrially in peacetime. - Total defense logistics: Sweden and the rest of the Nordic countries have, through a new declaration (September 2), established that supply preparedness shall ensure functioning production and logistics even during security policy crises and war. The structural consequence for Swedish natural gas The significance of this call for applications lies in the new state principle. The state now de facto treats gas production as a function whose resilience is so critical for the nation's supply preparedness that public capital is allocated to secure it. If the government, in accordance with the demands from SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv, repeals the 2022 gas ban to secure supply preparedness, the question therefore does not land in a vacuum. Sweden is already now building the structure where gas producers, gas infrastructure, and physical supply capability constitute an integrated part of energy preparedness. This confirms that the industrial logic behind Siljansgasen is now directly reflected in the state's own preparedness architecture.
- ·3.9.SWEDEN'S NEW PREPAREDNESS MODEL IS BEING BUILT IN PEACETIME - AND THE GAS BAN IS INCREASINGLY COMING INTO FOCUS The referral responses to SOU 2025:68 reveal a clear logic for Swedish supply preparedness: Strategic capacity must be built before the crisis occurs. Production, infrastructure, competence, stocks, and supply chains must be developed already in peacetime if they are to be usable during heightened preparedness and war. This is also the starting point for the new supply preparedness agreements, the F-agreements. Svenskt Näringsliv supports the system and describes the private business sector as the backbone of total defense and absolutely crucial for supply preparedness. The F-agreements refer to activities and deliveries needed for the population, critical societal functions, and military defense - including allied forces. THE GAS BAN COMES INTO FOCUS - SOU 2025:68 states that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to build preparedness where the extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas is to begin only during a peacetime crisis, heightened preparedness, or war. If domestic resources are to gain actual preparedness value, long lead times for investments, permits, competence, and infrastructure must therefore be managed in advance. The referral material reinforces the picture: - Svenskt Näringsliv: If the government, for preparedness reasons, wants to enable extraction, the most logical conclusion is that the 2022 ban is abolished, as commercial actors can then carry out necessary investments. - Installatörsföretagen: Expressly aligns itself with Svenskt Näringsliv's referral response in chapter 5 on coal, oil, and natural gas. - SGU: Shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. This does not mean that all referral bodies advocate for Swedish natural gas extraction. But the principle emerges clearly: Preparedness capacity that is to function in war must be prepared in peace. THE SILJAN RING - A DECADE-LONG FOUNDATION SOU 2025:68 reports on the Siljan Ring with a potential natural gas resource of 200–1 000 million m³, while only a smaller part is deemed likely to be technically extractable. Behind the figure there is extensive historical data: - 2015: Researchers from Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas and KTH estimated the gas volume of the Mora field alone at approximately 250–700 meters depth to be 0.5–1.0 billion m³, with potential at greater depths. - 2016–2017: Production tests exceeded previous expectations for the amount of gas in produced water. Igrene subsequently assessed that the volumes could be significantly larger and later described the potential as "billions of cubic meters with significant upside". - 2018–2019: A gas flow of approximately 1 000 Nm³/h was verified from a production well during the final part of a production test. Igrene assessed the following year that a first LNG plant of 50 000 tons/year would require 3–5 production wells. This was the company's then industrial planning and should not be equated with a verified extractable reserve. TWO PROCESSES ARE NOW BEGINNING TO CONVERGE Sweden is building a supply preparedness system where industrial capacity and private investments are to be prepared in peacetime for total defense and support for allies. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and natural gas remains in place. SOU 2025:68 has formulated the problem. SGU shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. Svenskt Näringsliv points to an abolished ban as the logical path if the government wants to create this preparedness opportunity. And the Siljan Ring already exists in the state's resource data. The crucial point is therefore no longer solely geological. Sweden must take a stand on whether the domestic natural gas resource that the state itself has identified should be able to be developed and evaluated in peacetime - when the entire new supply preparedness is simultaneously being built according to the principle that all strategic capacity must be prepared before the crisis occurs.What happens when the term of the current government expires, and a red/green government is to decide what will be a definitive decision for the handling of the gas in the Siljan Ring. Can MP - through horse-trading - once again become the pawn in the political game, which gives a NO to gas extraction for the company Igrene. Can Ebba Bosch "in the nick of time" become the saving angel in the domestic contingency plan for gas reserves in Sweden.
- ·25.8.SILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?The Swedish investigation indicates a potential natural gas resource of 0.2–1.0 billion m³ and simultaneously emphasizes that only a MINOR part is likely technically extractable. Norway, by comparison, produced 121.8 billion Sm³ of marketable gas in 2025. This means that the entire Swedish "potential resource" corresponds to approximately: 0.2 billion m³ = approximately 0.6 days of Norwegian gas production 1.0 billion m³ = approximately 3 days of Norwegian gas production
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 472 | NON | NON | ||
| 11 822 | NON | SSWM | ||
| 7 756 | NON | AVA | ||
| 75 022 | SWB | AVA | ||
| 12 222 | NON | AVA |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
Vain PDF
62 päivää sitten
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti 16.10. |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti 17.7. | ||
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti 8.4. | ||
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti 16.1. | ||
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti 17.10.2025 | ||
2025 Q3 - tulosraportti 18.7.2025 |
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
- ·5 t sittenEUROPE'S GAS PREPAREDNESS IS BEING TESTED – IMPORT DEPENDENCY IS NOW AN ACUTE SECURITY ISSUE Europe is heading towards winter with a rapidly deteriorating gas situation. Today's market data and flow analyses confirm in real-time the geopolitical risk underlying Sweden's and the EU's energy preparedness transition. According to Reuters, European gas reserves are now at an exceptionally low 67–68 percent. This creates an acute lack of margins in the European system ahead of winter. The cause is structural import dependency: -Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz severely limit LNG flows. The shortfall from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is estimated at approximately 36 million tons of LNG. - Europe is thus forced to compete increasingly fiercely with Asia for available LNG cargoes, especially from the USA, which in August accounted for 70 percent of the EU's LNG imports. In recent years, Europe has phased out Russian gas, but as LNG flows from the Middle East are now curtailed, the next critical vulnerability is exposed: diversified imports are completely at the mercy of geopolitically sensitive transport routes. The Swedish preparedness paradox is brought to a head It is in light of this rapidly shrinking European margin that state activity in Sweden must be interpreted. The state is now forced to build physical redundancy to meet exactly this scenario: - On September 3, Energimyndigheten opened calls within Energiberedskapsklivet where gas producers are explicitly given the opportunity to apply for state support for backup power to secure supply during heightened alert. - SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv have already pointed out that Swedish regulations concerning natural gas extraction must be changed from a supply preparedness perspective. We now see an unsustainable strategic contradiction. Sweden is actively financing the build-up of physical preparedness for gas supply – while Swedish natural gas, according to current legislation, may not be evaluated or extracted. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The industrial and security policy logic is inescapable: a functioning extraction capacity for national preparedness cannot be created out of thin air the day the crisis is already a fact. It must be prepared in peacetime. When Europe's gas reserves are empty, international LNG flows are blocked by war, and Sweden de facto allocates state capital to domestic gas preparedness, that logic is further tightened. The question of national sovereignty over the country's own energy resources is now relentlessly driven forward by the harsh European reality..... as well as the uncertain and unstable situation in Sweden's political situation, where the government's formation is not yet secured. Where will this "upcoming" fossil fuel capacity shortage with oil and gas lead (?), I'm not just thinking about fuel but also the need for natural gas for heavy industry. Should we already start worrying about shut-down ironworks and chemical industries. If there is now a stop also in the 1.5 mil narrow strait of Bab al-Mandab Strait off the Yemeni coast, then the price of oil will not be just 100 dollars/barrel as it is now, but significantly higher - a predicted guess. If it turns out like the 2018 election, we will in all likelihood have to await an unparalleled betrayal debate, because in the red/green camp, no new election will be an alternative due to prestige and power-craziness. Or should we believe in a miracle that everything will work out ..... for the best
- ·11.9.GEOPOLITICAL REALITY - THAT'S WHY SWEDEN IS BUILDING NEW PHYSICAL GAS PREPAREDNESS The day before yesterday, on September 9th, the Swedish Energy Agency shifted focus in its situation report for Swedish energy preparedness. The agency now explicitly links Swedish supply security to the military escalation in the Middle East and the choked transport flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk to Swedish energy security and international supply chains is no longer theoretical; it is monitored in real-time by Swedish authorities. This warning must be read in direct context of the extremely compressed state activity over the past eight days. Sweden is currently rapidly building a structural countermeasure: - September 2nd: Sweden and the other Nordic countries sign a declaration stipulating that functioning production, logistics, and distribution must be secured during war. - September 3rd: The Swedish Energy Agency opens calls for physical gas preparedness. It is now explicitly clear that gas producers can apply for state support to invest in backup power and critical infrastructure for supply preparedness. - September 10th (Yesterday's decision): The government appoints an inquiry to analyze whether the Environmental Code provides sufficient scope for the needs of the defense, with the aim of creating a more appropriate balance between environmental and defense interests. Preparedness is not built for the normal state: The state is rolling out a new preparedness architecture based on the premise that international transport routes can be blocked. Preparedness is not financed for the days when import flows are functioning, but for situations when markets falter. Here, yesterday's government decision on the Environmental Code becomes fundamentally decisive. It is not specifically about the gas ban, but it establishes a state precedent: When the needs of total defense and the security policy reality change, the state is prepared to reconsider environmental regulations and permit processes that otherwise limit the build-up of necessary capacity. It is at this exact intersection that the question of Swedish natural gas gains its institutional weight. SOU 2025:68 has already reported on the natural gas resource in the Siljan Ring and categorically stated that extraction capacity cannot be created only when the crisis is already a fact. Industrial capacity must be prepared in peacetime. Summary: When the state, in the same week, warns about the vulnerability in global energy transport routes, allows gas producers to apply for state support for physical crisis preparedness, and actively reviews how environmental legislation can be adapted to total defense, then the security policy logic tightens. The more Sweden is forced to build its energy preparedness based on disrupted international flows, the more central becomes the question of what role domestic production capacity must play. It is no longer about local environmental policy, but about how Sweden will handle the realities of an isolated import dependency in a war economy.We will have to wait and see how the natural gas issue resolves itself more concretely. As far as I know, the extraction of Swedish gas deposits has not been debated, neither in factual publications nor in media channels, which makes one wonder if, even if the need is great for any future times of unrest in the world situation regarding war, and problems with oil transports around the Arab states, there is the reservation about a red/green victory in the election that might delay important decisions for gas provision here in Sweden. Even if what is written above may seem prepared and coordinated, political decisions must be made regarding the state precedent to review environmental regulations and permit processes .... the sooner the better.
- ·4.9.THE STATE BEGINS TO FINANCE GAS PREPAREDNESS – AND THE PRODUCER LEVEL IS INTEGRATED The day after reviewing the referral responses to SOU 2025:68, the state takes the next logical step. The strategy has now transitioned into concrete capital allocation, and the production stage is explicitly included. The Swedish Energy Agency has opened Energiberedskapsklivet 2026. Of the 790 million SEK allocated to energy preparedness, at least 60 million SEK are earmarked specifically for the gas sector. The central point of the call for applications is the wording regarding who is covered: The Swedish Energy Agency explicitly states that, in addition to gas grid operators, gas producers can also apply for support for backup power required for gas supply during power outages during peacetime crises and heightened alert. A new principle for the system The shift in the state's planning is fundamental. The state no longer solely builds preparedness around distribution and import, but now makes the production capability itself a direct part of the preparedness architecture. When we place the state documents side by side, an inevitable structure emerges: - Preparedness financing: The state identifies gas supply as critical and finances physical preparedness where gas producers are now explicitly included. - Requirement for peacetime capacity: SOU 2025:68 stipulates that extraction for preparedness reasons cannot be initiated only when the crisis is a fact. It must be prepared industrially in peacetime. - Total defense logistics: Sweden and the rest of the Nordic countries have, through a new declaration (September 2), established that supply preparedness shall ensure functioning production and logistics even during security policy crises and war. The structural consequence for Swedish natural gas The significance of this call for applications lies in the new state principle. The state now de facto treats gas production as a function whose resilience is so critical for the nation's supply preparedness that public capital is allocated to secure it. If the government, in accordance with the demands from SGU and Svenskt Näringsliv, repeals the 2022 gas ban to secure supply preparedness, the question therefore does not land in a vacuum. Sweden is already now building the structure where gas producers, gas infrastructure, and physical supply capability constitute an integrated part of energy preparedness. This confirms that the industrial logic behind Siljansgasen is now directly reflected in the state's own preparedness architecture.
- ·3.9.SWEDEN'S NEW PREPAREDNESS MODEL IS BEING BUILT IN PEACETIME - AND THE GAS BAN IS INCREASINGLY COMING INTO FOCUS The referral responses to SOU 2025:68 reveal a clear logic for Swedish supply preparedness: Strategic capacity must be built before the crisis occurs. Production, infrastructure, competence, stocks, and supply chains must be developed already in peacetime if they are to be usable during heightened preparedness and war. This is also the starting point for the new supply preparedness agreements, the F-agreements. Svenskt Näringsliv supports the system and describes the private business sector as the backbone of total defense and absolutely crucial for supply preparedness. The F-agreements refer to activities and deliveries needed for the population, critical societal functions, and military defense - including allied forces. THE GAS BAN COMES INTO FOCUS - SOU 2025:68 states that it does not appear realistic or cost-effective to build preparedness where the extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas is to begin only during a peacetime crisis, heightened preparedness, or war. If domestic resources are to gain actual preparedness value, long lead times for investments, permits, competence, and infrastructure must therefore be managed in advance. The referral material reinforces the picture: - Svenskt Näringsliv: If the government, for preparedness reasons, wants to enable extraction, the most logical conclusion is that the 2022 ban is abolished, as commercial actors can then carry out necessary investments. - Installatörsföretagen: Expressly aligns itself with Svenskt Näringsliv's referral response in chapter 5 on coal, oil, and natural gas. - SGU: Shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. This does not mean that all referral bodies advocate for Swedish natural gas extraction. But the principle emerges clearly: Preparedness capacity that is to function in war must be prepared in peace. THE SILJAN RING - A DECADE-LONG FOUNDATION SOU 2025:68 reports on the Siljan Ring with a potential natural gas resource of 200–1 000 million m³, while only a smaller part is deemed likely to be technically extractable. Behind the figure there is extensive historical data: - 2015: Researchers from Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas and KTH estimated the gas volume of the Mora field alone at approximately 250–700 meters depth to be 0.5–1.0 billion m³, with potential at greater depths. - 2016–2017: Production tests exceeded previous expectations for the amount of gas in produced water. Igrene subsequently assessed that the volumes could be significantly larger and later described the potential as "billions of cubic meters with significant upside". - 2018–2019: A gas flow of approximately 1 000 Nm³/h was verified from a production well during the final part of a production test. Igrene assessed the following year that a first LNG plant of 50 000 tons/year would require 3–5 production wells. This was the company's then industrial planning and should not be equated with a verified extractable reserve. TWO PROCESSES ARE NOW BEGINNING TO CONVERGE Sweden is building a supply preparedness system where industrial capacity and private investments are to be prepared in peacetime for total defense and support for allies. At the same time, the 2022 ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and natural gas remains in place. SOU 2025:68 has formulated the problem. SGU shares the assessment that the ban needs to be lifted if extraction is to be enabled for supply preparedness. Svenskt Näringsliv points to an abolished ban as the logical path if the government wants to create this preparedness opportunity. And the Siljan Ring already exists in the state's resource data. The crucial point is therefore no longer solely geological. Sweden must take a stand on whether the domestic natural gas resource that the state itself has identified should be able to be developed and evaluated in peacetime - when the entire new supply preparedness is simultaneously being built according to the principle that all strategic capacity must be prepared before the crisis occurs.What happens when the term of the current government expires, and a red/green government is to decide what will be a definitive decision for the handling of the gas in the Siljan Ring. Can MP - through horse-trading - once again become the pawn in the political game, which gives a NO to gas extraction for the company Igrene. Can Ebba Bosch "in the nick of time" become the saving angel in the domestic contingency plan for gas reserves in Sweden.
- ·25.8.SILJAN GAS IN THE TOTAL DEFENSE'S ENERGY EQUATION - WHEN SWEDEN BECOMES NATO'S LOGISTICAL HUB Sweden's security and energy policy direction has materialized at an exceptional pace over the past twelve days. Through formal decisions and agency statements, NATO's operational planning is now directly linked to the physical capability of the Swedish energy system. The timeline from the past week speaks for itself: August 13: The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees are informed by the government and the Swedish Armed Forces about Sweden's NATO contribution, whereupon the meeting immediately transitions into formal confidentiality regarding "planned operations". August 19: The Swedish Energy Agency emphasizes in its referral response that Sweden's energy goals must harmonize with NATO's updated capability requirements. The agency stresses the demand for robust production, distribution, and storage of energy, and explicitly adds that this shall include "total defense, including host nation support". August 20: The Swedish Armed Forces state in their referral response that a functioning and secure energy supply is directly crucial for the ability to sustainably conduct military operations and fulfill Sweden's commitments within NATO's collective defense. August 24: The referral period closes. The Government Offices are now proceeding with the preparation, using the agencies' referral responses as part of the decision basis. This is no longer an abstract defense debate. As the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis notes, Sweden's geographical location means that the country constitutes a rear area in NATO's northwestern operational area, and thus an important basing and transit area. The establishment of a joint logistics headquarters in Enköping confirms Sweden's new role as a logistical hub. Enabling this extensive transit of allied troops and materiel requires a logistical endurance that neither militarily nor civilly can be sustained solely by electricity. The state resource mapping In this sharp, current context, the existing documents from the state's inquiry into increased supply preparedness (SOU 2025:68) come into an unavoidable light. The state's own expert agencies have already formulated several of the preparedness policy conditions that now make the domestic gas resource highly relevant: SGU: Believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. MSB: Emphasizes that total defense will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and that from a supply preparedness perspective, it is "best if there is domestic extraction". The Swedish Armed Forces: Considered that the ban on the extraction of coal, oil, and gas should not apply during heightened alert or war. In the same state inquiry, Sweden's domestic natural gas resources are mapped. The inquiry's table states the Siljan Ring with a potential resource of 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The SOU assesses small-scale production as likely possible, even if only a smaller part is likely technically extractable. An analysis of the resource and extraction costs is appropriately proposed to be handled through a joint government assignment to SGU and the Swedish Energy Agency. The time factor and Igrene's industrial advantage The state inquiry also draws a crucial conclusion: the path from exploration to production can be very long, which is why extraction that is to come quickly in a crisis must be prepared in peacetime. It is unrealistic to wait until a crisis is already a fact and trade flows have been disrupted to start Swedish gas extraction. This is exactly where Siljan gas transitions into operational reality. AB Igrene, after two decades of prospecting, already possesses the infrastructure, the ready production wells, and the geological history that the state would otherwise be forced to initiate from scratch. The industrial potential is underscored by the fact that one of the company's production wells measured approximately 1 000 cubic meters of gas per hour during production tests. The Swedish Armed Forces state that a secure energy supply is crucial for sustainable military operations. The Swedish Energy Agency requires that the energy goal be harmonized with NATO's capability requirements and explicitly include total defense and host nation support. SGU believes that the gas ban needs to be lifted to enable extraction for supply preparedness purposes. And in the state's own resource mapping, the Siljan Ring is already listed with 200–1 000 million cubic meters of natural gas. The state has thus defined the energy need, identified the need for domestic freedom of action, noted that preparations must take place in peacetime – and already mapped the gas resource in the Siljan Ring. The next step is the resource analysis. And once that analysis is initiated, the question that is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid is: which Swedish natural gas resource is more prepared for such a test than Siljan gas?The Swedish investigation indicates a potential natural gas resource of 0.2–1.0 billion m³ and simultaneously emphasizes that only a MINOR part is likely technically extractable. Norway, by comparison, produced 121.8 billion Sm³ of marketable gas in 2025. This means that the entire Swedish "potential resource" corresponds to approximately: 0.2 billion m³ = approximately 0.6 days of Norwegian gas production 1.0 billion m³ = approximately 3 days of Norwegian gas production
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 472 | NON | NON | ||
| 11 822 | NON | SSWM | ||
| 7 756 | NON | AVA | ||
| 75 022 | SWB | AVA | ||
| 12 222 | NON | AVA |
Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.
Rahastot ja ETF:t, joilla on osaketta
Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avanza Bank AB | 16 424 | 177 259 | −160 835 | 3 000 |
| SSW Market Making GmbH | 11 514 | 16 322 | −4 808 | 0 |
| Nordnet Bank AB | 94 625 | 79 482 | 15 143 | 30 513 |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | 25 000 | 0 | 25 000 | 0 |
| Swedbank AB | 125 500 | 0 | 125 500 | 0 |