2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | - | - | ||
| 5 935 | - | - | ||
| 9 461 | - | - | ||
| 300 | - | - | ||
| 7 517 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 3 696 647 | 3 696 647 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 3 696 647 | 3 696 647 | 0 | 0 |
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Foorumi
Liity keskusteluun Nordnet Socialissa
Kirjaudu
·2 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.- ·16 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·16 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·16 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
- ·1 päivä sittenHealthCap - tactical capital strategy Investor Analysis: HealthCap VI and shareholder behavior in Oncopeptides Oncopeptides is in a transition phase where the company is still financed as a development/turnaround case, but at the same time has a commercial product that is starting to generate more structural cash flow expectations. In this situation, the actions of the main shareholders in the 2026 issue become particularly important, especially HealthCap VI and HealthCap VIII. ⸻ 1. HealthCap VI: limited visible issue participation Public information shows that: * HealthCap VIII had clear subscription commitments in the issue. * HealthCap VI is not mentioned as an active issue-supporting party. If HealthCap VI had participated fully pro rata, they could have increased their holding by approximately 7.7 million shares, which would have raised their position to just over 23 million shares. This is not visible in available information. This leads to possible interpretations: Possible scenarios * They completely refrained from subscribing. * They chose not to use the issue as a tool and instead potentially buy shares on the market later. ⸻ 2. Possible tactical capital strategy In small and medium-sized biotech companies, it is not uncommon for larger shareholders to: 1. Participate limitedly in issues when the price is not perceived as optimal. 2. Await important catalysts (e.g., Q1/Q2 reports). 3. Increase exposure in the secondary market if developments confirm the case. This can provide several advantages: * better entry price than the issue price, * greater flexibility in positioning, * opportunity to act after new information rather than before. Since the liquidity in the stock is relatively low, even moderate purchases from institutions can have a significant price impact. ⸻ 3. The flagging pattern: active but selective ownership This is important because it signals that: * the ownership base is still active, * and that the stock is used in more dynamic positioning strategies (not passive long-term ownership). Typical drivers behind such flagging patterns are: * arbitrage linked to issues, * positioning before reports, * market making and liquidity management, * or gradual re-accumulation after capital events. ⸻ 4. Why this is logical in Oncopeptides The company is in an unusual hybrid situation: Operationally: * Product exists and is commercialized. * Sales are growing but are not yet fully stable. Financially: * Cash flow is still negative. * The capital market remains central for financing. Market-wise: * Expectations are divided: between turnaround and continued risk financing. This means that larger shareholders can choose to: * not overexpose themselves in issues, * but instead await commercial confirmation before increasing their stake. ⸻ 5. What the market still discounts That the stock trades below the issue price indicates that the market is still concerned about: * sustainable sales growth, * cash flow profile and burn rate, * potential future capital needs, * and commercial scalability. In practice, the company is still valued more as: a financing case than a stable specialty pharma company. ⸻ 6. Overall interpretation of shareholder behavior HealthCap VI's position can be interpreted in two ways: A. Cautious/neutral interpretation * Capital discipline. * Waiting for a better risk/return profile. * Selective participation in issues. B. Tactical/bullish interpretation * Awaits Q1/Q2 to reduce uncertainty. * Buys later on the market at a weak price. * Optimizes average price rather than locking up capital in an issue. The flagging pattern supports that: * the owners are not abandoning the case, * but rather repositioning themselves. ⸻ 7. Important future signals Bullish signals: 🔥 * increasing net ownership from institutions after reports, * improved sales trend, * reduced cash burn, * partnerships (e.g., Japan), * reduced reliance on issues. Bearish signals: 💀 * continued weak price despite operational improvement, * further capital raising within 12–18 months, * lack of growth acceleration, * decreased institutional interest.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
- ·2 päivää sittenInvestor Analysis: Oncopeptides – from 6 billion in financing to a market capitalization of 500 Mkr Executive summary Oncopeptides is a clear example of the biotech sector's extreme asymmetry. The company has historically raised approximately: * ~6 billion SEK in capital, but is valued today at approximately: * ~0.5 billion SEK. This means that the market has practically re-evaluated: * the probability of commercial success, * the pipeline value, * and the future cash flow potential very sharply downwards. At the same time, the annual report and regulatory development show that the company is not only trying to commercialize: Pepaxti, but also restructuring its intellectual assets through: Oncopeptides Innovation AB and building further on the PDC platform, including within glioblastoma. This makes the investment case unusually binary: the market today primarily prices in survival and financing risk, while the optionality in the platform largely appears to be discounted away.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
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2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Uutiset
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Kirjaudu
- ·2 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.
- ·16 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·16 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·16 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
- ·1 päivä sittenHealthCap - tactical capital strategy Investor Analysis: HealthCap VI and shareholder behavior in Oncopeptides Oncopeptides is in a transition phase where the company is still financed as a development/turnaround case, but at the same time has a commercial product that is starting to generate more structural cash flow expectations. In this situation, the actions of the main shareholders in the 2026 issue become particularly important, especially HealthCap VI and HealthCap VIII. ⸻ 1. HealthCap VI: limited visible issue participation Public information shows that: * HealthCap VIII had clear subscription commitments in the issue. * HealthCap VI is not mentioned as an active issue-supporting party. If HealthCap VI had participated fully pro rata, they could have increased their holding by approximately 7.7 million shares, which would have raised their position to just over 23 million shares. This is not visible in available information. This leads to possible interpretations: Possible scenarios * They completely refrained from subscribing. * They chose not to use the issue as a tool and instead potentially buy shares on the market later. ⸻ 2. Possible tactical capital strategy In small and medium-sized biotech companies, it is not uncommon for larger shareholders to: 1. Participate limitedly in issues when the price is not perceived as optimal. 2. Await important catalysts (e.g., Q1/Q2 reports). 3. Increase exposure in the secondary market if developments confirm the case. This can provide several advantages: * better entry price than the issue price, * greater flexibility in positioning, * opportunity to act after new information rather than before. Since the liquidity in the stock is relatively low, even moderate purchases from institutions can have a significant price impact. ⸻ 3. The flagging pattern: active but selective ownership This is important because it signals that: * the ownership base is still active, * and that the stock is used in more dynamic positioning strategies (not passive long-term ownership). Typical drivers behind such flagging patterns are: * arbitrage linked to issues, * positioning before reports, * market making and liquidity management, * or gradual re-accumulation after capital events. ⸻ 4. Why this is logical in Oncopeptides The company is in an unusual hybrid situation: Operationally: * Product exists and is commercialized. * Sales are growing but are not yet fully stable. Financially: * Cash flow is still negative. * The capital market remains central for financing. Market-wise: * Expectations are divided: between turnaround and continued risk financing. This means that larger shareholders can choose to: * not overexpose themselves in issues, * but instead await commercial confirmation before increasing their stake. ⸻ 5. What the market still discounts That the stock trades below the issue price indicates that the market is still concerned about: * sustainable sales growth, * cash flow profile and burn rate, * potential future capital needs, * and commercial scalability. In practice, the company is still valued more as: a financing case than a stable specialty pharma company. ⸻ 6. Overall interpretation of shareholder behavior HealthCap VI's position can be interpreted in two ways: A. Cautious/neutral interpretation * Capital discipline. * Waiting for a better risk/return profile. * Selective participation in issues. B. Tactical/bullish interpretation * Awaits Q1/Q2 to reduce uncertainty. * Buys later on the market at a weak price. * Optimizes average price rather than locking up capital in an issue. The flagging pattern supports that: * the owners are not abandoning the case, * but rather repositioning themselves. ⸻ 7. Important future signals Bullish signals: 🔥 * increasing net ownership from institutions after reports, * improved sales trend, * reduced cash burn, * partnerships (e.g., Japan), * reduced reliance on issues. Bearish signals: 💀 * continued weak price despite operational improvement, * further capital raising within 12–18 months, * lack of growth acceleration, * decreased institutional interest.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
- ·2 päivää sittenInvestor Analysis: Oncopeptides – from 6 billion in financing to a market capitalization of 500 Mkr Executive summary Oncopeptides is a clear example of the biotech sector's extreme asymmetry. The company has historically raised approximately: * ~6 billion SEK in capital, but is valued today at approximately: * ~0.5 billion SEK. This means that the market has practically re-evaluated: * the probability of commercial success, * the pipeline value, * and the future cash flow potential very sharply downwards. At the same time, the annual report and regulatory development show that the company is not only trying to commercialize: Pepaxti, but also restructuring its intellectual assets through: Oncopeptides Innovation AB and building further on the PDC platform, including within glioblastoma. This makes the investment case unusually binary: the market today primarily prices in survival and financing risk, while the optionality in the platform largely appears to be discounted away.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
Yllä olevat kommentit ovat peräisin Nordnetin sosiaalisen verkoston Nordnet Socialin käyttäjiltä, eikä niitä ole muokattu eikä Nordnet ole tarkastanut niitä etukäteen. Ne eivät tarkoita, että Nordnet tarjoaisi sijoitusneuvoja tai sijoitussuosituksia. Nordnet ei ota vastuuta kommenteista.
Tarjoustasot
Nasdaq Stockholm
Määrä
Osto
-
Myynti
Määrä
-
Viimeisimmät kaupat
| Aika | Hinta | Määrä | Ostaja | Myyjä |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | - | - | ||
| 5 935 | - | - | ||
| 9 461 | - | - | ||
| 300 | - | - | ||
| 7 517 | - | - |
Välittäjätilasto
Ostaneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 3 696 647 | 3 696 647 | 0 | 0 |
Myyneet eniten
| Välittäjä | Ostettu | Myyty | Netto | Sisäinen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonyymi | 3 696 647 | 3 696 647 | 0 | 0 |
Asiakkaat katsoivat myös
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti
81 päivää sitten
‧46 min
Uutiset
Tämän sivun uutiset ja/tai sijoitussuositukset tai otteet niistä sekä niihin liittyvät linkit ovat mainitun tahon tuottamia ja toimittamia. Nordnet ei ole osallistunut materiaalin laatimiseen, eikä ole tarkistanut sen sisältöä tai tehnyt sisältöön muutoksia. Lue lisää sijoitussuosituksista.
Yhtiötapahtumat
Datan lähde: FactSet, Quartr| Seuraava tapahtuma | |
|---|---|
2026 Q1 -tulosraportti 13.5. | 2 päivää |
| Menneet tapahtumat | ||
|---|---|---|
2025 Q4 -tulosraportti 19.2. | ||
2025 Q3 -tulosraportti 5.11.2025 | ||
2025 Q2 -tulosraportti 21.8.2025 | ||
2025 Q1 -tulosraportti 15.5.2025 | ||
2024 Q4 -tulosraportti 27.2.2025 |
Foorumi
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- ·2 t sittenAnalysis - today's press release AI has helped formulate the text Analysis: Why Oncopeptides now again wants to expand Pepaxti to the third line It is important to understand that Oncopeptides was not previously stopped by the EMA when the company tried to broaden Pepaxti's European indication. On the contrary, the EMA's scientific committee CHMP actually gave a positive opinion in 2023 to expand the use from patients with at least three prior lines of treatment to patients with at least two prior lines of treatment, based on the OCEAN study. Shortly thereafter, however, Oncopeptides itself chose to withdraw the process for the broader indication. The decision to withdraw the application then seems to have been primarily strategic and commercial. The company likely assessed that earlier lines of treatment had become too competitive, especially as CAR-T therapies and bispecific antibodies rapidly gained ground in multiple myeloma. At the same time, Pepaxti was considered to have the greatest medical value in late-stage treated patients where alternatives were fewer and the need greater. Now the situation seems to have changed. The most likely scenario is that Oncopeptides today assesses that the European market has become more receptive to Pepaxti and that the company has built up sufficient clinical and commercial experience to expand its use. After several years of use in Europe, doctors have gained greater experience of which patients benefit most from the treatment and how the drug can be used more effectively in clinical everyday practice. It is also clear that the company has now chosen a more selective strategy than before. It is not seeking a very broad earlier-line indication but is focusing specifically on the third line. This appears to be a conscious attempt to find a balance between market potential and competition level. The third line is attractive because the patient population is significantly larger than in today's late-stage indication, while competition is still less intense than in the second line where the largest pharmaceutical companies are investing very aggressively. Many patients in the third line are also not optimal candidates for advanced cell therapy or need treatment faster than some more complex therapies can be offered. Another important factor is that the regulatory risk is likely perceived as relatively low. Since CHMP had already previously recommended a broader indication, the company knows that European regulators have fundamentally accepted large parts of the clinical evidence behind Pepaxti. The new application therefore does not start from a regulatory "zero position," which likely makes the process less risky than the market previously perceived. Real-world data may also have influenced the decision. When drugs are used in routine clinical practice, it often becomes clearer which patient groups respond best and how side effects can be managed better through experience and selection. If Oncopeptides today sees stronger outcomes in certain patient groups than what first emerged in the OCEAN study, it strengthens the arguments for earlier use. At the same time, the economic driving force can hardly be ignored. The current indication severely limits the market. For a smaller biotech company like Oncopeptides, the opportunity to increase the treatable patient population is likely central to long-term sales growth, financing, and strategic value. An expansion to the third line could significantly improve the company's commercial potential and simultaneously strengthen its position vis-à-vis investors and potential partners. In summary, much suggests that Oncopeptides now believes that the balance between risk and opportunity has changed. Previously, the company prioritized minimizing uncertainty and focusing on a narrow late-line niche. Today, it seems to instead see an opportunity to expand more controllably, where the third line offers an attractive combination of medical need, manageable competition, and significantly greater commercial potential.
- ·16 t sittenJapan close? 💰📈 AI has helped formulate the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analyses. May 11, 2026 is an important day for Daiichi Sankyo as the company will present both FY2025 results and a new five-year plan (2026–2030). Such days often contain strategic and pipeline-related announcements. The same week, on May 13, Oncopeptides will also hold its quarterly presentation, which makes the week extra interesting from a broader hematology and cancer perspective. The connection between Daiichi Sankyo and Oncopeptides primarily lies in the technology. * Oncopeptides develops melflufen, a PDC (peptide–drug conjugate). * Daiichi Sankyo is a leader in ADC (antibody–drug conjugates). Both are based on the same basic idea: to deliver potent cytotoxic drugs selectively to cancer cells (“targeted cytotoxic delivery”). They also operate within the same overarching cancer area, particularly hematology and multiple myeloma (MM). MM is seen as attractive for next-generation targeted therapies because the disease has clear target antigens and is well-suited for ADC-, PDC-, CAR-T- and bispecific strategies. Daiichi Sankyo does not yet have an established MM-franchise, but their ADC platform could biologically fit the area well. Therefore, there is a reasonable strategic logic for the company to eventually expand into MM. Melflufen could potentially also be used as “bridge therapy” in the MM landscape in Japan and thus serve as an opportunistic addition to a future MM-franchise. https://www.daiichisankyo.com/investors/library/quarterly_result/·16 t sittenSame drug principle: “targeted cytotoxic delivery” * Melflufen (from Oncopeptides) is a peptide–drug conjugate (PDC) that delivers an alkylating cytotoxic payload (melphalan) into cancer cells. * Daiichi Sankyo is a world leader in antibody–drug conjugates (ADC) where antibodies deliver cytotoxic “payloads” (e.g., topoisomerase inhibitors like DXd). 👉 The connection: Both work with the same modern cancer strategy: “smart transport molecules + potent cytotoxic payload” ⸻ 🧪 Same competition and development area (hematology & cancer) * Melflufen was developed for multiple myeloma * Daiichi Sankyo develops several ADC programs within: * hematological cancers * solid tumors 👉 This means that: * They are not partners in melflufen * But they are direct technological neighbors/competitors in next-generation cancer drugs ⸻ 🔬 Indirect industry connection via the ADC/PDC ecosystem There is a broad connection in the industry: * Oncopeptides → PDC (peptide-drug conjugate) * Daiichi Sankyo → ADC (antibody-drug conjugate) Both technologies: * try to improve the therapeutic index * reduce systemic toxicity * deliver cytotoxic substances selectively to tumors 👉 Melflufen is often mentioned in the same research discussions as ADC platforms, because the mechanism is “same idea, different transport system”.·16 t sitten1. Daiichi Sankyo is already an ADC leader Daiichi Sankyo has built its entire modern oncology strategy around the ADC platform (DXd technology), where their most well-known programs are, for example: * HER2-targeted ADCs (e.g., trastuzumab deruxtecan / DS-8201) * several solid tumor indications * strong expansion via partnerships (e.g., with AstraZeneca) The important thing is: they are actively looking for more “target spaces” where ADC works. MM is one such candidate. ⸻ 2. Why MM is attractive for ADC development Multiple myeloma is almost “built” for modern targeted therapy: * B-cell maturation antigens (e.g., BCMA, GPRC5D, CD38) * high cell turnover → good for cytotoxic payloads * clear tumor-specific surface (bone marrow) This means MM already has: * CAR-T (BCMA) * bispecific antibodies * and now ADC-like strategies in development So from an industry perspective, MM is a “next logical step”. ⸻ 3. ADC competition in MM is still not “saturated” This is important for companies like Daiichi Sankyo: * CAR-T and bispecific antibodies dominate the headlines * but ADC in MM is still a relatively “early field” * there is still room for differentiation (efficacy, toxicity, convenience) This is exactly the kind of niche an ADC company wants to enter. ⸻ 4. Their technology suits MM biologically Daiichi Sankyo's ADC platform (DXd payload) is designed for: * strong cell internalization * potent topoisomerase I-killing * “bystander effect” (can kill even when antigen expression is heterogeneous) This is relevant in MM where: * antigen expression can vary * clonal evolution is a problem ⸻ 5. But: they are not “in MM yet” for real Important to be realistic: * Daiichi Sankyo has no established MM franchise today * their ADC portfolio is primarily in solid tumors * MM would require: * new target validation * bone marrow penetration * safety profile adaptation
- ·1 päivä sittenHealthCap - tactical capital strategy Investor Analysis: HealthCap VI and shareholder behavior in Oncopeptides Oncopeptides is in a transition phase where the company is still financed as a development/turnaround case, but at the same time has a commercial product that is starting to generate more structural cash flow expectations. In this situation, the actions of the main shareholders in the 2026 issue become particularly important, especially HealthCap VI and HealthCap VIII. ⸻ 1. HealthCap VI: limited visible issue participation Public information shows that: * HealthCap VIII had clear subscription commitments in the issue. * HealthCap VI is not mentioned as an active issue-supporting party. If HealthCap VI had participated fully pro rata, they could have increased their holding by approximately 7.7 million shares, which would have raised their position to just over 23 million shares. This is not visible in available information. This leads to possible interpretations: Possible scenarios * They completely refrained from subscribing. * They chose not to use the issue as a tool and instead potentially buy shares on the market later. ⸻ 2. Possible tactical capital strategy In small and medium-sized biotech companies, it is not uncommon for larger shareholders to: 1. Participate limitedly in issues when the price is not perceived as optimal. 2. Await important catalysts (e.g., Q1/Q2 reports). 3. Increase exposure in the secondary market if developments confirm the case. This can provide several advantages: * better entry price than the issue price, * greater flexibility in positioning, * opportunity to act after new information rather than before. Since the liquidity in the stock is relatively low, even moderate purchases from institutions can have a significant price impact. ⸻ 3. The flagging pattern: active but selective ownership This is important because it signals that: * the ownership base is still active, * and that the stock is used in more dynamic positioning strategies (not passive long-term ownership). Typical drivers behind such flagging patterns are: * arbitrage linked to issues, * positioning before reports, * market making and liquidity management, * or gradual re-accumulation after capital events. ⸻ 4. Why this is logical in Oncopeptides The company is in an unusual hybrid situation: Operationally: * Product exists and is commercialized. * Sales are growing but are not yet fully stable. Financially: * Cash flow is still negative. * The capital market remains central for financing. Market-wise: * Expectations are divided: between turnaround and continued risk financing. This means that larger shareholders can choose to: * not overexpose themselves in issues, * but instead await commercial confirmation before increasing their stake. ⸻ 5. What the market still discounts That the stock trades below the issue price indicates that the market is still concerned about: * sustainable sales growth, * cash flow profile and burn rate, * potential future capital needs, * and commercial scalability. In practice, the company is still valued more as: a financing case than a stable specialty pharma company. ⸻ 6. Overall interpretation of shareholder behavior HealthCap VI's position can be interpreted in two ways: A. Cautious/neutral interpretation * Capital discipline. * Waiting for a better risk/return profile. * Selective participation in issues. B. Tactical/bullish interpretation * Awaits Q1/Q2 to reduce uncertainty. * Buys later on the market at a weak price. * Optimizes average price rather than locking up capital in an issue. The flagging pattern supports that: * the owners are not abandoning the case, * but rather repositioning themselves. ⸻ 7. Important future signals Bullish signals: 🔥 * increasing net ownership from institutions after reports, * improved sales trend, * reduced cash burn, * partnerships (e.g., Japan), * reduced reliance on issues. Bearish signals: 💀 * continued weak price despite operational improvement, * further capital raising within 12–18 months, * lack of growth acceleration, * decreased institutional interest.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
- ·2 päivää sittenInvestor Analysis: Oncopeptides – from 6 billion in financing to a market capitalization of 500 Mkr Executive summary Oncopeptides is a clear example of the biotech sector's extreme asymmetry. The company has historically raised approximately: * ~6 billion SEK in capital, but is valued today at approximately: * ~0.5 billion SEK. This means that the market has practically re-evaluated: * the probability of commercial success, * the pipeline value, * and the future cash flow potential very sharply downwards. At the same time, the annual report and regulatory development show that the company is not only trying to commercialize: Pepaxti, but also restructuring its intellectual assets through: Oncopeptides Innovation AB and building further on the PDC platform, including within glioblastoma. This makes the investment case unusually binary: the market today primarily prices in survival and financing risk, while the optionality in the platform largely appears to be discounted away.·1 päivä sittenAI has helped with the formulation of the text, but the content is based on my own thoughts and analysis. It has primarily been used to develop and clarify what I myself have identified.
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