2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 505 | - | - | ||
| 622 | - | - | ||
| 1 805 | - | - | ||
| 5 070 | - | - | ||
| 450 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 5 468 738 | 5 468 738 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 5 468 738 | 5 468 738 | 0 | 0 |
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·2 t sittenAI has helped formulate the text Analysis of Oncopeptides after the news about earlier treatment lines The new information about use in earlier treatment lines could be one of the most important fundamental changes in the case since Pepaxti was re-established in Europe. Historically, the market has largely viewed Pepaxti as a niche drug for late-relapsed multiple myeloma, with a limited patient population and uncertain commercial potential after the FDA issues. This has significantly suppressed the valuation and effectively led the market to value the company as a high-risk case with limited upside. What is now changing is the potential scale. The signaling from the webcast that earlier treatment lines could mean an additional approximately 1.5 billion SEK in addressable market makes the case look completely different. If Pepaxti gains a foothold earlier in the treatment chain, it is no longer about a narrow “last-line” drug, but potentially about a significantly broader and more established treatment within multiple myeloma. In oncology, earlier treatment lines are often dramatically more valuable than late lines. The patient population is larger, treatment times are longer, and adoption can become broader if the data is strong. This also provides better commercial quality and greater long-term sales potential. If one combines: * current opportunity in late-line myeloma * the potential in earlier lines * continued European expansion * possible additional geographies * future label expansions a scenario around 3 billion SEK or more in peaksales begins to appear realistic rather than speculative. This is a level where specialty pharma and oncology companies have historically often been valued at many times higher levels than Oncopeptides today. A company with several billions in sales, good margins, and patent protection could, in a mature commercial stage, potentially justify a market capitalization far above today's levels, especially if growth is still strong. The interesting aspect is therefore the asymmetry in the case. The market still values the company as if: * commercialization may fail * adoption will be limited * capital requirements continue to be large * clinical potential is uncertain But if sales start to accelerate and earlier lines are clinically validated, the narrative can change quickly. The biotech market often tends to ignore potential until clear evidence emerges — and thereafter the revaluation happens very abruptly. Another important component that many probably do not value at all today is the optionality in glioblastoma. Glioblastoma is one of the most aggressive and difficult-to-treat cancer areas, where the need for new treatments is enormous and where even limited progress can create great medical and commercial value. If Oncopeptides were to show meaningful activity there in the long term, it could open up an entirely new value track outside of multiple myeloma. It is important to understand that glioblastoma currently likely has a very low probability priced in by the market. But precisely because of this, it acts as a form of free optionality in the case: * the market pays almost nothing for the opportunity today * but the outcome can be very valuable if the data develops positively This means that the case is not just about Pepaxti's current use, but also about the possibility that the platform or substance could gain broader relevance over time. At the same time, the risks remain significant: * regulatory risks persist * commercialization must be proven * the sales curve must improve * additional capital may be needed * clinical data must continue to be strengthened But if the company succeeds in demonstrating: * accelerating sales * stronger adoption in Europe * success in earlier treatment lines * continued clinical expansion * and potential optionality in new indications like glioblastoma then today's valuation may retrospectively appear extremely low relative to the long-term potential. What it could mean for the valuation If the market starts to believe in a realistic scenario with: * approximately 3 bn SEK peaksales * good commercial execution * reasonable margin profile * continued patent protection then it is not uncommon for specialty pharma/oncology companies to be valued at: * 4–8x sales or * 15–25x operating profit This could correspond to approximately - see image. ⚠️ Not financial advice.- ·6 t sittenSince HealthCap has board representation in Oncopeptides, they are normally covered by the EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). This means that persons discharging managerial responsibilities (including board members and closely associated persons) are generally not allowed to trade in the company's shares during a so-called "closed period" of 30 calendar days before an interim report or year-end report. Buying shares two days before the report would therefore normally: * be prohibited during the closed period, and * only be possible if there is a very specific exception approved by the company (which is unusual and requires special reasons). So the starting point is that they cannot trade so close to the report if they are covered by the insider/PDMR rules.·6 t sittenA larger rise might come on Wednesday?·2 t sittenI believe that HealthCap can clear the order book to approximately 1.55, upon a neutral to positive Q1 report on Wednesday. Please read the post - "HealthCap - tactical capital strategy"
·7 t sitten · MuokattuThat the day before a report comes with news ? how should one interpret it ? is it positive, or is it a way to push up the price to cover the bad report coming the next day, many ? who knows, it might be a good report after all·6 t sittenI don't believe there are any conspiracy theories behind the decision to release the news before the report on Wednesday – for example, to hide weak Q1 results. The webcast had a positive tone and provided a rational explanation for the decision. Furthermore, the guidance for 2027 remains firm, which also argues against it being about trying to divert focus from the report.- ·9 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.
- ·23 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·23 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·23 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
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2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Uutiset
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- ·2 t sittenAI has helped formulate the text Analysis of Oncopeptides after the news about earlier treatment lines The new information about use in earlier treatment lines could be one of the most important fundamental changes in the case since Pepaxti was re-established in Europe. Historically, the market has largely viewed Pepaxti as a niche drug for late-relapsed multiple myeloma, with a limited patient population and uncertain commercial potential after the FDA issues. This has significantly suppressed the valuation and effectively led the market to value the company as a high-risk case with limited upside. What is now changing is the potential scale. The signaling from the webcast that earlier treatment lines could mean an additional approximately 1.5 billion SEK in addressable market makes the case look completely different. If Pepaxti gains a foothold earlier in the treatment chain, it is no longer about a narrow “last-line” drug, but potentially about a significantly broader and more established treatment within multiple myeloma. In oncology, earlier treatment lines are often dramatically more valuable than late lines. The patient population is larger, treatment times are longer, and adoption can become broader if the data is strong. This also provides better commercial quality and greater long-term sales potential. If one combines: * current opportunity in late-line myeloma * the potential in earlier lines * continued European expansion * possible additional geographies * future label expansions a scenario around 3 billion SEK or more in peaksales begins to appear realistic rather than speculative. This is a level where specialty pharma and oncology companies have historically often been valued at many times higher levels than Oncopeptides today. A company with several billions in sales, good margins, and patent protection could, in a mature commercial stage, potentially justify a market capitalization far above today's levels, especially if growth is still strong. The interesting aspect is therefore the asymmetry in the case. The market still values the company as if: * commercialization may fail * adoption will be limited * capital requirements continue to be large * clinical potential is uncertain But if sales start to accelerate and earlier lines are clinically validated, the narrative can change quickly. The biotech market often tends to ignore potential until clear evidence emerges — and thereafter the revaluation happens very abruptly. Another important component that many probably do not value at all today is the optionality in glioblastoma. Glioblastoma is one of the most aggressive and difficult-to-treat cancer areas, where the need for new treatments is enormous and where even limited progress can create great medical and commercial value. If Oncopeptides were to show meaningful activity there in the long term, it could open up an entirely new value track outside of multiple myeloma. It is important to understand that glioblastoma currently likely has a very low probability priced in by the market. But precisely because of this, it acts as a form of free optionality in the case: * the market pays almost nothing for the opportunity today * but the outcome can be very valuable if the data develops positively This means that the case is not just about Pepaxti's current use, but also about the possibility that the platform or substance could gain broader relevance over time. At the same time, the risks remain significant: * regulatory risks persist * commercialization must be proven * the sales curve must improve * additional capital may be needed * clinical data must continue to be strengthened But if the company succeeds in demonstrating: * accelerating sales * stronger adoption in Europe * success in earlier treatment lines * continued clinical expansion * and potential optionality in new indications like glioblastoma then today's valuation may retrospectively appear extremely low relative to the long-term potential. What it could mean for the valuation If the market starts to believe in a realistic scenario with: * approximately 3 bn SEK peaksales * good commercial execution * reasonable margin profile * continued patent protection then it is not uncommon for specialty pharma/oncology companies to be valued at: * 4–8x sales or * 15–25x operating profit This could correspond to approximately - see image. ⚠️ Not financial advice.
- ·6 t sittenSince HealthCap has board representation in Oncopeptides, they are normally covered by the EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). This means that persons discharging managerial responsibilities (including board members and closely associated persons) are generally not allowed to trade in the company's shares during a so-called "closed period" of 30 calendar days before an interim report or year-end report. Buying shares two days before the report would therefore normally: * be prohibited during the closed period, and * only be possible if there is a very specific exception approved by the company (which is unusual and requires special reasons). So the starting point is that they cannot trade so close to the report if they are covered by the insider/PDMR rules.·6 t sittenA larger rise might come on Wednesday?·2 t sittenI believe that HealthCap can clear the order book to approximately 1.55, upon a neutral to positive Q1 report on Wednesday. Please read the post - "HealthCap - tactical capital strategy"
- ·7 t sitten · MuokattuThat the day before a report comes with news ? how should one interpret it ? is it positive, or is it a way to push up the price to cover the bad report coming the next day, many ? who knows, it might be a good report after all·6 t sittenI don't believe there are any conspiracy theories behind the decision to release the news before the report on Wednesday – for example, to hide weak Q1 results. The webcast had a positive tone and provided a rational explanation for the decision. Furthermore, the guidance for 2027 remains firm, which also argues against it being about trying to divert focus from the report.
- ·9 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.
- ·23 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·23 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·23 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 505 | - | - | ||
| 622 | - | - | ||
| 1 805 | - | - | ||
| 5 070 | - | - | ||
| 450 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 5 468 738 | 5 468 738 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 5 468 738 | 5 468 738 | 0 | 0 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
Foorumi
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- ·2 t sittenAI has helped formulate the text Analysis of Oncopeptides after the news about earlier treatment lines The new information about use in earlier treatment lines could be one of the most important fundamental changes in the case since Pepaxti was re-established in Europe. Historically, the market has largely viewed Pepaxti as a niche drug for late-relapsed multiple myeloma, with a limited patient population and uncertain commercial potential after the FDA issues. This has significantly suppressed the valuation and effectively led the market to value the company as a high-risk case with limited upside. What is now changing is the potential scale. The signaling from the webcast that earlier treatment lines could mean an additional approximately 1.5 billion SEK in addressable market makes the case look completely different. If Pepaxti gains a foothold earlier in the treatment chain, it is no longer about a narrow “last-line” drug, but potentially about a significantly broader and more established treatment within multiple myeloma. In oncology, earlier treatment lines are often dramatically more valuable than late lines. The patient population is larger, treatment times are longer, and adoption can become broader if the data is strong. This also provides better commercial quality and greater long-term sales potential. If one combines: * current opportunity in late-line myeloma * the potential in earlier lines * continued European expansion * possible additional geographies * future label expansions a scenario around 3 billion SEK or more in peaksales begins to appear realistic rather than speculative. This is a level where specialty pharma and oncology companies have historically often been valued at many times higher levels than Oncopeptides today. A company with several billions in sales, good margins, and patent protection could, in a mature commercial stage, potentially justify a market capitalization far above today's levels, especially if growth is still strong. The interesting aspect is therefore the asymmetry in the case. The market still values the company as if: * commercialization may fail * adoption will be limited * capital requirements continue to be large * clinical potential is uncertain But if sales start to accelerate and earlier lines are clinically validated, the narrative can change quickly. The biotech market often tends to ignore potential until clear evidence emerges — and thereafter the revaluation happens very abruptly. Another important component that many probably do not value at all today is the optionality in glioblastoma. Glioblastoma is one of the most aggressive and difficult-to-treat cancer areas, where the need for new treatments is enormous and where even limited progress can create great medical and commercial value. If Oncopeptides were to show meaningful activity there in the long term, it could open up an entirely new value track outside of multiple myeloma. It is important to understand that glioblastoma currently likely has a very low probability priced in by the market. But precisely because of this, it acts as a form of free optionality in the case: * the market pays almost nothing for the opportunity today * but the outcome can be very valuable if the data develops positively This means that the case is not just about Pepaxti's current use, but also about the possibility that the platform or substance could gain broader relevance over time. At the same time, the risks remain significant: * regulatory risks persist * commercialization must be proven * the sales curve must improve * additional capital may be needed * clinical data must continue to be strengthened But if the company succeeds in demonstrating: * accelerating sales * stronger adoption in Europe * success in earlier treatment lines * continued clinical expansion * and potential optionality in new indications like glioblastoma then today's valuation may retrospectively appear extremely low relative to the long-term potential. What it could mean for the valuation If the market starts to believe in a realistic scenario with: * approximately 3 bn SEK peaksales * good commercial execution * reasonable margin profile * continued patent protection then it is not uncommon for specialty pharma/oncology companies to be valued at: * 4–8x sales or * 15–25x operating profit This could correspond to approximately - see image. ⚠️ Not financial advice.
- ·6 t sittenSince HealthCap has board representation in Oncopeptides, they are normally covered by the EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). This means that persons discharging managerial responsibilities (including board members and closely associated persons) are generally not allowed to trade in the company's shares during a so-called "closed period" of 30 calendar days before an interim report or year-end report. Buying shares two days before the report would therefore normally: * be prohibited during the closed period, and * only be possible if there is a very specific exception approved by the company (which is unusual and requires special reasons). So the starting point is that they cannot trade so close to the report if they are covered by the insider/PDMR rules.·6 t sittenA larger rise might come on Wednesday?·2 t sittenI believe that HealthCap can clear the order book to approximately 1.55, upon a neutral to positive Q1 report on Wednesday. Please read the post - "HealthCap - tactical capital strategy"
- ·7 t sitten · MuokattuThat the day before a report comes with news ? how should one interpret it ? is it positive, or is it a way to push up the price to cover the bad report coming the next day, many ? who knows, it might be a good report after all·6 t sittenI don't believe there are any conspiracy theories behind the decision to release the news before the report on Wednesday – for example, to hide weak Q1 results. The webcast had a positive tone and provided a rational explanation for the decision. Furthermore, the guidance for 2027 remains firm, which also argues against it being about trying to divert focus from the report.
- ·9 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.
- ·23 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·23 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·23 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
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