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MST World Energy-rahasto pyrkii US-dollarimääräiseen arvonnousuun sijoittamalla maailmanlaajuisesti listattuihin yrityksiin, joiden liikevaihdosta merkittävä osuus koostuu energian tutkimuksesta, kehittämisestä, tuotannosta tai jakelusta. Rahasto sijoittaa myös yrityksiin, jotka pyrkivät kehittämään uusia teknologioita energian tuottamisessa tai etsimään vaihtoehtoisia energiamuotoja.
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Päivitetty 28.2.2026
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·8 t sittenTherefore, the oil price will not return to $60–70 — even if the war ends Much of the market commentary this week is about daily price fluctuations: Brent above $119 intraday, back to $108 at closing time after Netanyahu's statements about the opening of Hormuz. But the focus on short-term movements overshadows a more important question — namely where the bottom of oil prices now lies, regardless of the conflict's development. The answer, according to a number of leading analysts, is that we will not see $60–70 again for a very long time. Before the war started on February 28, Brent traded in precisely that range — around $69 per barrel. J.P. Morgan then had a bearish base scenario of $60 as the average price for 2026, justified by oversupplied global supply. That scenario is now fundamentally changed, and not just because Hormuz is closed. The critical insight comes from Rystad Energy and Societe Generale, both of whom point out that Middle Eastern production is not just temporarily affected by logistics — it is in the process of shutting in. Iraq and Kuwait have already cut production because storage capacity in the Gulf is full. UAE is the next candidate, according to Societe Generale's analysts. Amir Zaman, head of Americas commercial team at Rystad, emphasizes that fields that are shut down can take «days, weeks or months» to reopen to normal levels — even after the conflict itself is over. Dan Pickering, founder and CIO of Pickering Energy Partners, formulates it precisely: «We are moving from a supply chain problem to potentially a supply problem. There is a big difference. You solve supply chain problems quickly. If you change the ability to produce, that's something else.» To this, CSIS and the World Economic Forum add a structural point: The IEA's historic emergency release of 400 million barrels — the largest ever — represents barely four days of global consumption, and less than three weeks of normal throughput through Hormuz. Emergency reserves buy time, they do not solve the deficit. Even among the most optimistic voices, such as Sasha Foss at Marex, the conclusion is that «even with de-escalation, it is unlikely that prices will return to the $60–70 range seen earlier this year.» Paul Gooden, head of global natural resources at Ninety One, shares this assessment: even in a scenario where tensions subside in the coming weeks, prices will remain structurally higher than the initial level. For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy A2, this means that the downside risk of a quick peace agreement is more limited than many might fear. It is not $65 Brent that awaits on the other side — it is a market that has had its geopolitical risk model permanently rewritten. The question is no longer whether we return to the old price level, but where the new structural floor is located. Discussion question: Do you think the market is pricing in a permanent new price floor for Brent, or are investors still underestimating how quickly production normalization can occur after the opening of Hormuz? This post is written for informational purposes and is not to be considered investment advice. Investments in funds involve risk, and historical returns are no guarantee of future returns. Sources: ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.html ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/09/oil-prices-iran-war-middle-east-us-israel-strait-of-hormuz.html ∙ https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/15/strategic-oil-release-may-calm-markets-but-cannot-fix-hormuz-disruption ∙ https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/03/the-global-price-tag-of-war-in-the-middle-east ∙ https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-iran-war-mean-global-energy-markets- ·22 t sitten · MuokattuEnergy infrastructure is the main target — and that changes everything What has long been an informal boundary in the Middle East conflict may now have been breached. According to several international media outlets, Israel carried out an airstrike on March 18 against South Pars, the world's largest natural gas field. The same evening, Iran responded with a ballistic missile attack against Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar, the world's largest LNG export facility. Several missiles were intercepted, but one is said to have hit the facility and caused significant damage. This points to more than an escalation. It could be a strategic turning point. Researcher Hamidreza Azizi at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that the conflict has now entered a phase where energy infrastructure is a primary target. The attack on South Pars strikes at the core of Iran's economy, while Iran's response can be interpreted as an attempt to regionalize the conflict and simultaneously globalize the consequences through energy markets. Markets reacted immediately. Brent rose sharply at the opening in Asia, European gas prices jumped, and Asian stock markets fell. Dagens Næringsliv describes the situation as a possible worst-case scenario for the gas market, with increasing concern for supply security and price volatility. The ripple effects are already visible. Iraq reports a halt in Iranian gas deliveries, threatening the power supply. In Abu Dhabi, the Habshan facility was temporarily shut down after incidents related to downed missiles. At the same time, the risk in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing, where around 20 percent of the world's seaborne oil trade passes. Harsh signals are also coming from the American side. Donald Trump has warned of strong retaliations if energy infrastructure in the region is further attacked. For investors, this could mark a regime change. We are moving away from a market where geopolitical risk is primarily priced into the margins, to a market where production capacity itself is at stake. BGF World Energy Fund is exposed to integrated energy companies across production, transport, and processing. In the short term, higher prices support earnings. At the same time, the risk of lasting disruptions in supply chains, higher insurance premiums, and delays in new investment projects increases. There are particularly three factors the market must now price in: Firstly: increased probability of direct attacks on critical energy infrastructure, which could lead to persistent supply shocks. Secondly: higher capital costs and insurance premiums in the Gulf, which could slow new capacity over time. Thirdly: a more lasting geopolitical risk premium in both oil and gas markets, not as a temporary factor, but as a structural component. The question, therefore, is not just what is happening now, but what this means in the longer term. If energy infrastructure becomes a legitimate target in interstate conflicts, it could change the investment dynamics in the energy sector in the years to come and contribute to a higher and more volatile price level. ⸻ This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Sources: https://www.dn.no/utenriks/iran/usa/energipanikk-etter-iransk-angrep-pa-gigant-det-gassmarkedet-frykter-mest/2-1-1962356https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.htmlhttps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/qatar-says-iran-missile-attack-sparks-fire-causes-damage-at-gas-facilityhttps://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-israel-united-states-attacks-9.7132837https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890393
- ·1 päivä sittenHouthi rebels can join in — and that can change everything The war between Iran and USA/Israel has until now primarily played out in the airspace over the Persian Gulf and at the energy facilities along the Gulf. But there is one actor who has not yet been fully unleashed: Yemen's Houthi rebels. DNB Carnegie's energy analyst Helge André Martinsen points today to a scenario that many energy investors should note: if Iran wishes to escalate further and block the redirection of shipping traffic from the Red Sea, we could start to see drone attacks from the Houthis, who until now have stayed on the sidelines. This is not a hypothetical scenario — it is a logical consequence of the escalation dynamic we already see. Iran's attack on Ras Laffan has already inflicted «extensive damage» on the enormous LNG complex in Qatar,  and QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on all LNG deliveries — which in practice removed 20 percent of the world's LNG supply from the market overnight.  For the first time in modern history, both of the Middle East's major maritime corridors are blocked simultaneously. The Red Sea route to Europe is already operating at less than half of normal capacity, while the Strait of Hormuz — which transports 20 percent of the world's daily oil supply — is effectively closed.  If the Houthis now actively enter the conflict with drone attacks against shipping traffic in the Red Sea and against energy infrastructure along the Arabian Peninsula, this will put further pressure on an already strained global energy market. Oil and gas are traded today as if the market is pricing in more unrest, not less — the oil price has risen sharply and is now trading above 107 dollars a barrel,  and European gas prices jumped almost 50 percent after QatarEnergy's operational halt.  For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy, this is a double-edged picture: higher energy prices provide increased revenues for producers, but escalated conflict also increases the risk of supply disruptions that can affect the very basis of operations. It is no longer just geopolitical background noise — it is core risk. The question the market is now asking itself: will the Houthis be held back by Iran as a diplomatic card, or will they be unleashed as an escalation tool if the USA and Israel increase the pressure further? This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Source: E24 – Attack at Ras Laffan | Al Jazeera | Bloomberg What do you think — will the Houthis escalate, or will Iran hold them back as a bargaining chip?
·17 t sittenHow many drones do the Houthis have? Are we talking about 50, or several thousand?·16 t sittenThe Houthi arsenal and Hormuz: When cheap drones threaten the world's most expensive oil route It is easy to underestimate the Houthis. A poor rebel movement from Yemen's mountainous regions, without an airbase, without a navy of significance — and yet they have succeeded in crippling some of the world's most important energy infrastructure for over two years. The question many are now asking is: what happens when the same Iran-backed drone technologies encounter an even narrower and more vulnerable route than the Red Sea? The Houthis do not have 50 drones. According to available analyses from organizations like GTTAC, the group alone carried out 388 documented drone attacks between 2018 and 2024, and the pace has accelerated significantly since then. They operate a growing arsenal of at least eight drone models — from the Qasef-family kamikaze drones to the long-range Sammad-3 models with a range of over 1 500 km, the latter used in the attack on Tel Aviv in 2024. In addition, they use Iranian Shahed 136 drones, identical to those Russia uses in Ukraine. The drones are partly imported from Iran and partly assembled from local and commercial components — which makes their stockpiles much harder to deplete through air strikes alone. The Americans have bombed over 30 Houthi targets in March 2025 alone, without the frequency of attacks decreasing notably. This is the background for why the Houthis are now relevant again — not only in the Red Sea, but as an actor in a broader escalation dynamic around Hormuz. Since the American and Israeli operation against Iran on 28 February 2026, when, among others, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, the Houthis have resumed attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is formally Iran's domain, not the Houthis' — but the combination of IRGC drones, mine risk, anti-ship missiles, and Houthi attacks further south creates a combined logistics threat profile of historical dimensions. Around 20 percent of the world's daily oil consumption passes through Hormuz, and about 31 percent of all seaborne crude oil. Insurance premiums for tankers have multiplied since the conflict broke out, and several major shipping companies have suspended transit. Analyst Alessio Patalano at King’s College London points out that the navies' capacity depth is a fraction of what it was in the 1980s — the last time tanker escort in Hormuz was tested in combat. Lloyd’s List Intelligence chief Richard Meade estimates that a basic escort operation would require between eight and ten destroyers to protect a convoy of five to ten ships per transit, which at best could restore about ten percent of normal traffic. Even Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, now offers contributions in the form of cheap interception drones and battlefield experience from three years of Russian Shahed attacks. The strategic picture is thus the following: the Houthis were a proof-of-concept that a non-state actor environment with Iranian backing can use mass-produced, inexpensive drones to drive insurance premiums sky-high, force shipping companies to Cape of Good Hope detours, and tie up Western naval forces over time. Iran possesses a far more advanced variant of the same arsenal — and controls both shores of the narrowest point in the world's most important energy corridor. Geopolitical risk has not been higher since the tanker war in the 1980s, and the oil market still does not fully price in a scenario where Hormuz remains effectively closed for months rather than weeks. Discussion question: Do you think the West has the military capacity and political will to keep Hormuz open in the long term — or are we already in a period where geopolitical risk premium will be structurally repriced into the energy market? Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. The author has an exposure to the energy sector through BGF World Energy A2. All investment involves risk of loss. Sources: Orion Policy Institute – The Houthi Drone Supply Chain (2025) https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain/ Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis CNBC – Strait of Hormuz closure: which countries will be hit the most (March 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/strait-of-hormuz-closure-which-countries-will-be-hit-the-most.html CNN / Lloyd’s List Intelligence – Hormuz naval escort analysis (March 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/16/middleeast/hormuz-strait-us-navy-escorts-analysis-intl-hnk-ml Military.com / AP – Iran war has blocked the Strait of Hormuz (March 2026) https://www.military.com/daily-news/2026/03/11/iran-war-has-blocked-strait-of-hormuz-vital-oil-chokepoint-reopening-it-big-challenge.html Fox News – NATO heavyweights balk at Hormuz mission (March 2026) https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nato-heavyweights-balk-hormuz-mission-trump-warns-alliance-risk - 1 päivä sitten1 päivä sittenRas Laffan in Flames – and BGF World Energy Is About Far More Than Oil On 18 March 2026, QatarEnergy confirmed that Ras Laffan Industrial City – the world’s largest LNG export facility – had been struck by Iranian drones for the second time. The attack came hours after a fresh Iranian strike on the South Pars gas field, and Iran has now published a target list explicitly naming energy installations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This is no longer an escalation on the periphery of energy markets. It is a direct strike on the architecture of global energy infrastructure. As early as 2 March, QatarEnergy suspended all LNG production following the first Iranian drone strikes on Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial City. The facility alone accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the world’s total LNG exports. The market’s response was immediate: European wholesale gas prices rose by more than 50 per cent on the day – the sharpest single-session move since the energy crisis of 2022. Asian LNG prices jumped by nearly 40 per cent. Brent crude is now trading above $107 per barrel. Qatar’s energy minister has made clear that restarting production could take weeks to months, even if hostilities were to cease today. Analysts at Energy Intelligence estimate a minimum outage of four to six weeks. At least eight LNG tankers have already been diverted, and Asian importers – Japan, South Korea, and China among them – are now competing openly with European buyers for spot cargoes on global markets. The United States stands to benefit in the near term, with demand for American LNG rising sharply. For an investor in BGF World Energy A2, this landscape is of direct relevance. The fund invests at least 70 per cent of its assets globally in equities of companies engaged in the exploration, development, production, and distribution of energy, using the MSCI World Energy Index as its reference benchmark. A sustained supply crisis of this magnitude provides structural tailwinds for large integrated oil majors, American LNG producers such as Cheniere Energy, and offshore services companies benefiting from elevated capacity pricing. BGF World Energy A2 is positioned to capture precisely this kind of repricing of risk across the global energy system. What is unfolding in the Gulf is not a transient price spike. It is a fundamental rewriting of what energy security costs. Ras Laffan was constructed as a cornerstone of international LNG trade. When that cornerstone is shaken, it is not merely gas that gets repriced – the entire infrastructure value chain around fossil energy absorbs a geopolitical risk premium not seen since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Discussion question: Do you believe energy markets have already priced in a prolonged production outage in Qatar, or is the market still underestimating the duration of this conflict? This represents personal analysis and does not constitute financial advice. Always invest at your own risk. Sources: ∙ E24 – Attack on Ras Laffan: https://e24.no/internasjonal-oekonomi/i/QJM0jP/angrep-ved-det-enorme-lng-anlegget-ras-laffan-i-qatar-omfattende-skade ∙ Al Jazeera – QatarEnergy halts LNG production: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/qatarenergy-worlds-largest-lng-firm-halts-production-after-iran-attacks ∙ OilPrice.com – Qatar’s LNG Blackout: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Qatars-LNG-Blackout-Just-Broke-the-Global-Gas-Market.html ∙ Fortune – Qatar’s energy minister warns: https://fortune.com/2026/03/06/qatar-lng-halts-exports-iran-conflict-facility-shuttered/ ∙ OilPrice.com – Asia’s LNG Lifeline: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Asias-LNG-Lifeline-Takes-a-Hit.html ∙ BlackRock – BGF World Energy Fund A2: https://www.blackrock.com/uk/individual/products/229918/blackrock-world-energy-a2-usd-fund
- ·1 päivä sittenBGF World Energy and Equinor: Who profits most from the Iran conflict – and why the Permian Basin is the market's safety valve Energy markets are in strong imbalance after the latest escalation in the Middle East. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is not physically blocked, but high risk, increased insurance costs, and attacks on ships have significantly reduced the flow. The result is a strong supply shock in an already tight oil market. For Norwegian investors, there are two main ways to get exposure: directly through Equinor, or via the BGF World Energy Fund, which gathers some of the world's largest energy companies. Equinor: price winner in the European gas market Equinor is a key supplier of pipeline gas to Europe and holds a unique position when the LNG market is characterized by disruptions. A significant portion of global LNG exports normally passes through Hormuz – when this flow is disrupted, the value of alternative deliveries increases. The upside is nevertheless primarily price-driven: the company has limited capacity to increase production in the short term. BGF World Energy: exposure to global winners BGF World Energy Fund provides broader exposure. Among the most important positions, we find Chevron and ExxonMobil, heavily exposed to the Permian Basin, ConocoPhillips with high oil price sensitivity, Shell and TotalEnergies with global LNG reach, and Canadian producers with low geopolitical risk. Common to several is that they operate far from the conflict zone. Permian Basin: the market's safety valve The most important distinction is about flexibility. The Permian Basin can quickly adjust production according to price – and thus functions as a safety valve in the global market. Here lies an interesting paradox: the companies that profit most from high prices simultaneously help to dampen them in the long run. Who profits most? In the short term, much points towards Equinor, which gets a direct effect from higher energy prices in Europe. In the longer term, the picture may tip towards Chevron and ExxonMobil, where flexible production in Permian makes it possible to exploit high prices and increase volumes. The winner depends on the time horizon: Equinor is the price winner – the volume engine is in the USA. This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Kilder: https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/03/17/iran-war-europes-corporate-winners-and-losers-revealedhttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/equinor-sees-little-space-to-lift-gas-output-to-ease-war-impacthttps://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/middle-east-war-gas-energy-lng-drone-qatar-strait-hormuz-price-shock.htmlhttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-6-the-permian-fortress-chevron-surges-23-as-us-onshore-assets-shield-investors-from-middle-east-conflicthttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-18-global-energy-markets-in-turmoil-as-strait-of-hormuz-closure-sends-oil-toward-120https://www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261647438-iran-war-hormuz-oil-price-surge-us-energy-stocks-tradingkeyhttps://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Shell-and-TotalEnergies-Issue-Force-Majeure-After-Qatar-LNG-Shut-Down.htmlhttps://www.blackrock.com/fi/individual/products/229673/blackrock-world-energy-fund-a2-fund Discussion: Equinor primarily profits from higher prices, while American companies can increase production and simultaneously help to dampen the price increase. Which model do you think will provide the best return going forward?
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- Avaintietoasiakirja
Tietoa rahastosta
MST World Energy-rahasto pyrkii US-dollarimääräiseen arvonnousuun sijoittamalla maailmanlaajuisesti listattuihin yrityksiin, joiden liikevaihdosta merkittävä osuus koostuu energian tutkimuksesta, kehittämisestä, tuotannosta tai jakelusta. Rahasto sijoittaa myös yrityksiin, jotka pyrkivät kehittämään uusia teknologioita energian tuottamisessa tai etsimään vaihtoehtoisia energiamuotoja.
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Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
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Päivitetty 28.2.2026
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- ·8 t sittenTherefore, the oil price will not return to $60–70 — even if the war ends Much of the market commentary this week is about daily price fluctuations: Brent above $119 intraday, back to $108 at closing time after Netanyahu's statements about the opening of Hormuz. But the focus on short-term movements overshadows a more important question — namely where the bottom of oil prices now lies, regardless of the conflict's development. The answer, according to a number of leading analysts, is that we will not see $60–70 again for a very long time. Before the war started on February 28, Brent traded in precisely that range — around $69 per barrel. J.P. Morgan then had a bearish base scenario of $60 as the average price for 2026, justified by oversupplied global supply. That scenario is now fundamentally changed, and not just because Hormuz is closed. The critical insight comes from Rystad Energy and Societe Generale, both of whom point out that Middle Eastern production is not just temporarily affected by logistics — it is in the process of shutting in. Iraq and Kuwait have already cut production because storage capacity in the Gulf is full. UAE is the next candidate, according to Societe Generale's analysts. Amir Zaman, head of Americas commercial team at Rystad, emphasizes that fields that are shut down can take «days, weeks or months» to reopen to normal levels — even after the conflict itself is over. Dan Pickering, founder and CIO of Pickering Energy Partners, formulates it precisely: «We are moving from a supply chain problem to potentially a supply problem. There is a big difference. You solve supply chain problems quickly. If you change the ability to produce, that's something else.» To this, CSIS and the World Economic Forum add a structural point: The IEA's historic emergency release of 400 million barrels — the largest ever — represents barely four days of global consumption, and less than three weeks of normal throughput through Hormuz. Emergency reserves buy time, they do not solve the deficit. Even among the most optimistic voices, such as Sasha Foss at Marex, the conclusion is that «even with de-escalation, it is unlikely that prices will return to the $60–70 range seen earlier this year.» Paul Gooden, head of global natural resources at Ninety One, shares this assessment: even in a scenario where tensions subside in the coming weeks, prices will remain structurally higher than the initial level. For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy A2, this means that the downside risk of a quick peace agreement is more limited than many might fear. It is not $65 Brent that awaits on the other side — it is a market that has had its geopolitical risk model permanently rewritten. The question is no longer whether we return to the old price level, but where the new structural floor is located. Discussion question: Do you think the market is pricing in a permanent new price floor for Brent, or are investors still underestimating how quickly production normalization can occur after the opening of Hormuz? This post is written for informational purposes and is not to be considered investment advice. Investments in funds involve risk, and historical returns are no guarantee of future returns. Sources: ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.html ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/09/oil-prices-iran-war-middle-east-us-israel-strait-of-hormuz.html ∙ https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/15/strategic-oil-release-may-calm-markets-but-cannot-fix-hormuz-disruption ∙ https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/03/the-global-price-tag-of-war-in-the-middle-east ∙ https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-iran-war-mean-global-energy-markets
- ·22 t sitten · MuokattuEnergy infrastructure is the main target — and that changes everything What has long been an informal boundary in the Middle East conflict may now have been breached. According to several international media outlets, Israel carried out an airstrike on March 18 against South Pars, the world's largest natural gas field. The same evening, Iran responded with a ballistic missile attack against Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar, the world's largest LNG export facility. Several missiles were intercepted, but one is said to have hit the facility and caused significant damage. This points to more than an escalation. It could be a strategic turning point. Researcher Hamidreza Azizi at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that the conflict has now entered a phase where energy infrastructure is a primary target. The attack on South Pars strikes at the core of Iran's economy, while Iran's response can be interpreted as an attempt to regionalize the conflict and simultaneously globalize the consequences through energy markets. Markets reacted immediately. Brent rose sharply at the opening in Asia, European gas prices jumped, and Asian stock markets fell. Dagens Næringsliv describes the situation as a possible worst-case scenario for the gas market, with increasing concern for supply security and price volatility. The ripple effects are already visible. Iraq reports a halt in Iranian gas deliveries, threatening the power supply. In Abu Dhabi, the Habshan facility was temporarily shut down after incidents related to downed missiles. At the same time, the risk in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing, where around 20 percent of the world's seaborne oil trade passes. Harsh signals are also coming from the American side. Donald Trump has warned of strong retaliations if energy infrastructure in the region is further attacked. For investors, this could mark a regime change. We are moving away from a market where geopolitical risk is primarily priced into the margins, to a market where production capacity itself is at stake. BGF World Energy Fund is exposed to integrated energy companies across production, transport, and processing. In the short term, higher prices support earnings. At the same time, the risk of lasting disruptions in supply chains, higher insurance premiums, and delays in new investment projects increases. There are particularly three factors the market must now price in: Firstly: increased probability of direct attacks on critical energy infrastructure, which could lead to persistent supply shocks. Secondly: higher capital costs and insurance premiums in the Gulf, which could slow new capacity over time. Thirdly: a more lasting geopolitical risk premium in both oil and gas markets, not as a temporary factor, but as a structural component. The question, therefore, is not just what is happening now, but what this means in the longer term. If energy infrastructure becomes a legitimate target in interstate conflicts, it could change the investment dynamics in the energy sector in the years to come and contribute to a higher and more volatile price level. ⸻ This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Sources: https://www.dn.no/utenriks/iran/usa/energipanikk-etter-iransk-angrep-pa-gigant-det-gassmarkedet-frykter-mest/2-1-1962356https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.htmlhttps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/qatar-says-iran-missile-attack-sparks-fire-causes-damage-at-gas-facilityhttps://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-israel-united-states-attacks-9.7132837https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890393
- ·1 päivä sittenHouthi rebels can join in — and that can change everything The war between Iran and USA/Israel has until now primarily played out in the airspace over the Persian Gulf and at the energy facilities along the Gulf. But there is one actor who has not yet been fully unleashed: Yemen's Houthi rebels. DNB Carnegie's energy analyst Helge André Martinsen points today to a scenario that many energy investors should note: if Iran wishes to escalate further and block the redirection of shipping traffic from the Red Sea, we could start to see drone attacks from the Houthis, who until now have stayed on the sidelines. This is not a hypothetical scenario — it is a logical consequence of the escalation dynamic we already see. Iran's attack on Ras Laffan has already inflicted «extensive damage» on the enormous LNG complex in Qatar,  and QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on all LNG deliveries — which in practice removed 20 percent of the world's LNG supply from the market overnight.  For the first time in modern history, both of the Middle East's major maritime corridors are blocked simultaneously. The Red Sea route to Europe is already operating at less than half of normal capacity, while the Strait of Hormuz — which transports 20 percent of the world's daily oil supply — is effectively closed.  If the Houthis now actively enter the conflict with drone attacks against shipping traffic in the Red Sea and against energy infrastructure along the Arabian Peninsula, this will put further pressure on an already strained global energy market. Oil and gas are traded today as if the market is pricing in more unrest, not less — the oil price has risen sharply and is now trading above 107 dollars a barrel,  and European gas prices jumped almost 50 percent after QatarEnergy's operational halt.  For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy, this is a double-edged picture: higher energy prices provide increased revenues for producers, but escalated conflict also increases the risk of supply disruptions that can affect the very basis of operations. It is no longer just geopolitical background noise — it is core risk. The question the market is now asking itself: will the Houthis be held back by Iran as a diplomatic card, or will they be unleashed as an escalation tool if the USA and Israel increase the pressure further? This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Source: E24 – Attack at Ras Laffan | Al Jazeera | Bloomberg What do you think — will the Houthis escalate, or will Iran hold them back as a bargaining chip?·17 t sittenHow many drones do the Houthis have? Are we talking about 50, or several thousand?·16 t sittenThe Houthi arsenal and Hormuz: When cheap drones threaten the world's most expensive oil route It is easy to underestimate the Houthis. A poor rebel movement from Yemen's mountainous regions, without an airbase, without a navy of significance — and yet they have succeeded in crippling some of the world's most important energy infrastructure for over two years. The question many are now asking is: what happens when the same Iran-backed drone technologies encounter an even narrower and more vulnerable route than the Red Sea? The Houthis do not have 50 drones. According to available analyses from organizations like GTTAC, the group alone carried out 388 documented drone attacks between 2018 and 2024, and the pace has accelerated significantly since then. They operate a growing arsenal of at least eight drone models — from the Qasef-family kamikaze drones to the long-range Sammad-3 models with a range of over 1 500 km, the latter used in the attack on Tel Aviv in 2024. In addition, they use Iranian Shahed 136 drones, identical to those Russia uses in Ukraine. The drones are partly imported from Iran and partly assembled from local and commercial components — which makes their stockpiles much harder to deplete through air strikes alone. The Americans have bombed over 30 Houthi targets in March 2025 alone, without the frequency of attacks decreasing notably. This is the background for why the Houthis are now relevant again — not only in the Red Sea, but as an actor in a broader escalation dynamic around Hormuz. Since the American and Israeli operation against Iran on 28 February 2026, when, among others, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, the Houthis have resumed attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is formally Iran's domain, not the Houthis' — but the combination of IRGC drones, mine risk, anti-ship missiles, and Houthi attacks further south creates a combined logistics threat profile of historical dimensions. Around 20 percent of the world's daily oil consumption passes through Hormuz, and about 31 percent of all seaborne crude oil. Insurance premiums for tankers have multiplied since the conflict broke out, and several major shipping companies have suspended transit. Analyst Alessio Patalano at King’s College London points out that the navies' capacity depth is a fraction of what it was in the 1980s — the last time tanker escort in Hormuz was tested in combat. Lloyd’s List Intelligence chief Richard Meade estimates that a basic escort operation would require between eight and ten destroyers to protect a convoy of five to ten ships per transit, which at best could restore about ten percent of normal traffic. Even Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, now offers contributions in the form of cheap interception drones and battlefield experience from three years of Russian Shahed attacks. The strategic picture is thus the following: the Houthis were a proof-of-concept that a non-state actor environment with Iranian backing can use mass-produced, inexpensive drones to drive insurance premiums sky-high, force shipping companies to Cape of Good Hope detours, and tie up Western naval forces over time. Iran possesses a far more advanced variant of the same arsenal — and controls both shores of the narrowest point in the world's most important energy corridor. Geopolitical risk has not been higher since the tanker war in the 1980s, and the oil market still does not fully price in a scenario where Hormuz remains effectively closed for months rather than weeks. Discussion question: Do you think the West has the military capacity and political will to keep Hormuz open in the long term — or are we already in a period where geopolitical risk premium will be structurally repriced into the energy market? Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. The author has an exposure to the energy sector through BGF World Energy A2. All investment involves risk of loss. Sources: Orion Policy Institute – The Houthi Drone Supply Chain (2025) https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain/ Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis CNBC – Strait of Hormuz closure: which countries will be hit the most (March 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/strait-of-hormuz-closure-which-countries-will-be-hit-the-most.html CNN / Lloyd’s List Intelligence – Hormuz naval escort analysis (March 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/16/middleeast/hormuz-strait-us-navy-escorts-analysis-intl-hnk-ml Military.com / AP – Iran war has blocked the Strait of Hormuz (March 2026) https://www.military.com/daily-news/2026/03/11/iran-war-has-blocked-strait-of-hormuz-vital-oil-chokepoint-reopening-it-big-challenge.html Fox News – NATO heavyweights balk at Hormuz mission (March 2026) https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nato-heavyweights-balk-hormuz-mission-trump-warns-alliance-risk
- 1 päivä sitten1 päivä sittenRas Laffan in Flames – and BGF World Energy Is About Far More Than Oil On 18 March 2026, QatarEnergy confirmed that Ras Laffan Industrial City – the world’s largest LNG export facility – had been struck by Iranian drones for the second time. The attack came hours after a fresh Iranian strike on the South Pars gas field, and Iran has now published a target list explicitly naming energy installations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This is no longer an escalation on the periphery of energy markets. It is a direct strike on the architecture of global energy infrastructure. As early as 2 March, QatarEnergy suspended all LNG production following the first Iranian drone strikes on Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial City. The facility alone accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the world’s total LNG exports. The market’s response was immediate: European wholesale gas prices rose by more than 50 per cent on the day – the sharpest single-session move since the energy crisis of 2022. Asian LNG prices jumped by nearly 40 per cent. Brent crude is now trading above $107 per barrel. Qatar’s energy minister has made clear that restarting production could take weeks to months, even if hostilities were to cease today. Analysts at Energy Intelligence estimate a minimum outage of four to six weeks. At least eight LNG tankers have already been diverted, and Asian importers – Japan, South Korea, and China among them – are now competing openly with European buyers for spot cargoes on global markets. The United States stands to benefit in the near term, with demand for American LNG rising sharply. For an investor in BGF World Energy A2, this landscape is of direct relevance. The fund invests at least 70 per cent of its assets globally in equities of companies engaged in the exploration, development, production, and distribution of energy, using the MSCI World Energy Index as its reference benchmark. A sustained supply crisis of this magnitude provides structural tailwinds for large integrated oil majors, American LNG producers such as Cheniere Energy, and offshore services companies benefiting from elevated capacity pricing. BGF World Energy A2 is positioned to capture precisely this kind of repricing of risk across the global energy system. What is unfolding in the Gulf is not a transient price spike. It is a fundamental rewriting of what energy security costs. Ras Laffan was constructed as a cornerstone of international LNG trade. When that cornerstone is shaken, it is not merely gas that gets repriced – the entire infrastructure value chain around fossil energy absorbs a geopolitical risk premium not seen since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Discussion question: Do you believe energy markets have already priced in a prolonged production outage in Qatar, or is the market still underestimating the duration of this conflict? This represents personal analysis and does not constitute financial advice. Always invest at your own risk. Sources: ∙ E24 – Attack on Ras Laffan: https://e24.no/internasjonal-oekonomi/i/QJM0jP/angrep-ved-det-enorme-lng-anlegget-ras-laffan-i-qatar-omfattende-skade ∙ Al Jazeera – QatarEnergy halts LNG production: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/qatarenergy-worlds-largest-lng-firm-halts-production-after-iran-attacks ∙ OilPrice.com – Qatar’s LNG Blackout: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Qatars-LNG-Blackout-Just-Broke-the-Global-Gas-Market.html ∙ Fortune – Qatar’s energy minister warns: https://fortune.com/2026/03/06/qatar-lng-halts-exports-iran-conflict-facility-shuttered/ ∙ OilPrice.com – Asia’s LNG Lifeline: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Asias-LNG-Lifeline-Takes-a-Hit.html ∙ BlackRock – BGF World Energy Fund A2: https://www.blackrock.com/uk/individual/products/229918/blackrock-world-energy-a2-usd-fund
- ·1 päivä sittenBGF World Energy and Equinor: Who profits most from the Iran conflict – and why the Permian Basin is the market's safety valve Energy markets are in strong imbalance after the latest escalation in the Middle East. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is not physically blocked, but high risk, increased insurance costs, and attacks on ships have significantly reduced the flow. The result is a strong supply shock in an already tight oil market. For Norwegian investors, there are two main ways to get exposure: directly through Equinor, or via the BGF World Energy Fund, which gathers some of the world's largest energy companies. Equinor: price winner in the European gas market Equinor is a key supplier of pipeline gas to Europe and holds a unique position when the LNG market is characterized by disruptions. A significant portion of global LNG exports normally passes through Hormuz – when this flow is disrupted, the value of alternative deliveries increases. The upside is nevertheless primarily price-driven: the company has limited capacity to increase production in the short term. BGF World Energy: exposure to global winners BGF World Energy Fund provides broader exposure. Among the most important positions, we find Chevron and ExxonMobil, heavily exposed to the Permian Basin, ConocoPhillips with high oil price sensitivity, Shell and TotalEnergies with global LNG reach, and Canadian producers with low geopolitical risk. Common to several is that they operate far from the conflict zone. Permian Basin: the market's safety valve The most important distinction is about flexibility. The Permian Basin can quickly adjust production according to price – and thus functions as a safety valve in the global market. Here lies an interesting paradox: the companies that profit most from high prices simultaneously help to dampen them in the long run. Who profits most? In the short term, much points towards Equinor, which gets a direct effect from higher energy prices in Europe. In the longer term, the picture may tip towards Chevron and ExxonMobil, where flexible production in Permian makes it possible to exploit high prices and increase volumes. The winner depends on the time horizon: Equinor is the price winner – the volume engine is in the USA. This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Kilder: https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/03/17/iran-war-europes-corporate-winners-and-losers-revealedhttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/equinor-sees-little-space-to-lift-gas-output-to-ease-war-impacthttps://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/middle-east-war-gas-energy-lng-drone-qatar-strait-hormuz-price-shock.htmlhttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-6-the-permian-fortress-chevron-surges-23-as-us-onshore-assets-shield-investors-from-middle-east-conflicthttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-18-global-energy-markets-in-turmoil-as-strait-of-hormuz-closure-sends-oil-toward-120https://www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261647438-iran-war-hormuz-oil-price-surge-us-energy-stocks-tradingkeyhttps://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Shell-and-TotalEnergies-Issue-Force-Majeure-After-Qatar-LNG-Shut-Down.htmlhttps://www.blackrock.com/fi/individual/products/229673/blackrock-world-energy-fund-a2-fund Discussion: Equinor primarily profits from higher prices, while American companies can increase production and simultaneously help to dampen the price increase. Which model do you think will provide the best return going forward?
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- ·8 t sittenTherefore, the oil price will not return to $60–70 — even if the war ends Much of the market commentary this week is about daily price fluctuations: Brent above $119 intraday, back to $108 at closing time after Netanyahu's statements about the opening of Hormuz. But the focus on short-term movements overshadows a more important question — namely where the bottom of oil prices now lies, regardless of the conflict's development. The answer, according to a number of leading analysts, is that we will not see $60–70 again for a very long time. Before the war started on February 28, Brent traded in precisely that range — around $69 per barrel. J.P. Morgan then had a bearish base scenario of $60 as the average price for 2026, justified by oversupplied global supply. That scenario is now fundamentally changed, and not just because Hormuz is closed. The critical insight comes from Rystad Energy and Societe Generale, both of whom point out that Middle Eastern production is not just temporarily affected by logistics — it is in the process of shutting in. Iraq and Kuwait have already cut production because storage capacity in the Gulf is full. UAE is the next candidate, according to Societe Generale's analysts. Amir Zaman, head of Americas commercial team at Rystad, emphasizes that fields that are shut down can take «days, weeks or months» to reopen to normal levels — even after the conflict itself is over. Dan Pickering, founder and CIO of Pickering Energy Partners, formulates it precisely: «We are moving from a supply chain problem to potentially a supply problem. There is a big difference. You solve supply chain problems quickly. If you change the ability to produce, that's something else.» To this, CSIS and the World Economic Forum add a structural point: The IEA's historic emergency release of 400 million barrels — the largest ever — represents barely four days of global consumption, and less than three weeks of normal throughput through Hormuz. Emergency reserves buy time, they do not solve the deficit. Even among the most optimistic voices, such as Sasha Foss at Marex, the conclusion is that «even with de-escalation, it is unlikely that prices will return to the $60–70 range seen earlier this year.» Paul Gooden, head of global natural resources at Ninety One, shares this assessment: even in a scenario where tensions subside in the coming weeks, prices will remain structurally higher than the initial level. For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy A2, this means that the downside risk of a quick peace agreement is more limited than many might fear. It is not $65 Brent that awaits on the other side — it is a market that has had its geopolitical risk model permanently rewritten. The question is no longer whether we return to the old price level, but where the new structural floor is located. Discussion question: Do you think the market is pricing in a permanent new price floor for Brent, or are investors still underestimating how quickly production normalization can occur after the opening of Hormuz? This post is written for informational purposes and is not to be considered investment advice. Investments in funds involve risk, and historical returns are no guarantee of future returns. Sources: ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.html ∙ https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/09/oil-prices-iran-war-middle-east-us-israel-strait-of-hormuz.html ∙ https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/15/strategic-oil-release-may-calm-markets-but-cannot-fix-hormuz-disruption ∙ https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/03/the-global-price-tag-of-war-in-the-middle-east ∙ https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-iran-war-mean-global-energy-markets
- ·22 t sitten · MuokattuEnergy infrastructure is the main target — and that changes everything What has long been an informal boundary in the Middle East conflict may now have been breached. According to several international media outlets, Israel carried out an airstrike on March 18 against South Pars, the world's largest natural gas field. The same evening, Iran responded with a ballistic missile attack against Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar, the world's largest LNG export facility. Several missiles were intercepted, but one is said to have hit the facility and caused significant damage. This points to more than an escalation. It could be a strategic turning point. Researcher Hamidreza Azizi at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that the conflict has now entered a phase where energy infrastructure is a primary target. The attack on South Pars strikes at the core of Iran's economy, while Iran's response can be interpreted as an attempt to regionalize the conflict and simultaneously globalize the consequences through energy markets. Markets reacted immediately. Brent rose sharply at the opening in Asia, European gas prices jumped, and Asian stock markets fell. Dagens Næringsliv describes the situation as a possible worst-case scenario for the gas market, with increasing concern for supply security and price volatility. The ripple effects are already visible. Iraq reports a halt in Iranian gas deliveries, threatening the power supply. In Abu Dhabi, the Habshan facility was temporarily shut down after incidents related to downed missiles. At the same time, the risk in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing, where around 20 percent of the world's seaborne oil trade passes. Harsh signals are also coming from the American side. Donald Trump has warned of strong retaliations if energy infrastructure in the region is further attacked. For investors, this could mark a regime change. We are moving away from a market where geopolitical risk is primarily priced into the margins, to a market where production capacity itself is at stake. BGF World Energy Fund is exposed to integrated energy companies across production, transport, and processing. In the short term, higher prices support earnings. At the same time, the risk of lasting disruptions in supply chains, higher insurance premiums, and delays in new investment projects increases. There are particularly three factors the market must now price in: Firstly: increased probability of direct attacks on critical energy infrastructure, which could lead to persistent supply shocks. Secondly: higher capital costs and insurance premiums in the Gulf, which could slow new capacity over time. Thirdly: a more lasting geopolitical risk premium in both oil and gas markets, not as a temporary factor, but as a structural component. The question, therefore, is not just what is happening now, but what this means in the longer term. If energy infrastructure becomes a legitimate target in interstate conflicts, it could change the investment dynamics in the energy sector in the years to come and contribute to a higher and more volatile price level. ⸻ This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Sources: https://www.dn.no/utenriks/iran/usa/energipanikk-etter-iransk-angrep-pa-gigant-det-gassmarkedet-frykter-mest/2-1-1962356https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/19/oil-jumps-iran-strikes-qatar-lng-facility-supply-worries.htmlhttps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/qatar-says-iran-missile-attack-sparks-fire-causes-damage-at-gas-facilityhttps://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-israel-united-states-attacks-9.7132837https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890393
- ·1 päivä sittenHouthi rebels can join in — and that can change everything The war between Iran and USA/Israel has until now primarily played out in the airspace over the Persian Gulf and at the energy facilities along the Gulf. But there is one actor who has not yet been fully unleashed: Yemen's Houthi rebels. DNB Carnegie's energy analyst Helge André Martinsen points today to a scenario that many energy investors should note: if Iran wishes to escalate further and block the redirection of shipping traffic from the Red Sea, we could start to see drone attacks from the Houthis, who until now have stayed on the sidelines. This is not a hypothetical scenario — it is a logical consequence of the escalation dynamic we already see. Iran's attack on Ras Laffan has already inflicted «extensive damage» on the enormous LNG complex in Qatar,  and QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on all LNG deliveries — which in practice removed 20 percent of the world's LNG supply from the market overnight.  For the first time in modern history, both of the Middle East's major maritime corridors are blocked simultaneously. The Red Sea route to Europe is already operating at less than half of normal capacity, while the Strait of Hormuz — which transports 20 percent of the world's daily oil supply — is effectively closed.  If the Houthis now actively enter the conflict with drone attacks against shipping traffic in the Red Sea and against energy infrastructure along the Arabian Peninsula, this will put further pressure on an already strained global energy market. Oil and gas are traded today as if the market is pricing in more unrest, not less — the oil price has risen sharply and is now trading above 107 dollars a barrel,  and European gas prices jumped almost 50 percent after QatarEnergy's operational halt.  For investors in energy funds like BGF World Energy, this is a double-edged picture: higher energy prices provide increased revenues for producers, but escalated conflict also increases the risk of supply disruptions that can affect the very basis of operations. It is no longer just geopolitical background noise — it is core risk. The question the market is now asking itself: will the Houthis be held back by Iran as a diplomatic card, or will they be unleashed as an escalation tool if the USA and Israel increase the pressure further? This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Make your own assessments before any investment decisions. Source: E24 – Attack at Ras Laffan | Al Jazeera | Bloomberg What do you think — will the Houthis escalate, or will Iran hold them back as a bargaining chip?·17 t sittenHow many drones do the Houthis have? Are we talking about 50, or several thousand?·16 t sittenThe Houthi arsenal and Hormuz: When cheap drones threaten the world's most expensive oil route It is easy to underestimate the Houthis. A poor rebel movement from Yemen's mountainous regions, without an airbase, without a navy of significance — and yet they have succeeded in crippling some of the world's most important energy infrastructure for over two years. The question many are now asking is: what happens when the same Iran-backed drone technologies encounter an even narrower and more vulnerable route than the Red Sea? The Houthis do not have 50 drones. According to available analyses from organizations like GTTAC, the group alone carried out 388 documented drone attacks between 2018 and 2024, and the pace has accelerated significantly since then. They operate a growing arsenal of at least eight drone models — from the Qasef-family kamikaze drones to the long-range Sammad-3 models with a range of over 1 500 km, the latter used in the attack on Tel Aviv in 2024. In addition, they use Iranian Shahed 136 drones, identical to those Russia uses in Ukraine. The drones are partly imported from Iran and partly assembled from local and commercial components — which makes their stockpiles much harder to deplete through air strikes alone. The Americans have bombed over 30 Houthi targets in March 2025 alone, without the frequency of attacks decreasing notably. This is the background for why the Houthis are now relevant again — not only in the Red Sea, but as an actor in a broader escalation dynamic around Hormuz. Since the American and Israeli operation against Iran on 28 February 2026, when, among others, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, the Houthis have resumed attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is formally Iran's domain, not the Houthis' — but the combination of IRGC drones, mine risk, anti-ship missiles, and Houthi attacks further south creates a combined logistics threat profile of historical dimensions. Around 20 percent of the world's daily oil consumption passes through Hormuz, and about 31 percent of all seaborne crude oil. Insurance premiums for tankers have multiplied since the conflict broke out, and several major shipping companies have suspended transit. Analyst Alessio Patalano at King’s College London points out that the navies' capacity depth is a fraction of what it was in the 1980s — the last time tanker escort in Hormuz was tested in combat. Lloyd’s List Intelligence chief Richard Meade estimates that a basic escort operation would require between eight and ten destroyers to protect a convoy of five to ten ships per transit, which at best could restore about ten percent of normal traffic. Even Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, now offers contributions in the form of cheap interception drones and battlefield experience from three years of Russian Shahed attacks. The strategic picture is thus the following: the Houthis were a proof-of-concept that a non-state actor environment with Iranian backing can use mass-produced, inexpensive drones to drive insurance premiums sky-high, force shipping companies to Cape of Good Hope detours, and tie up Western naval forces over time. Iran possesses a far more advanced variant of the same arsenal — and controls both shores of the narrowest point in the world's most important energy corridor. Geopolitical risk has not been higher since the tanker war in the 1980s, and the oil market still does not fully price in a scenario where Hormuz remains effectively closed for months rather than weeks. Discussion question: Do you think the West has the military capacity and political will to keep Hormuz open in the long term — or are we already in a period where geopolitical risk premium will be structurally repriced into the energy market? Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. The author has an exposure to the energy sector through BGF World Energy A2. All investment involves risk of loss. Sources: Orion Policy Institute – The Houthi Drone Supply Chain (2025) https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain/ Wikipedia – 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis CNBC – Strait of Hormuz closure: which countries will be hit the most (March 2026) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/strait-of-hormuz-closure-which-countries-will-be-hit-the-most.html CNN / Lloyd’s List Intelligence – Hormuz naval escort analysis (March 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/16/middleeast/hormuz-strait-us-navy-escorts-analysis-intl-hnk-ml Military.com / AP – Iran war has blocked the Strait of Hormuz (March 2026) https://www.military.com/daily-news/2026/03/11/iran-war-has-blocked-strait-of-hormuz-vital-oil-chokepoint-reopening-it-big-challenge.html Fox News – NATO heavyweights balk at Hormuz mission (March 2026) https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nato-heavyweights-balk-hormuz-mission-trump-warns-alliance-risk
- 1 päivä sitten1 päivä sittenRas Laffan in Flames – and BGF World Energy Is About Far More Than Oil On 18 March 2026, QatarEnergy confirmed that Ras Laffan Industrial City – the world’s largest LNG export facility – had been struck by Iranian drones for the second time. The attack came hours after a fresh Iranian strike on the South Pars gas field, and Iran has now published a target list explicitly naming energy installations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This is no longer an escalation on the periphery of energy markets. It is a direct strike on the architecture of global energy infrastructure. As early as 2 March, QatarEnergy suspended all LNG production following the first Iranian drone strikes on Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial City. The facility alone accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the world’s total LNG exports. The market’s response was immediate: European wholesale gas prices rose by more than 50 per cent on the day – the sharpest single-session move since the energy crisis of 2022. Asian LNG prices jumped by nearly 40 per cent. Brent crude is now trading above $107 per barrel. Qatar’s energy minister has made clear that restarting production could take weeks to months, even if hostilities were to cease today. Analysts at Energy Intelligence estimate a minimum outage of four to six weeks. At least eight LNG tankers have already been diverted, and Asian importers – Japan, South Korea, and China among them – are now competing openly with European buyers for spot cargoes on global markets. The United States stands to benefit in the near term, with demand for American LNG rising sharply. For an investor in BGF World Energy A2, this landscape is of direct relevance. The fund invests at least 70 per cent of its assets globally in equities of companies engaged in the exploration, development, production, and distribution of energy, using the MSCI World Energy Index as its reference benchmark. A sustained supply crisis of this magnitude provides structural tailwinds for large integrated oil majors, American LNG producers such as Cheniere Energy, and offshore services companies benefiting from elevated capacity pricing. BGF World Energy A2 is positioned to capture precisely this kind of repricing of risk across the global energy system. What is unfolding in the Gulf is not a transient price spike. It is a fundamental rewriting of what energy security costs. Ras Laffan was constructed as a cornerstone of international LNG trade. When that cornerstone is shaken, it is not merely gas that gets repriced – the entire infrastructure value chain around fossil energy absorbs a geopolitical risk premium not seen since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Discussion question: Do you believe energy markets have already priced in a prolonged production outage in Qatar, or is the market still underestimating the duration of this conflict? This represents personal analysis and does not constitute financial advice. Always invest at your own risk. Sources: ∙ E24 – Attack on Ras Laffan: https://e24.no/internasjonal-oekonomi/i/QJM0jP/angrep-ved-det-enorme-lng-anlegget-ras-laffan-i-qatar-omfattende-skade ∙ Al Jazeera – QatarEnergy halts LNG production: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/qatarenergy-worlds-largest-lng-firm-halts-production-after-iran-attacks ∙ OilPrice.com – Qatar’s LNG Blackout: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Qatars-LNG-Blackout-Just-Broke-the-Global-Gas-Market.html ∙ Fortune – Qatar’s energy minister warns: https://fortune.com/2026/03/06/qatar-lng-halts-exports-iran-conflict-facility-shuttered/ ∙ OilPrice.com – Asia’s LNG Lifeline: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Asias-LNG-Lifeline-Takes-a-Hit.html ∙ BlackRock – BGF World Energy Fund A2: https://www.blackrock.com/uk/individual/products/229918/blackrock-world-energy-a2-usd-fund
- ·1 päivä sittenBGF World Energy and Equinor: Who profits most from the Iran conflict – and why the Permian Basin is the market's safety valve Energy markets are in strong imbalance after the latest escalation in the Middle East. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is not physically blocked, but high risk, increased insurance costs, and attacks on ships have significantly reduced the flow. The result is a strong supply shock in an already tight oil market. For Norwegian investors, there are two main ways to get exposure: directly through Equinor, or via the BGF World Energy Fund, which gathers some of the world's largest energy companies. Equinor: price winner in the European gas market Equinor is a key supplier of pipeline gas to Europe and holds a unique position when the LNG market is characterized by disruptions. A significant portion of global LNG exports normally passes through Hormuz – when this flow is disrupted, the value of alternative deliveries increases. The upside is nevertheless primarily price-driven: the company has limited capacity to increase production in the short term. BGF World Energy: exposure to global winners BGF World Energy Fund provides broader exposure. Among the most important positions, we find Chevron and ExxonMobil, heavily exposed to the Permian Basin, ConocoPhillips with high oil price sensitivity, Shell and TotalEnergies with global LNG reach, and Canadian producers with low geopolitical risk. Common to several is that they operate far from the conflict zone. Permian Basin: the market's safety valve The most important distinction is about flexibility. The Permian Basin can quickly adjust production according to price – and thus functions as a safety valve in the global market. Here lies an interesting paradox: the companies that profit most from high prices simultaneously help to dampen them in the long run. Who profits most? In the short term, much points towards Equinor, which gets a direct effect from higher energy prices in Europe. In the longer term, the picture may tip towards Chevron and ExxonMobil, where flexible production in Permian makes it possible to exploit high prices and increase volumes. The winner depends on the time horizon: Equinor is the price winner – the volume engine is in the USA. This is personal analysis and not financial advice. Kilder: https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/03/17/iran-war-europes-corporate-winners-and-losers-revealedhttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-12/equinor-sees-little-space-to-lift-gas-output-to-ease-war-impacthttps://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/03/middle-east-war-gas-energy-lng-drone-qatar-strait-hormuz-price-shock.htmlhttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-6-the-permian-fortress-chevron-surges-23-as-us-onshore-assets-shield-investors-from-middle-east-conflicthttps://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-18-global-energy-markets-in-turmoil-as-strait-of-hormuz-closure-sends-oil-toward-120https://www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261647438-iran-war-hormuz-oil-price-surge-us-energy-stocks-tradingkeyhttps://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Shell-and-TotalEnergies-Issue-Force-Majeure-After-Qatar-LNG-Shut-Down.htmlhttps://www.blackrock.com/fi/individual/products/229673/blackrock-world-energy-fund-a2-fund Discussion: Equinor primarily profits from higher prices, while American companies can increase production and simultaneously help to dampen the price increase. Which model do you think will provide the best return going forward?
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