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Igrene

Ylin-
Alin-
Vaihto-
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten

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AikaHintaMäärä
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Rahastoja ja ETF:iä jotka omistavat osaketta

Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2027 Q1 - tulosraportti
15.1.2027
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
16.10.
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
17.7.
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
8.4.
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti
16.1.
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti
17.10.2025

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6 t sitten
    ·
    @mxrobban @Lapplandgold MXRobban, those numbers can sound pretty impressive to people who don't have that good of a grasp on the gas industry. But if you just do a simple Google search, you'll see that IGRENE's old estimate for the Mora field was around 0.5–1 billion m³ of gas, so roughly 5.5–11 TWh. And then we're talking estimated resources, not any proven, commercially extractable reserves. To put it all into a bit of perspective: Norway produced 121.8 billion m³ of gas in 2025. The entire estimated resource of the Mora field thus corresponds to only 1.5–3 days of Norwegian gas production! And over in the US, in the Lower 48, they produced in December 2024 roughly 3.3 billion m³ of gas a day**, from a whole heck of a lot of wells. It goes without saying that you can find methane down in the bedrock. But from there to actually being able to show commercially extractable reserves, stable production, and a strategic energy supply, well, there's still quite a long way to go, buddy! Geological potential is one thing. Industrial reality is something completely different, you see!
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    11.11.
    ·
    POLAND'S LNG CRASH AND TOTAL DEFENSE DEMANDS: WHY THE EXTRACTION BAN MUST BE SCRAPPED An international contract worth 570 million euros has just collapsed. At the same time, the IEA warns of empty gas storage facilities in Europe, and NATO now classifies energy supply as a direct prerequisite for military defense capability. This is no longer a theoretical risk analysis. It is the brutal security-policy reality, and it forces a rethink regarding Swedish gas extraction. 1. POLAND PROVES WHY IMPORT CONTRACTS ARE PAPER TIGERS Yesterday (Nov 10), the Polish energy giant ORLEN announced that they are canceling a massive LNG agreement with QatarEnergy. The agreement would have secured 15.3 TWh of gas annually until 2034, but is now being scrapped due to force majeure and failed deliveries. How does ORLEN survive the crash? They state with ice-cold calm that their own domestic gas production covers the shortfall. Poland has built physical freedom of action. Sweden has banned its own. 2. NATO AND THE SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENSE Regardless of disruptions, the IEA warns (Nov 3) that Europe's gas storage could crash below 10 percent as early as March 2027. At the same time, NATO (Rutte/Birol, Nov 5) asserts that military mobility and the defense industry require secure energy infrastructure. This echoes directly in Swedish defense planning. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly point out energy infrastructure, ports, and underwater cables as designated sabotage targets. Paper contracts on LNG vessels do not protect a country when international supply chains are severed or ports are blockaded. Total defense requires physical redundancy inland, far from vulnerable coasts. 3. SOU 2025:68 IS THE LEGAL KEY The state's own supply preparedness inquiry points out precisely this vulnerability. If the government wants to create the freedom of action to use domestic gas when trade flows are disrupted, the extraction ban needs to be completely abolished. You do not drill, finance, or commission a gas field the same day international deliveries cease. The industrial base must be permitted and built up in peacetime. 4. SILJANSGASEN IS A STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESOURCE It is in this hard-as-stone context that Igrene's assets in the Siljan Ring must be valued. The geological base is already laid. The production wells (for example PB2) are drilled, the flows are tested, and the gas has been proven. To let this domestic, geographically protected energy resource remain locked behind an extraction ban from 2022 is defense-political idiocy when Europe's entire gas supply is rocking. Sweden's gas policy has been confronted with reality. When multi-billion contracts break and NATO demands energy security, domestic production is the only true preparedness.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    7.11.
    ·
    @mxrobban No, I am not reversing the chronology. I agree that project financing comes after the law is opened and production data is verified. My point is another: The company must survive and pay for well work, testing, and permits until then. That money is not in the cash register today. The latest rights issue was not fully subscribed, and the option premiums contribute 120 000 kronor. When the board bets on a law change at the same time as Mora is to be developed without a financing plan, then the math does not add up. Listen here, we should not let ourselves be dazzled by board member names, backgrounds, or options. It will be a damn mess, at best. @Lapplandgold summarizes it well: - High stakes, no guarantees.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ENERGY SUPPLY IS NOW A DESIGNATED SABOTAGE TARGET – TOTAL DEFENCE REQUIRES REDUNDANCY On November 5, the government decided on continued internal border control, with explicit reference to Russian hybrid threats and hostile actors on Swedish soil. This is not grand politics for diplomats – it is brutal infrastructure facts that redraw the entire playing field for Swedish preparedness. 1. ENERGY IS A DESIGNATED TARGET FOR SABOTAGE The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly designate energy supply and submarine cables as sabotage targets in hybrid warfare. They state that Russia is continuously making preparations for sabotage. Säpo is equally uncompromising: "The sabotage threat from Russia is real." The consequence is inevitable. An LNG terminal on the coast or an international cable is no longer just an asset – it is an extremely vulnerable pinpoint target. Total defence is no longer chasing paper contracts, they demand geographical dispersion and physical redundancy. 2. SVENSKA KRAFTNÄT'S 15-MINUTE LIFELINE Sweden has already realized the need for decentralized survival power. Svenska kraftnät currently manages overloads with 20 strategically distributed gas turbines (1,300 MW) that can be started within 15 minutes when the grid is knocked out. The government notes that we have about 40 turbines in the country and is now investigating support for more. But when total defence is scaled up to handle physical attacks, the need for rapid, distributed backup power will explode. 3. A TURBINE WITHOUT DOMESTIC FUEL IS JUST STEEL Regardless of how many turbines are built, the defence equation falls on a single question: What happens when the fuel for all this distributed backup power must be transported in via ships to closed or sabotaged ports? This is where Siljansgasen becomes indispensable. Local, protected extraction inland, connected to geographically distributed turbines, provides immediate backup power when international import routes are cut off. CONCLUSION: SOU 2025:68 HAS ALREADY PROVIDED THE ANSWER The state's own inquiry (SOU 2025:68) establishes that commercial investments in Swedish natural gas must be permitted already in peacetime for us to have access to it when trade flows are disrupted. The inquiry's conclusion is explicit: the 2022 extraction ban must be completely abolished. When Sweden explicitly plans for Russian sabotage against critical energy infrastructure, a ban on Swedish energy extraction is defence policy idiocy. What is produced beneath Swedish soil gives the country a supply route that no foreign power can close.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    5.11.
    ·
    Although @mxrobban seems to be pulling the strings in this thread, it is important to understand today's realities and not fool oneself. Well, now we really must distinguish between what has actually been paid in and what will possibly come later. With the option premium of 3 öre that you state, the four have paid 30,000 kronor each. A total of 120,000 kronor. The remaining 4.96 million will only come if all options are exercised in the autumn of 2029. That hardly secures the cash position and peace of mind "all the way". To understand what we are actually talking about: Biokraft stated at the launch of Stockholm Bio-LNG in 2023 a project investment of approximately 330 MSEK. The capacity was 50 tonnes of liquefied gas per day. Igrene's previously presented ambition was 50,000 tonnes per year, corresponding to approximately 137 tonnes per day. The projects are not directly comparable. Biokraft's investment referred to an expansion at an existing biogas plant, and the cost cannot be scaled up proportionally. But it is a concrete Swedish reference showing the scale that the investments can have. In Mora, a financing plan must also include work on wells, production tests, gas collection and possible water management. Before major expansion capital can be justified, investors need reliable production profiles over several months: sustained gas flows, pressure development, water production and documented operating costs. A good flow during a short test is not the same as secured production over many years. And all of this presupposes that legislation opens up for extraction and that the necessary permits are in place. The board's option purchases may be a sign of faith in the future. But a significantly stronger message would have been to subscribe and pay for new shares already today and thereby provide the company with capital that can actually be used. Especially when the latest rights issue was not fully subscribed. Now they are paying a limited premium for the opportunity to invest more in 2029, if developments justify it. That is fully understandable from their perspective, but hardly the same as committing the full amount here and now. The company needs cash in hand, not potential money in three years. The subscription price of 1.24 kronor is an option condition. It is neither an independent valuation of the project nor proof of commercially extractable gas volumes. It goes without saying that one may be optimistic. But between 120,000 kronor in option premiums and a functioning LNG operation lies quite a substantial amount of work and a completely different capital requirement. Surely we can have some sense of proportion Source: Biokraft's press release on August 24, 2023.
    Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ColdAsIce, you are turning the industrial chronology completely upside down. You demand that hundreds of millions in fixed capital should be on the bank account before it is even legal to extract the gas. You are confusing the board incentive program with the financing of heavy infrastructure. Let us sort out the order. 1. THE OPTION PROGRAM IS NOT STEEL AND CONCRETE Nobody is claiming that 120 000 SEK in option premiums will build an LNG plant. The purpose of the program is to tie the board members' own wallets to the company's success. That four board members enter at maximum allocation with a pain threshold around 1.27 SEK (strike + premium), when the stock was at 0.38 SEK, is the relevant signal. It forces management to deliver fundamental, structural results in order to get their money back at all. 2. BIOKRAFT PROVES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPANY CASH AND INDUSTRIAL CAPEX Your reference to Biokraft is completely correct, and it shows exactly why your calculations are wrong. Heavy energy infrastructure in that size category is never financed by building a massive cash pile in advance via continuous new share issues from retail investors. It is financed via project financing, bank syndicates, industrial partners, and long-term customer contracts (off-take) where the industry commits to future volumes. But this heavy capital is never activated as long as there is a Swedish legal ban on extraction. 3. SOU 2025:68 DICTATES THE INDUSTRIAL CHRONOLOGY The state's own security of supply inquiry is crystal clear. If Sweden is to have the freedom of action to use domestic natural gas when international trade flows are disrupted, commercial actors must be able to invest in extraction already in peacetime. The inquiry therefore notes that the ban needs to be abolished if the government wants to create that freedom of action. The industrial chain is inescapable: 1. Legal opening (the ban is lifted according to SOU). 2. Verified production flows over time. 3. Investment decisions and large-scale project financing. You are practically demanding step 3 before step 1 is resolved. Between today's option premiums and a finished plant lies a massive amount of work, and it is precisely that legal and industrial preparatory work that management has now taken the financial responsibility to deliver. It is "skin in the game". The real gauge of value thereafter will be exactly what you are asking for: legal opening, sustainable production data, and thereafter industrial project financing.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, ​​eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.

Välittäjätilasto

Ostaneet eniten

Ostaneet eniten
VälittäjäOstettuMyytyNettoSisäinen
Swedbank AB32 43256431 8680
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB26 250026 2500
SSW Market Making GmbH15 53525 917−10 3820
Avanza Bank AB30 90452 373−21 46910 340
Nordnet Bank AB24 26650 533−26 2670

Myyneet eniten

Myyneet eniten
VälittäjäOstettuMyytyNettoSisäinen
Nordnet Bank AB24 26650 533−26 2670
Avanza Bank AB30 90452 373−21 46910 340
SSW Market Making GmbH15 53525 917−10 3820
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB26 250026 2500
Swedbank AB32 43256431 8680
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6 t sitten
    ·
    @mxrobban @Lapplandgold MXRobban, those numbers can sound pretty impressive to people who don't have that good of a grasp on the gas industry. But if you just do a simple Google search, you'll see that IGRENE's old estimate for the Mora field was around 0.5–1 billion m³ of gas, so roughly 5.5–11 TWh. And then we're talking estimated resources, not any proven, commercially extractable reserves. To put it all into a bit of perspective: Norway produced 121.8 billion m³ of gas in 2025. The entire estimated resource of the Mora field thus corresponds to only 1.5–3 days of Norwegian gas production! And over in the US, in the Lower 48, they produced in December 2024 roughly 3.3 billion m³ of gas a day**, from a whole heck of a lot of wells. It goes without saying that you can find methane down in the bedrock. But from there to actually being able to show commercially extractable reserves, stable production, and a strategic energy supply, well, there's still quite a long way to go, buddy! Geological potential is one thing. Industrial reality is something completely different, you see!
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    11.11.
    ·
    POLAND'S LNG CRASH AND TOTAL DEFENSE DEMANDS: WHY THE EXTRACTION BAN MUST BE SCRAPPED An international contract worth 570 million euros has just collapsed. At the same time, the IEA warns of empty gas storage facilities in Europe, and NATO now classifies energy supply as a direct prerequisite for military defense capability. This is no longer a theoretical risk analysis. It is the brutal security-policy reality, and it forces a rethink regarding Swedish gas extraction. 1. POLAND PROVES WHY IMPORT CONTRACTS ARE PAPER TIGERS Yesterday (Nov 10), the Polish energy giant ORLEN announced that they are canceling a massive LNG agreement with QatarEnergy. The agreement would have secured 15.3 TWh of gas annually until 2034, but is now being scrapped due to force majeure and failed deliveries. How does ORLEN survive the crash? They state with ice-cold calm that their own domestic gas production covers the shortfall. Poland has built physical freedom of action. Sweden has banned its own. 2. NATO AND THE SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENSE Regardless of disruptions, the IEA warns (Nov 3) that Europe's gas storage could crash below 10 percent as early as March 2027. At the same time, NATO (Rutte/Birol, Nov 5) asserts that military mobility and the defense industry require secure energy infrastructure. This echoes directly in Swedish defense planning. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly point out energy infrastructure, ports, and underwater cables as designated sabotage targets. Paper contracts on LNG vessels do not protect a country when international supply chains are severed or ports are blockaded. Total defense requires physical redundancy inland, far from vulnerable coasts. 3. SOU 2025:68 IS THE LEGAL KEY The state's own supply preparedness inquiry points out precisely this vulnerability. If the government wants to create the freedom of action to use domestic gas when trade flows are disrupted, the extraction ban needs to be completely abolished. You do not drill, finance, or commission a gas field the same day international deliveries cease. The industrial base must be permitted and built up in peacetime. 4. SILJANSGASEN IS A STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESOURCE It is in this hard-as-stone context that Igrene's assets in the Siljan Ring must be valued. The geological base is already laid. The production wells (for example PB2) are drilled, the flows are tested, and the gas has been proven. To let this domestic, geographically protected energy resource remain locked behind an extraction ban from 2022 is defense-political idiocy when Europe's entire gas supply is rocking. Sweden's gas policy has been confronted with reality. When multi-billion contracts break and NATO demands energy security, domestic production is the only true preparedness.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    7.11.
    ·
    @mxrobban No, I am not reversing the chronology. I agree that project financing comes after the law is opened and production data is verified. My point is another: The company must survive and pay for well work, testing, and permits until then. That money is not in the cash register today. The latest rights issue was not fully subscribed, and the option premiums contribute 120 000 kronor. When the board bets on a law change at the same time as Mora is to be developed without a financing plan, then the math does not add up. Listen here, we should not let ourselves be dazzled by board member names, backgrounds, or options. It will be a damn mess, at best. @Lapplandgold summarizes it well: - High stakes, no guarantees.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ENERGY SUPPLY IS NOW A DESIGNATED SABOTAGE TARGET – TOTAL DEFENCE REQUIRES REDUNDANCY On November 5, the government decided on continued internal border control, with explicit reference to Russian hybrid threats and hostile actors on Swedish soil. This is not grand politics for diplomats – it is brutal infrastructure facts that redraw the entire playing field for Swedish preparedness. 1. ENERGY IS A DESIGNATED TARGET FOR SABOTAGE The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly designate energy supply and submarine cables as sabotage targets in hybrid warfare. They state that Russia is continuously making preparations for sabotage. Säpo is equally uncompromising: "The sabotage threat from Russia is real." The consequence is inevitable. An LNG terminal on the coast or an international cable is no longer just an asset – it is an extremely vulnerable pinpoint target. Total defence is no longer chasing paper contracts, they demand geographical dispersion and physical redundancy. 2. SVENSKA KRAFTNÄT'S 15-MINUTE LIFELINE Sweden has already realized the need for decentralized survival power. Svenska kraftnät currently manages overloads with 20 strategically distributed gas turbines (1,300 MW) that can be started within 15 minutes when the grid is knocked out. The government notes that we have about 40 turbines in the country and is now investigating support for more. But when total defence is scaled up to handle physical attacks, the need for rapid, distributed backup power will explode. 3. A TURBINE WITHOUT DOMESTIC FUEL IS JUST STEEL Regardless of how many turbines are built, the defence equation falls on a single question: What happens when the fuel for all this distributed backup power must be transported in via ships to closed or sabotaged ports? This is where Siljansgasen becomes indispensable. Local, protected extraction inland, connected to geographically distributed turbines, provides immediate backup power when international import routes are cut off. CONCLUSION: SOU 2025:68 HAS ALREADY PROVIDED THE ANSWER The state's own inquiry (SOU 2025:68) establishes that commercial investments in Swedish natural gas must be permitted already in peacetime for us to have access to it when trade flows are disrupted. The inquiry's conclusion is explicit: the 2022 extraction ban must be completely abolished. When Sweden explicitly plans for Russian sabotage against critical energy infrastructure, a ban on Swedish energy extraction is defence policy idiocy. What is produced beneath Swedish soil gives the country a supply route that no foreign power can close.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    5.11.
    ·
    Although @mxrobban seems to be pulling the strings in this thread, it is important to understand today's realities and not fool oneself. Well, now we really must distinguish between what has actually been paid in and what will possibly come later. With the option premium of 3 öre that you state, the four have paid 30,000 kronor each. A total of 120,000 kronor. The remaining 4.96 million will only come if all options are exercised in the autumn of 2029. That hardly secures the cash position and peace of mind "all the way". To understand what we are actually talking about: Biokraft stated at the launch of Stockholm Bio-LNG in 2023 a project investment of approximately 330 MSEK. The capacity was 50 tonnes of liquefied gas per day. Igrene's previously presented ambition was 50,000 tonnes per year, corresponding to approximately 137 tonnes per day. The projects are not directly comparable. Biokraft's investment referred to an expansion at an existing biogas plant, and the cost cannot be scaled up proportionally. But it is a concrete Swedish reference showing the scale that the investments can have. In Mora, a financing plan must also include work on wells, production tests, gas collection and possible water management. Before major expansion capital can be justified, investors need reliable production profiles over several months: sustained gas flows, pressure development, water production and documented operating costs. A good flow during a short test is not the same as secured production over many years. And all of this presupposes that legislation opens up for extraction and that the necessary permits are in place. The board's option purchases may be a sign of faith in the future. But a significantly stronger message would have been to subscribe and pay for new shares already today and thereby provide the company with capital that can actually be used. Especially when the latest rights issue was not fully subscribed. Now they are paying a limited premium for the opportunity to invest more in 2029, if developments justify it. That is fully understandable from their perspective, but hardly the same as committing the full amount here and now. The company needs cash in hand, not potential money in three years. The subscription price of 1.24 kronor is an option condition. It is neither an independent valuation of the project nor proof of commercially extractable gas volumes. It goes without saying that one may be optimistic. But between 120,000 kronor in option premiums and a functioning LNG operation lies quite a substantial amount of work and a completely different capital requirement. Surely we can have some sense of proportion Source: Biokraft's press release on August 24, 2023.
    Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ColdAsIce, you are turning the industrial chronology completely upside down. You demand that hundreds of millions in fixed capital should be on the bank account before it is even legal to extract the gas. You are confusing the board incentive program with the financing of heavy infrastructure. Let us sort out the order. 1. THE OPTION PROGRAM IS NOT STEEL AND CONCRETE Nobody is claiming that 120 000 SEK in option premiums will build an LNG plant. The purpose of the program is to tie the board members' own wallets to the company's success. That four board members enter at maximum allocation with a pain threshold around 1.27 SEK (strike + premium), when the stock was at 0.38 SEK, is the relevant signal. It forces management to deliver fundamental, structural results in order to get their money back at all. 2. BIOKRAFT PROVES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPANY CASH AND INDUSTRIAL CAPEX Your reference to Biokraft is completely correct, and it shows exactly why your calculations are wrong. Heavy energy infrastructure in that size category is never financed by building a massive cash pile in advance via continuous new share issues from retail investors. It is financed via project financing, bank syndicates, industrial partners, and long-term customer contracts (off-take) where the industry commits to future volumes. But this heavy capital is never activated as long as there is a Swedish legal ban on extraction. 3. SOU 2025:68 DICTATES THE INDUSTRIAL CHRONOLOGY The state's own security of supply inquiry is crystal clear. If Sweden is to have the freedom of action to use domestic natural gas when international trade flows are disrupted, commercial actors must be able to invest in extraction already in peacetime. The inquiry therefore notes that the ban needs to be abolished if the government wants to create that freedom of action. The industrial chain is inescapable: 1. Legal opening (the ban is lifted according to SOU). 2. Verified production flows over time. 3. Investment decisions and large-scale project financing. You are practically demanding step 3 before step 1 is resolved. Between today's option premiums and a finished plant lies a massive amount of work, and it is precisely that legal and industrial preparatory work that management has now taken the financial responsibility to deliver. It is "skin in the game". The real gauge of value thereafter will be exactly what you are asking for: legal opening, sustainable production data, and thereafter industrial project financing.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, ​​eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.

Tarjoustasot

Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-

Viimeisimmät kaupat

AikaHintaMäärä
11 498
4 393
5 000
1 100
2 458

Huomioi, että vaikka osakkeisiin säästäminen on pitkällä aikavälillä tuottanut hyvin, tulevasta tuotosta ei ole takeita. On olemassa riski, että et saa sijoittamiasi varoja takaisin.

Rahastoja ja ETF:iä jotka omistavat osaketta

Mikään rahasto ei ilmoita osaketta kymmenen suurimman omistuksensa joukossa.

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2027 Q1 - tulosraportti
15.1.2027
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
16.10.
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
17.7.
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
8.4.
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti
16.1.
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti
17.10.2025

Välittäjätilasto

Ostaneet eniten

Ostaneet eniten
VälittäjäOstettuMyytyNettoSisäinen
Swedbank AB32 43256431 8680
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB26 250026 2500
SSW Market Making GmbH15 53525 917−10 3820
Avanza Bank AB30 90452 373−21 46910 340
Nordnet Bank AB24 26650 533−26 2670

Myyneet eniten

Myyneet eniten
VälittäjäOstettuMyytyNettoSisäinen
Nordnet Bank AB24 26650 533−26 2670
Avanza Bank AB30 90452 373−21 46910 340
SSW Market Making GmbH15 53525 917−10 3820
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB26 250026 2500
Swedbank AB32 43256431 8680
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
32 päivää sitten

Uutiset

AI
Viimeisin
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.

Yhtiötapahtumat

Datan lähde: Quartr
Seuraava tapahtuma
2027 Q1 - tulosraportti
15.1.2027
Menneet tapahtumat
2026 Q4 - tulosraportti
16.10.
2026 Q3 - tulosraportti
17.7.
2026 Q2 - tulosraportti
8.4.
2026 Q1 - tulosraportti
16.1.
2025 Q4 - tulosraportti
17.10.2025

Foorumi

Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6 t sitten
    ·
    @mxrobban @Lapplandgold MXRobban, those numbers can sound pretty impressive to people who don't have that good of a grasp on the gas industry. But if you just do a simple Google search, you'll see that IGRENE's old estimate for the Mora field was around 0.5–1 billion m³ of gas, so roughly 5.5–11 TWh. And then we're talking estimated resources, not any proven, commercially extractable reserves. To put it all into a bit of perspective: Norway produced 121.8 billion m³ of gas in 2025. The entire estimated resource of the Mora field thus corresponds to only 1.5–3 days of Norwegian gas production! And over in the US, in the Lower 48, they produced in December 2024 roughly 3.3 billion m³ of gas a day**, from a whole heck of a lot of wells. It goes without saying that you can find methane down in the bedrock. But from there to actually being able to show commercially extractable reserves, stable production, and a strategic energy supply, well, there's still quite a long way to go, buddy! Geological potential is one thing. Industrial reality is something completely different, you see!
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    11.11.
    ·
    POLAND'S LNG CRASH AND TOTAL DEFENSE DEMANDS: WHY THE EXTRACTION BAN MUST BE SCRAPPED An international contract worth 570 million euros has just collapsed. At the same time, the IEA warns of empty gas storage facilities in Europe, and NATO now classifies energy supply as a direct prerequisite for military defense capability. This is no longer a theoretical risk analysis. It is the brutal security-policy reality, and it forces a rethink regarding Swedish gas extraction. 1. POLAND PROVES WHY IMPORT CONTRACTS ARE PAPER TIGERS Yesterday (Nov 10), the Polish energy giant ORLEN announced that they are canceling a massive LNG agreement with QatarEnergy. The agreement would have secured 15.3 TWh of gas annually until 2034, but is now being scrapped due to force majeure and failed deliveries. How does ORLEN survive the crash? They state with ice-cold calm that their own domestic gas production covers the shortfall. Poland has built physical freedom of action. Sweden has banned its own. 2. NATO AND THE SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENSE Regardless of disruptions, the IEA warns (Nov 3) that Europe's gas storage could crash below 10 percent as early as March 2027. At the same time, NATO (Rutte/Birol, Nov 5) asserts that military mobility and the defense industry require secure energy infrastructure. This echoes directly in Swedish defense planning. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly point out energy infrastructure, ports, and underwater cables as designated sabotage targets. Paper contracts on LNG vessels do not protect a country when international supply chains are severed or ports are blockaded. Total defense requires physical redundancy inland, far from vulnerable coasts. 3. SOU 2025:68 IS THE LEGAL KEY The state's own supply preparedness inquiry points out precisely this vulnerability. If the government wants to create the freedom of action to use domestic gas when trade flows are disrupted, the extraction ban needs to be completely abolished. You do not drill, finance, or commission a gas field the same day international deliveries cease. The industrial base must be permitted and built up in peacetime. 4. SILJANSGASEN IS A STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESOURCE It is in this hard-as-stone context that Igrene's assets in the Siljan Ring must be valued. The geological base is already laid. The production wells (for example PB2) are drilled, the flows are tested, and the gas has been proven. To let this domestic, geographically protected energy resource remain locked behind an extraction ban from 2022 is defense-political idiocy when Europe's entire gas supply is rocking. Sweden's gas policy has been confronted with reality. When multi-billion contracts break and NATO demands energy security, domestic production is the only true preparedness.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    7.11.
    ·
    @mxrobban No, I am not reversing the chronology. I agree that project financing comes after the law is opened and production data is verified. My point is another: The company must survive and pay for well work, testing, and permits until then. That money is not in the cash register today. The latest rights issue was not fully subscribed, and the option premiums contribute 120 000 kronor. When the board bets on a law change at the same time as Mora is to be developed without a financing plan, then the math does not add up. Listen here, we should not let ourselves be dazzled by board member names, backgrounds, or options. It will be a damn mess, at best. @Lapplandgold summarizes it well: - High stakes, no guarantees.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ENERGY SUPPLY IS NOW A DESIGNATED SABOTAGE TARGET – TOTAL DEFENCE REQUIRES REDUNDANCY On November 5, the government decided on continued internal border control, with explicit reference to Russian hybrid threats and hostile actors on Swedish soil. This is not grand politics for diplomats – it is brutal infrastructure facts that redraw the entire playing field for Swedish preparedness. 1. ENERGY IS A DESIGNATED TARGET FOR SABOTAGE The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MCF) and the Swedish Armed Forces now explicitly designate energy supply and submarine cables as sabotage targets in hybrid warfare. They state that Russia is continuously making preparations for sabotage. Säpo is equally uncompromising: "The sabotage threat from Russia is real." The consequence is inevitable. An LNG terminal on the coast or an international cable is no longer just an asset – it is an extremely vulnerable pinpoint target. Total defence is no longer chasing paper contracts, they demand geographical dispersion and physical redundancy. 2. SVENSKA KRAFTNÄT'S 15-MINUTE LIFELINE Sweden has already realized the need for decentralized survival power. Svenska kraftnät currently manages overloads with 20 strategically distributed gas turbines (1,300 MW) that can be started within 15 minutes when the grid is knocked out. The government notes that we have about 40 turbines in the country and is now investigating support for more. But when total defence is scaled up to handle physical attacks, the need for rapid, distributed backup power will explode. 3. A TURBINE WITHOUT DOMESTIC FUEL IS JUST STEEL Regardless of how many turbines are built, the defence equation falls on a single question: What happens when the fuel for all this distributed backup power must be transported in via ships to closed or sabotaged ports? This is where Siljansgasen becomes indispensable. Local, protected extraction inland, connected to geographically distributed turbines, provides immediate backup power when international import routes are cut off. CONCLUSION: SOU 2025:68 HAS ALREADY PROVIDED THE ANSWER The state's own inquiry (SOU 2025:68) establishes that commercial investments in Swedish natural gas must be permitted already in peacetime for us to have access to it when trade flows are disrupted. The inquiry's conclusion is explicit: the 2022 extraction ban must be completely abolished. When Sweden explicitly plans for Russian sabotage against critical energy infrastructure, a ban on Swedish energy extraction is defence policy idiocy. What is produced beneath Swedish soil gives the country a supply route that no foreign power can close.
  • Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    5.11.
    ·
    Although @mxrobban seems to be pulling the strings in this thread, it is important to understand today's realities and not fool oneself. Well, now we really must distinguish between what has actually been paid in and what will possibly come later. With the option premium of 3 öre that you state, the four have paid 30,000 kronor each. A total of 120,000 kronor. The remaining 4.96 million will only come if all options are exercised in the autumn of 2029. That hardly secures the cash position and peace of mind "all the way". To understand what we are actually talking about: Biokraft stated at the launch of Stockholm Bio-LNG in 2023 a project investment of approximately 330 MSEK. The capacity was 50 tonnes of liquefied gas per day. Igrene's previously presented ambition was 50,000 tonnes per year, corresponding to approximately 137 tonnes per day. The projects are not directly comparable. Biokraft's investment referred to an expansion at an existing biogas plant, and the cost cannot be scaled up proportionally. But it is a concrete Swedish reference showing the scale that the investments can have. In Mora, a financing plan must also include work on wells, production tests, gas collection and possible water management. Before major expansion capital can be justified, investors need reliable production profiles over several months: sustained gas flows, pressure development, water production and documented operating costs. A good flow during a short test is not the same as secured production over many years. And all of this presupposes that legislation opens up for extraction and that the necessary permits are in place. The board's option purchases may be a sign of faith in the future. But a significantly stronger message would have been to subscribe and pay for new shares already today and thereby provide the company with capital that can actually be used. Especially when the latest rights issue was not fully subscribed. Now they are paying a limited premium for the opportunity to invest more in 2029, if developments justify it. That is fully understandable from their perspective, but hardly the same as committing the full amount here and now. The company needs cash in hand, not potential money in three years. The subscription price of 1.24 kronor is an option condition. It is neither an independent valuation of the project nor proof of commercially extractable gas volumes. It goes without saying that one may be optimistic. But between 120,000 kronor in option premiums and a functioning LNG operation lies quite a substantial amount of work and a completely different capital requirement. Surely we can have some sense of proportion Source: Biokraft's press release on August 24, 2023.
    Käyttäjän profiilikuva
    6.11.
    ·
    ColdAsIce, you are turning the industrial chronology completely upside down. You demand that hundreds of millions in fixed capital should be on the bank account before it is even legal to extract the gas. You are confusing the board incentive program with the financing of heavy infrastructure. Let us sort out the order. 1. THE OPTION PROGRAM IS NOT STEEL AND CONCRETE Nobody is claiming that 120 000 SEK in option premiums will build an LNG plant. The purpose of the program is to tie the board members' own wallets to the company's success. That four board members enter at maximum allocation with a pain threshold around 1.27 SEK (strike + premium), when the stock was at 0.38 SEK, is the relevant signal. It forces management to deliver fundamental, structural results in order to get their money back at all. 2. BIOKRAFT PROVES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPANY CASH AND INDUSTRIAL CAPEX Your reference to Biokraft is completely correct, and it shows exactly why your calculations are wrong. Heavy energy infrastructure in that size category is never financed by building a massive cash pile in advance via continuous new share issues from retail investors. It is financed via project financing, bank syndicates, industrial partners, and long-term customer contracts (off-take) where the industry commits to future volumes. But this heavy capital is never activated as long as there is a Swedish legal ban on extraction. 3. SOU 2025:68 DICTATES THE INDUSTRIAL CHRONOLOGY The state's own security of supply inquiry is crystal clear. If Sweden is to have the freedom of action to use domestic natural gas when international trade flows are disrupted, commercial actors must be able to invest in extraction already in peacetime. The inquiry therefore notes that the ban needs to be abolished if the government wants to create that freedom of action. The industrial chain is inescapable: 1. Legal opening (the ban is lifted according to SOU). 2. Verified production flows over time. 3. Investment decisions and large-scale project financing. You are practically demanding step 3 before step 1 is resolved. Between today's option premiums and a finished plant lies a massive amount of work, and it is precisely that legal and industrial preparatory work that management has now taken the financial responsibility to deliver. It is "skin in the game". The real gauge of value thereafter will be exactly what you are asking for: legal opening, sustainable production data, and thereafter industrial project financing.
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